Kant's Contribution to Moral Epistemology

PARADIGMI ◽  
2012 ◽  
pp. 69-77
Author(s):  
Carla Bagnoli
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Ontological Commitments ◽  
First Order

This paper argues that the most innovative aspect of Kant's ethical theory is not afirst-order normative ethics, even though the importance and long-lasting mark ofKant's ethics of autonomy cannot be questioned. Rather, it consists in a constructivistaccount of moral cognition. This claim may be perplexing in more than one way, sinceconstructivism is often characterized both as a first-order account of moral judgmentsand as a retreat from epistemological and ontological commitments. This characterizationis misleading in general, and mistaken for Kant's constructivism in particular.Kant's constructivism is a methodological claim about the authority and productivefunction of reason and an epistemological claim about the nature of moral cognitions.

Fichte's Ethics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Kosch
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Basic Research ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Rational Agency ◽  
First Order ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Philosophy Of Right ◽  
Direct Guidance

This book offers a systematic, historically informed reconstruction of Fichte’s ethical theory of the Jena period, highlighting that theory’s very substantial potential for contribution to various contemporary debates. One of Fichte’s most important ideas—that nature can place limits on our ability to govern ourselves, and that anyone who values autonomy is thereby committed to the value of basic research and of the development of autonomy-enhancing technologies—has received little attention in the interpretative literature on Fichte, and has little currency in contemporary ethics. This book is an effort to address both deficits. Beginning from a reconstruction of Fichte’s theory of rational agency, it examines his arguments for the thesis that rational agency so understood must have two constitutive ends: substantive and formal independence. It argues for a novel interpretation of Fichte’s conception of substantive independence, and shows how Fichte’s account of moral duties is derived from the end of substantive independence on that conception. It also argues for a novel interpretation of Fichte’s conception of formal independence, and explains why the usual understanding of this end as providing direct guidance for action must be mistaken. It encompasses a systematic reconstruction of Fichte’s first-order claims in normative ethics and the philosophy of right.

Not Sufficiently Neutral?

2019 ◽  
pp. 147-158
Author(s):  
Richard Rowland
Keyword(s):  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Jonathan Dancy ◽  
First Order ◽  
Buck Passing

Jonathan Dancy, Ulrike Heuer, Jonas Olson, and others have argued that there is reason to reject the buck-passing account of value (BPA) because of its implications for first-order normative ethics. Dancy argues that BPA is inconsistent with certain deontological views. Olson argues that BPA is inconsistent with an attractive way of distinguishing between consequentialism and deontology. Heuer argues that it begs the question against Williams’s internalism about reasons. This chapter argues that Dancy, Olson, and Heuer are mistaken. Others claim that certain versions of BPA are inconsistent with a consequentialist view about the reasons for pro-attitudes there are. This chapter argues that even global consequentialism should not involve a consequentialist view about the reasons for pro-attitudes that there are and because of this it is not a problem for BPA that it is inconsistent with a consequentialist view of the reasons for pro-attitudes that there are.

Butler's Theory of Moral Judgment

1978 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 199-225
Author(s):  
Roger A. Shiner
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Main Interest

It is something of a commonplace of Butlerian interpretation that the main interest and achievements of Butler's moral philosophy are in normative ethics, and not metaethics. He wishes to bring moral enlightenment to citizens and not, to philosophers, epistemological enlightenment. Nonetheless for that he makes a number of remarks which, if we were collecting for some bizarre purpose metaethical forms of words, we would note down and include in our collection. Thus he makes some progress towards the development of a moral epistemology, a theory of moral judgment. My purpose here is to assess those steps, and to see how far the structure which results can be called a theory. I have the impression that much of the reluctance among scholars to allow that Butler does have a theory of moral judgment is caused by the metaethical blinkers that they themselves wear; what is in fact the beginnings of an unfashionable and unconventional theory is seen as unsophisticated confusion. But I shall not overdo praise of Butler. I shall suggest that Aristotle does a somewhat better job of developing this type of theory.

A Dictionary of Ethics

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terence Cuneo
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Applied Ethics ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Key Terms

This authoritative dictionary contains clear, concise definitions of key terms from ethical theory and touches upon a variety of relevant subfields including metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. A Dictionary of Ethics is a valuable reference resource for academics, practitioners, and students of moral philosophy, applied ethics, and public policy. It will also be of interest to readers looking to familiarize themselves with ethical terms and the concepts they express.

scholarly journals Ethical Theories as Methods of Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 247-269
Author(s):  
Jussi Suikkanen
Keyword(s):  
Theory Choice ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Moral Inquiry ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
First Order ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
Ways Of Thinking

This chapter presents a new argument for thinking of traditional ethical theories not as criteria of rightness and wrongness, but rather as methods that can be used in first-order moral inquiry. It begins from outlining how ethical theories such as consequentialism and contractualism are flexible frameworks in which different versions of these theories can be formulated to correspond to different first-order ethical views. This chapter then argues that, as a result, the traditional ethical theories cannot be evaluated in terms of their truth or correctness. Instead, it suggests that these theories should be understood as providing different kinds of ways of thinking about difficult moral problems. Finally, the chapter recommends a certain kind of an attitude of pragmatic pluralism as something that should guide our theory choice in normative ethics—it may well be that different moral problems are better approached through different ethical theories.

scholarly journals Right-Making, Reference, and Reduction

Disputatio ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (39) ◽  
pp. 139-145
Author(s):  
Michael Byron
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Causal Theory ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Descriptive Property ◽  
Reference Relation ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

Abstract The causal theory of reference (CTR) provides a well-articulated and widely-accepted account of the reference relation. On CTR the reference of a term is fixed by whatever property causally regulates the competent use of that term. CTR poses a metaethical challenge to realists by demanding an account of the properties that regulate the competent use of normative predicates. CTR might pose a challenge to ethical theorists as well. Long (2012) argues that CTR entails the falsity of any normative ethical theory. First-order theory attempts to specify what purely descriptive property is a fundamental right-making property (FRM). Long contends that the notion that the FRM causally regulates competent use of the predicate ‘right’ leads to a reductio. The failure of this argument is nevertheless instructive concerning a point at which ethics and metaethics overlap.

The Ethics of the Anselmian Being II (Respect)

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark C. Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
William Rowe

Prior formulations of the problem of evil, for example, by J. L. Mackie, William Rowe, and Paul Draper, assume that God must have requiring reasons to prevent evils to creatures, and use that assumption as the basis for claiming that the existence (or types, or amount, or distribution) of evils in this world is either incompatible with or gives strong prima facie evidence against the existence of God. But given that God’s reasons with respect to preventing evils are justifying, not requiring, reasons, no such arguments can get off the ground. This account, which is based on a first-order theory of divine ethics, differs from skeptical theism, which is based on moral epistemology. This difference makes the account developed here immune from the most serious criticisms that have made trouble for skeptical theism.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Timmons
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
New Work ◽  
Moral Choice ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Desire Satisfaction ◽  
Choice Under Uncertainty ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics brings together new work on various dimensions of normative ethical theory. This seventh volume features thirteen chapters dealing with practical reasoning, Bernard Williams’s ‘one thought too many’ complaint about impartial ethical theories, the concept of moral right, the wrongness of lying, moral choice under uncertainty, the notion of subjective obligation, commendatory reasons, desire satisfaction and time, a challenge to contractualism, the nature of creditworthiness, partiality toward oneself, the relation between virtue and action, and monism versus pluralism about non-derivative value....

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Timmons
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
New Work ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Evaluative Beliefs ◽  
Moral Advice ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics features new work in the field of normative ethical theory. This eighth volume features chapters which collectively address the following topics: the irreplaceable value of human beings, interpersonal morality and conceptions of welfare, what it is for something to be good for an animal (including humans), the relation between good will and right action, moral advice and joint agency, moral responsibility and wrongdoing, the basis of equality, the role of needs claims in ethical theory, threshold conceptions of deontology, prudential reasons, the significance of evaluative beliefs, and Stoic conceptions of insults....

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