Coordinating a three level supply chain with multiple retailers

Research Work ◽

The Other ◽

Total Cost ◽

Numerical Examples ◽

Conflicting Interests ◽

Order Quantities ◽

The objective of this research is to highlight the factors that can optimize the total cost of a centralized supply chain through coordination of order quantities amongst the players in a supply chain. Survey of earlier research reveals that players in a supply chain usually have conflicting interests, such as reducing inventories and increasing profitability. Thus, to make coordination feasible, it is essential to provide proper incentives to individual players. Munson and Rosenblatt (2001) were the first to discuss coordination in a three level supply chain with a single player at each level. On the other hand, Viswanathan and Piplani (2001) are believed to be the first to consider cooordination in a two level supply chain with a single vendor and multiple retailers. This research extends upon these works by investigating coordination in a three level supply chain with multiple retailers. This is done by incorporating the model of Viswanathan and Piplani (2001) into that of Munson and Rosenblatt (2001). A new mathematical model is developed, with numerical examples presented and results discussed. When players in a supply chain agree to coordinate, it is possible to have some of the players benefiting more than others in the chain, if not losing. The mathematical model developed in this research work guarantees that the local costs for the players either remain the same as before coordination, or decrease as a result of coordination. Furthermore, this research work assumes that savings generated from coordination should be distributed among the players of the chain. This led to developing a scheme to fairly distribute savings amongst the players of the supply chain. Results indicate that even though players may have conflicting interests in the supply chain, coordination is recommended and should be pursued.

Advances in Business Information Systems and Analytics - Electronic Supply Network Coordination in Intelligent and Dynamic Environments ◽

Supply Chain Coordination under Price Competition

10.4018/978-1-60566-808-6.ch010 ◽

2011 ◽

pp. 226-248

Author(s):

S.P. Sarmah ◽

Santanu Sinha

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Steady State ◽

Price Competition ◽

The Other ◽

Coordination Mechanism ◽

Quantity Discounts ◽

Numerical Examples ◽

Retail Prices ◽

Perfect Channel

This chapter analyzes the coordination and competition issues in a two-stage supply-chain in which a vendor distributes a product to two different retailers who compete on their retail prices in the same market. The demand faced by each retailer not only depends on its own price, but also on the price set by the other retailer. Mathematical models have been developed to analyze the coordination mechanism. It is shown here that perfect channel coordination can be achieved by employing simultaneously quantity discounts, volume discounts and franchise fees. Further, it has been shown that under non-cooperative price competition, the steady state equilibrium is dynamically stable in nature under certain conditions. The model is illustrated with suitable numerical examples.

Supply Chain Decisions of Fresh Products for Competitive Suppliers with Traceability Technology

E3S Web of Conferences ◽

10.1051/e3sconf/202125702072 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 257 ◽

pp. 02072

Author(s):

Qi Zheng ◽

Qian Xiao ◽

Peiting Zhao

Keyword(s):

Mathematical Model ◽

Decision Making ◽

Supply Chain ◽

Technology Adoption ◽

Cost Sharing ◽

Decentralized Decision Making ◽

Fresh Products ◽

The Impact ◽

This paper focuses on the impact of traceability technology adoption on supply chain coordination. We consider a fresh product supply chain consisting of two suppliers and one retailer with centralized and decentralized decision-making. Considering the factors of the tag cost of traceability technology and the freshness of the product, two scenarios-with and without traceability technology are analyzed. The mathematical model is applied to investigate the impact of applying traceability technology on decision-making and profit of supply chain when two suppliers compete. The results show that: (1) the fresh product supply chain with the traceability technology is more profitable than the case that without the traceability technology; (2) when the tag cost of the traceability technology is within the threshold, the supplier’s profit decreases with the increase of the tag cost, and it is always greater than the corresponding profit when comparing with the case that without adopting the traceability technology; (3) if the tag cost of the traceability technology is too high, the retailer can use cost sharing or bargaining with the supplier to encourage him to implement the technology.

Supply Chain Coordination Contracts under Double Sided Disruptions Simultaneously

Mathematical Problems in Engineering ◽

10.1155/2015/812043 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 2015 ◽

pp. 1-9 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Huan Zhang ◽

Yang Liu ◽

Jingsi Huang

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Optimal Price ◽

Supply Chain System ◽

Pricing Policy ◽

Product Cost ◽

Numerical Examples ◽

Supply Chain Contracts ◽

Different Types ◽

Key Factor

Supply chain coordination models are developed in a two-echelon supply chain with double sided disruptions. In a supply chain system, the supplier may suffer from the product cost disruption and the retailer suffers from the demand disruption simultaneously. The purpose of this study is to design proper supply chain contracts, under which the supply chain with double sided disruption can be coordinated. Firstly, the centralized decision-making models are applied to find the optimal price and quantity under three cases as the baseline. The different cases are divided by the different relationship between the product cost disruption and the demand disruption. Secondly, two different types of contracts are introduced to coordinate the whole supply chain. One is all-unit wholesale quantity discount policy (AQDP) contract, and the other one is capacitated linear pricing policy (CLPP) contract. And it is found out that the gap between the demand disruption and the product cost disruption is the key factor to influence the supply chain coordination. Some numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are given to illustrate the models. The AQDP contracts are listed out under different cases to show how to use it under double sided disruptions.

Supply Chain Coordination under Stock- and Price-Dependent Selling Rates under Declining Market

Advances in Operations Research ◽

10.1155/2012/375128 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 2012 ◽

pp. 1-14 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Subrata Saha ◽

Sambhu Das ◽

Manjusri Basu

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Revenue Sharing ◽

Stackelberg Games ◽

Numerical Examples ◽

Revenue Sharing Contract ◽

Demand Rate ◽

Time Price

We explore coordination issues of a two-echelon supply chain, consisting of a distributor and a retailer. The effect of revenue-sharing contract mechanism is examined under stock-time-price-sensitive demand rate. First, we investigate relationships between distributor and retailer under noncooperative distributor-Stackelberg games. Then we establish analytically that revenue sharing contact is able to coordinate the system and leads to the win-win outcomes. Finally, numerical examples are presented to compare results between the different models.

Optimization Control of the Bullwhip Effect in Supply Chain Inventory

Advanced Materials Research ◽

10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.945-949.3187 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 945-949 ◽

pp. 3187-3190

Author(s):

Hai Dong ◽

Jin Hua Liu ◽

Liang Yu Liu

Keyword(s):

Mathematical Model ◽

Supply Chain ◽

Control Theory ◽

Inventory Control ◽

Pid Controller ◽

Bullwhip Effect ◽

Control Gain ◽

Optimization Control ◽

Suitable Combination ◽

The bullwhip effect was caused by fuzzy demand among the enterprises. In order to reduce this effect, control theory was applied to solve the inventory in supply chain. Firstly, inventory control in supply chain and the bullwhip effect was researched. Secondly, a kind of proportional integral differential (PID) controller was developed for inventory control in a three-level supply chain, and the mathematical model of the PID controller for inventory control was presented. Finally, the results show that the PID controller can evidently alleviate the bullwhip effect and inventory fluctuations under the suitable combination of control gain.

Motion Simulation for Triangular-Shaped Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (TAUV) with Controllable Rudder

Journal of Physics Conference Series ◽

10.1088/1742-6596/2107/1/012046 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 2107 (1) ◽

pp. 012046

Author(s):

I Y Amran ◽

K Isa

Keyword(s):

Mathematical Model ◽

Autonomous Underwater Vehicle ◽

Research Work ◽

Underwater Vehicle ◽

Open Loop ◽

Vehicle Speed ◽

Motion Simulation ◽

Loop Control ◽

Angular Velocities ◽

Abstract The dynamic model and motion simulation for a Triangular-Shaped Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (TAUV) with independently controlled rudders are described in this paper. The TAUV is designed for biofouling cleaning in aquaculture cage fishnet. It is buoyant underwater and moves by controlling two thrusters. Hence, in this research work, the authors designed a TAUV that is propelled by two thrusters and maneuvered by using an independently controllable rudder. This paper discussed the development of a mathematical model for the TAUV and its dynamic characteristics. The mathematical model was simulated by using Matlab and Simulink to analyze the TAUV’s motion based on open-loop control of different rudder angles. The position, linear and angular velocities, angle of attack, and underwater vehicle speed are all demonstrated in the findings.

Contracts based on Inventory Cost Share for Supply Chain Coordination

Supply Chain Optimization, Management and Integration ◽

10.4018/978-1-60960-135-5.ch009 ◽

2011 ◽

pp. 126-138 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Alejandra Gomez-Padilla

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

The Other ◽

Inventory Cost ◽

Cost Share ◽

Pricing Scheme ◽

Holding Cost ◽

Inventory Holding Cost ◽

Inventory Holding

In this document it is analyzed the importance of contracts for coordination between two companies in a supply chain. In the studied situation, one company, or supplier, supplies one product to the other company, who is a retailer. The companies are going to coordinate by two types of decisions: economic (concerning prices fixed on a contract), and physical exchange (concerning the inventory to be held). Two types of contracts will be presented: one contract with a simple pricing scheme and two contracts with inventory holding cost shared among the companies of the supply chain. The objective is to show that contracts with inventory holding cost share allow the two companies to efficiently coordinate the chain they form.

Effect of superfused insulin on cerebral cortical glucose utilization in awake goats

AJP Endocrinology and Metabolism ◽

10.1152/ajpendo.1987.253.4.e418 ◽

1987 ◽

Vol 253 (4) ◽

pp. E418-E427

Author(s):

D. A. Pelligrino ◽

D. J. Miletich ◽

R. F. Albrecht

Keyword(s):

Mathematical Model ◽

Cerebrospinal Fluid ◽

Metabolic Regulation ◽

Glucose Utilization ◽

The Other ◽

Insulin Administration ◽

Cortical Tissue ◽

Control Tissue ◽

The Mathematical Model ◽

Test Control

The effect on cortical cerebral glucose utilization (CMRglu) of intracerebral insulin administration in awake goats was studied. The insulin was superfused in a mock cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) solution employing chronically implanted cranial windows. Two windows were implanted bilaterally: one window over an equivalent portion of each parietal cortex. With one window used to deliver insulin/CSF and the other used to simultaneously deliver CSF alone (control), changes in CMRglu were assessed using a modification of a sequential 2-[3H]- then 2-[14C]deoxy-D-glucose (2DG) technique originally described by Altenau and Agranoff (Brain Res. 153: 375-381, 1978). Initial experiments employing 125I-insulin demonstrated that the superfusion procedure increased insulin levels only in the outer 1 mm of cortical tissue exposed to insulin containing perfusate. Additional preliminary evaluations, using conditions known to alter CMRglu, generally established that present methods were adequate to induce and detect CMRglu changes. However, it was also shown experimentally and using a mathematical model that 2-[3H]DG test/control tissue ratios could be influenced by subsequent changes in CMRglu and the dephosphorylation rate. Thus 3H ratios could not be used to establish preexperimental test/control CMRglu relationships as the originally devised model assumed but could be employed to indicate changes in dephosphorylation. The mathematical model allowed for improved estimates of CMRglu changes from 2-[14C]DG/2-[3H]DG test over control tissue ratios. Even with these corrections, insulin was estimated to cause no more than an 8-15% increase in cortical CMRglu. A very limited role for insulin, at least in cerebral cortical metabolic regulation, is thus indicated.

The More Supply Chain Control Power, the Better? A Comparison among Four Kinds of Cooperation Models

Mathematical Problems in Engineering ◽

10.1155/2015/290912 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 2015 ◽

pp. 1-19 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Weihua Liu ◽

Shuqing Wang ◽

Donglei Zhu

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Supply Chain ◽

Wholesale Price ◽

The Other ◽

Order Quantity ◽

Control Power ◽

Decentralized Decision Making ◽

Optimal Value ◽

Total Profit

This paper introduces the parameter of supply chain control power into existing supply chain coordination models and explores the impacts of control power on the profits of manufacturer, retailer, and the overall supply chain under four modes of decision-making, including the decentralized decision-making dominated by manufacturer, the decentralized decision-making dominated by retailer, centralized decision-making, and Nash negotiation decision-making. Some significant conclusions are obtained. Firstly, supply chain control power does have great impact on the supply chain profits. The profit of the whole supply chain with centralized decision-making is higher than those of the other three modes, while the overall profit of supply chain with decentralized decision-making is superior to the profit when retailer and manufacturer dominate the supply chain together. Secondly, with decentralized decision-making, for manufacturer and retailer, it is beneficial to gain the control powers of the supply chain; however, control power has an optimal value, not the bigger, the better. Thirdly, under certain circumstances, order quantity will increase and the wholesale price will decrease when control power is transferred from manufacturer to retailer. In this case, the total profit of supply chain dominated by retailer will be greater than that dominated by manufacturer.