Normative ethics: Nagel's hybrid ethical theory

Thomas Nagel ◽  
2013 ◽  
pp. 163-206
Author(s):  
Alan Thomas
PARADIGMI ◽  
2012 ◽  
pp. 69-77
Author(s):  
Carla Bagnoli

This paper argues that the most innovative aspect of Kant's ethical theory is not afirst-order normative ethics, even though the importance and long-lasting mark ofKant's ethics of autonomy cannot be questioned. Rather, it consists in a constructivistaccount of moral cognition. This claim may be perplexing in more than one way, sinceconstructivism is often characterized both as a first-order account of moral judgmentsand as a retreat from epistemological and ontological commitments. This characterizationis misleading in general, and mistaken for Kant's constructivism in particular.Kant's constructivism is a methodological claim about the authority and productivefunction of reason and an epistemological claim about the nature of moral cognitions.


Author(s):  
Terence Cuneo

This authoritative dictionary contains clear, concise definitions of key terms from ethical theory and touches upon a variety of relevant subfields including metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. A Dictionary of Ethics is a valuable reference resource for academics, practitioners, and students of moral philosophy, applied ethics, and public policy. It will also be of interest to readers looking to familiarize themselves with ethical terms and the concepts they express.


Author(s):  
Mark Timmons

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics brings together new work on various dimensions of normative ethical theory. This seventh volume features thirteen chapters dealing with practical reasoning, Bernard Williams’s ‘one thought too many’ complaint about impartial ethical theories, the concept of moral right, the wrongness of lying, moral choice under uncertainty, the notion of subjective obligation, commendatory reasons, desire satisfaction and time, a challenge to contractualism, the nature of creditworthiness, partiality toward oneself, the relation between virtue and action, and monism versus pluralism about non-derivative value....


Author(s):  
Michelle Kosch

This book offers a systematic, historically informed reconstruction of Fichte’s ethical theory of the Jena period, highlighting that theory’s very substantial potential for contribution to various contemporary debates. One of Fichte’s most important ideas—that nature can place limits on our ability to govern ourselves, and that anyone who values autonomy is thereby committed to the value of basic research and of the development of autonomy-enhancing technologies—has received little attention in the interpretative literature on Fichte, and has little currency in contemporary ethics. This book is an effort to address both deficits. Beginning from a reconstruction of Fichte’s theory of rational agency, it examines his arguments for the thesis that rational agency so understood must have two constitutive ends: substantive and formal independence. It argues for a novel interpretation of Fichte’s conception of substantive independence, and shows how Fichte’s account of moral duties is derived from the end of substantive independence on that conception. It also argues for a novel interpretation of Fichte’s conception of formal independence, and explains why the usual understanding of this end as providing direct guidance for action must be mistaken. It encompasses a systematic reconstruction of Fichte’s first-order claims in normative ethics and the philosophy of right.


Author(s):  
Mark Timmons

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics features new work in the field of normative ethical theory. This eighth volume features chapters which collectively address the following topics: the irreplaceable value of human beings, interpersonal morality and conceptions of welfare, what it is for something to be good for an animal (including humans), the relation between good will and right action, moral advice and joint agency, moral responsibility and wrongdoing, the basis of equality, the role of needs claims in ethical theory, threshold conceptions of deontology, prudential reasons, the significance of evaluative beliefs, and Stoic conceptions of insults....


2014 ◽  
Vol 62 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Héctor Wittwer

AbstractThe fact that the topic of emergency situations has been neglected almost completely by ethical theory raises the question why normative ethics has had so little to say about extreme situations so far. One can assume that this disinterest is not due to the rarity of emergency situations but rather to their peculiar properties. All ethical theories rest on the premise that moral agents make the most of their decisions under normal circumstances. The aim of the paper is to answer the question whether or not normative ethics is able to adequately evaluate emergency situations. In order to do this, different types of extreme situations must be distinguished. It is argued that, on the one hand, self-defence and agreements by which all the participants refrain from certain of their rights in order to enable some of them to survive are morally unproblematic. On the other hand, there are emergency situations that do not allow for a solution which would be morally acceptable to all of the involved persons. Hence, morality itself can be unacceptable under extreme circumstances.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 604-612
Author(s):  
Jon Rueda

AbstractThe neuroscience of ethics is allegedly having a double impact. First, it is transforming the view of human morality through the discovery of the neurobiological underpinnings that influence moral behavior. Second, some neuroscientific findings are radically challenging traditional views on normative ethics. Both claims have some truth but are also overstated. In this article, the author shows that they can be understood together, although with different caveats, under the label of “neurofoundationalism.” Whereas the neuroscientific picture of human morality is undoubtedly valuable if we avoid neuroessentialistic portraits, the empirical disruption of normative ethics seems less plausible. The neuroscience of morality, however, is providing relevant evidence that any empirically informed ethical theory needs to critically consider. Although neuroethics is not going to bridge the is–ought divide, it may establish certain facts that require us to rethink the way we achieve our ethical aspirations.


Etyka ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 139-158
Author(s):  
John Ladd

This paper is concerned with the interrelationship between ethical analysis (metaethics) and normative ethics. It is argued that the two cannot be divorced logically and that their separation explains in large part why analytical ethical theory has so little of relevance to say to live moral issues. Two of the bases of the prevailing logical separation of the inquiries are examined critically: first, a de jure basis in which the separation is defended on theoretical grounds, e.g. by intuitionists, emotivists and prescriptivists, and second, a de facto basis in which we find a separation in practice that results from using analytical techniques borrowed from other areas in philosophy (viz. epistemology) that are inappropriate for ethics, e.g. by ordinary language philosophers. The prevailing conception of ethical analysis is criticized on the grounds that both the pre-analytical data and the aims of ethical analysis are sui generis and not to be compared to the data and aims of the other kinds of logical analysis. Problems like ethical relativism, moral dilemmas and akrasia cannot be analysed separately, but are part of the given logical and conceptual analysis of ethics.


2021 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 35-49
Author(s):  
Jarosław Kucharski

The role of ethicists is to provide a genuine ethical theory to help non-ethicists interpret and solve moral dilemmas, to define what is right or wrong, and, finally, to clarify moral values. Therefore, ethicists are taught to address morality with rational procedures, to set aside their moral intuitions and emotions. Sometimes, professional ethicists are prone to falling into the archangel delusion – the belief that they are beyond the influence of their own emotions. This can lead to ousting moral intuitions from the space of ethical reflection, thus making ethicists unaware of them. They may treat intuitive beliefs about morality as an expression of primal moral feelings. The main question pursued in this article, is how those feelings may influence moral theories, which should be developed by professional ethicists. Ethicists may provide an ethical theory which is merely a rationalisation and justification for their own suppressed moral emotions, rather than the effect of genuine, rational moral reasoning. To help ethicists cope with this delusion, a model of cooperation between descriptive and normative ethics is proposed. Ethicists should therefore use the research tools of descriptive ethics to determine their own intuitions, and the moral emotions in which these intuitions are grounded. --------------- Received: 09/06/2021. Reviewed: 23/07/2021. Accepted: 13/08/2021.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document