scholarly journals Ethical Theories as Methods of Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 247-269
Author(s):  
Jussi Suikkanen
Keyword(s):  
Theory Choice ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Moral Inquiry ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
First Order ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
Ways Of Thinking

This chapter presents a new argument for thinking of traditional ethical theories not as criteria of rightness and wrongness, but rather as methods that can be used in first-order moral inquiry. It begins from outlining how ethical theories such as consequentialism and contractualism are flexible frameworks in which different versions of these theories can be formulated to correspond to different first-order ethical views. This chapter then argues that, as a result, the traditional ethical theories cannot be evaluated in terms of their truth or correctness. Instead, it suggests that these theories should be understood as providing different kinds of ways of thinking about difficult moral problems. Finally, the chapter recommends a certain kind of an attitude of pragmatic pluralism as something that should guide our theory choice in normative ethics—it may well be that different moral problems are better approached through different ethical theories.

Meta-Ethics Naturalized

1980 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 637-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Zimmerman
Keyword(s):  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Rational Basis ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
First Order ◽  
Current Climate ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
English Speaking ◽  
English Speaking World ◽  
The Way

Meta-ethics without normative ethics is empty. In the current climate this hardly needs emphasis: since 1960 or so philosophers in the English-speaking world have put away their earlier reluctance to think about substantive moral issues. For a while, in fact, it seemed that normative ethics would completely dominate the scene in the way metaethics once did, but, happily, this situation has begun to change with the appearance of a stimulating and illuminating body of work on the rational basis of morality. Even those philosophers most intent on solving first-order moral problems have begun to realize that, in the last analysis, normative ethics without meta-ethics is blind.

Artificial Identity

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
James DiGiovanna
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Intentional States ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Persistence Conditions ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
Extreme Change ◽  
At Will

Enhancement and AI create moral dilemmas not envisaged in standard ethical theories. Some of this stems from the increased malleability of personal identity that this technology affords: an artificial being can instantly alter its memory, preferences, and moral character. If a self can, at will, jettison essential identity-giving characteristics, how are we to rely upon, befriend, or judge it? Moral problems will stem from the fact that such beings are para-persons: they meet all the standard requirements of personhood (self-awareness, agency, intentional states, second-order desires, etc.) but have an additional ability—the capacity for instant change—that disqualifies them from ordinary personal identity. In order to rescue some responsibility assignments for para-persons, a fine-grained analysis of responsibility-bearing parts of selves and the persistence conditions of these parts is proposed and recommended also for standard persons who undergo extreme change.

Kant's Contribution to Moral Epistemology

PARADIGMI ◽  
2012 ◽  
pp. 69-77
Author(s):  
Carla Bagnoli
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Ontological Commitments ◽  
First Order

This paper argues that the most innovative aspect of Kant's ethical theory is not afirst-order normative ethics, even though the importance and long-lasting mark ofKant's ethics of autonomy cannot be questioned. Rather, it consists in a constructivistaccount of moral cognition. This claim may be perplexing in more than one way, sinceconstructivism is often characterized both as a first-order account of moral judgmentsand as a retreat from epistemological and ontological commitments. This characterizationis misleading in general, and mistaken for Kant's constructivism in particular.Kant's constructivism is a methodological claim about the authority and productivefunction of reason and an epistemological claim about the nature of moral cognitions.

Not Sufficiently Neutral?

2019 ◽  
pp. 147-158
Author(s):  
Richard Rowland
Keyword(s):  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Jonathan Dancy ◽  
First Order ◽  
Buck Passing

Jonathan Dancy, Ulrike Heuer, Jonas Olson, and others have argued that there is reason to reject the buck-passing account of value (BPA) because of its implications for first-order normative ethics. Dancy argues that BPA is inconsistent with certain deontological views. Olson argues that BPA is inconsistent with an attractive way of distinguishing between consequentialism and deontology. Heuer argues that it begs the question against Williams’s internalism about reasons. This chapter argues that Dancy, Olson, and Heuer are mistaken. Others claim that certain versions of BPA are inconsistent with a consequentialist view about the reasons for pro-attitudes there are. This chapter argues that even global consequentialism should not involve a consequentialist view about the reasons for pro-attitudes that there are and because of this it is not a problem for BPA that it is inconsistent with a consequentialist view of the reasons for pro-attitudes that there are.

scholarly journals THE LIMITATIONS OF NORMATIVE ETHICS: ANTHROPOCENTRISM IN KIM STANLEY ROBINSON’S 2312

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (6) ◽  
pp. 1040-1047
Author(s):  
Rajesh K ◽  
Rajasekaran V
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Code Of Ethics ◽  
Research Process ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Quantum Computers ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Utilitarian Approach

Purpose of the study: The present study mainly argues the limitations of normative ethics and analyzes the anthropocentrism in Kim Stanley Robinson’s 2312 based on the actions or duties of the characters. Methodology: The article used normative ethics as a methodology. Normative ethics is the study of ethical actions that has certain rules and regulations about how we ought to do and decide. So, this study has chosen a normative ethic that consists of three ethical theories Utilitarian approach, Kantian ethics and Virtue ethics to judge duties that are right and wrong.   Main Findings: As a result, normative ethics compact with a one-dimensional approach. All three ethics deal with its own specific code of ethics. Utilitarianism has focused on good outcomes. Kantian ethics has paid attention to good rules with duty. Virtue ethics focused on the good people but all three theories have a strong common objective of focusing on only human beings (sentient entities) and omit other entities (plants and animals). So all normative ethics have certain limitations and do their duties without thinking about consequences and situations. In conclusion, this code of normative ethics has provoked as anthropocentric. In addition that Swan’s actions and the rational behavior made her miserably failed in Mercury through the construction of the biome and creation of quantum computers. So this cause, in the end, the space people want to move from space to earth to rebuild the biome. Applications of this study: The prudent study analyses the normative ethics in a detailed manner under the Utilitarian approach, Kantian ethics and Virtue ethics. These philosophical domains can be benefitted for researchers to practice and implement during the research process in Humanities and Social Sciences especially. Novelty/Originality of this study: The study analyzed the anthropocentric attitude of the character Swan in 2312 based on her actions or duties through the code of normative ethics (Utilitarianism, Kantian ethics and Virtue ethics).

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Timmons
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
New Work ◽  
Moral Choice ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Desire Satisfaction ◽  
Choice Under Uncertainty ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics brings together new work on various dimensions of normative ethical theory. This seventh volume features thirteen chapters dealing with practical reasoning, Bernard Williams’s ‘one thought too many’ complaint about impartial ethical theories, the concept of moral right, the wrongness of lying, moral choice under uncertainty, the notion of subjective obligation, commendatory reasons, desire satisfaction and time, a challenge to contractualism, the nature of creditworthiness, partiality toward oneself, the relation between virtue and action, and monism versus pluralism about non-derivative value....

Fichte's Ethics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Kosch
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Basic Research ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Rational Agency ◽  
First Order ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Philosophy Of Right ◽  
Direct Guidance

This book offers a systematic, historically informed reconstruction of Fichte’s ethical theory of the Jena period, highlighting that theory’s very substantial potential for contribution to various contemporary debates. One of Fichte’s most important ideas—that nature can place limits on our ability to govern ourselves, and that anyone who values autonomy is thereby committed to the value of basic research and of the development of autonomy-enhancing technologies—has received little attention in the interpretative literature on Fichte, and has little currency in contemporary ethics. This book is an effort to address both deficits. Beginning from a reconstruction of Fichte’s theory of rational agency, it examines his arguments for the thesis that rational agency so understood must have two constitutive ends: substantive and formal independence. It argues for a novel interpretation of Fichte’s conception of substantive independence, and shows how Fichte’s account of moral duties is derived from the end of substantive independence on that conception. It also argues for a novel interpretation of Fichte’s conception of formal independence, and explains why the usual understanding of this end as providing direct guidance for action must be mistaken. It encompasses a systematic reconstruction of Fichte’s first-order claims in normative ethics and the philosophy of right.

Notsituationen als Herausforderung für die Moralphilosophie

2014 ◽  
Vol 62 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Héctor Wittwer
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Emergency Situations ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The One ◽  
Self Defence

AbstractThe fact that the topic of emergency situations has been neglected almost completely by ethical theory raises the question why normative ethics has had so little to say about extreme situations so far. One can assume that this disinterest is not due to the rarity of emergency situations but rather to their peculiar properties. All ethical theories rest on the premise that moral agents make the most of their decisions under normal circumstances. The aim of the paper is to answer the question whether or not normative ethics is able to adequately evaluate emergency situations. In order to do this, different types of extreme situations must be distinguished. It is argued that, on the one hand, self-defence and agreements by which all the participants refrain from certain of their rights in order to enable some of them to survive are morally unproblematic. On the other hand, there are emergency situations that do not allow for a solution which would be morally acceptable to all of the involved persons. Hence, morality itself can be unacceptable under extreme circumstances.

Social Issues and Moral Scrutiny: Cragg and Narveson

Dialogue ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-290
Author(s):  
Jerome E. Bickenbach
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Capital Punishment ◽  
Social Issues ◽  
Social Ethics ◽  
Applied Ethics ◽  
Biomedical Ethics ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
Ethics Courses

For several years philosophy departments across this continent have offered undergraduate philosophy courses designed to acquaint students with philosophical techniques and fundamental ethical theories in the context of concrete moral problems. These “applied ethics” courses go by various names: “Contemporary Moral Issues”, “Practical Ethics”, “Social Ethics”, “Issues in Applied Ethics”, “Current Moral and Legal Problems”, “Moral Philosophy and Medicine”, “Biomedical Ethics”, and so on. I have taught several versions of applied ethics courses many times and have always enjoyed them. Typically they are popular courses, drawing students from many disciplines and backgrounds, most of whom have never taken philosophy before. The range of possible “applied ethics” topics available is limited only by the instructor's imagination, although there is a fascination for the thanatological—hence the pride of place usually given to discussions of abortion, suicide, euthanasia, world starvation, war, and capital punishment.

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