scholarly journals The Functional Model of Analysis as Middle Ground Meta-Ethics

Diametros ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Saja

The main purpose of the paper is to present a new framework of meta-ethics which I call the Functional Model of Analysis. It presupposes that the most important meta-ethical question is not “What is the meaning of normative words, sentences and what is the ontological fabric of the moral world?” but “What should morality and ethics be for?”. It is a form of meta-ethics that focuses on finding theoretical resources that can be helpful in understanding ongoing ethical debates between disciples of Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, Augustine, Hobbes, utilitarians and Kant, and in building normative ethical theories that can help us to answer normative questions. As an example of such output I will present a formal sketch of Hybrid Function Consequentialism – a normative ethical theory based upon the meta-ethical framework proposed here.

Author(s):  
Mark Timmons

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics brings together new work on various dimensions of normative ethical theory. This seventh volume features thirteen chapters dealing with practical reasoning, Bernard Williams’s ‘one thought too many’ complaint about impartial ethical theories, the concept of moral right, the wrongness of lying, moral choice under uncertainty, the notion of subjective obligation, commendatory reasons, desire satisfaction and time, a challenge to contractualism, the nature of creditworthiness, partiality toward oneself, the relation between virtue and action, and monism versus pluralism about non-derivative value....


Author(s):  
Bronwyn Finnigan

Is there a “common element” in Buddhist ethical thought from which one might rationally reconstruct a Buddhist normative ethical theory? Many construe this as the question Which contemporary normative theory does Buddhist ethics best approximate: consequentialism or virtue ethics? This essay argues that two distinct evaluative relations underlie these positions: an instrumental and a constitutive analysis. This chapter raises some difficulties for linking these distinct analyses to particular normative ethical theories but gives reasons to think that both may be justified as meta-ethical grounds for rationally reconstructing Buddhist thought as an ethical theory. It closes with some reflections on the complexity involved in trying to establish a single and homogeneous position on the nature of Buddhist ethics.


This series aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new chapters that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of issues and positions in normative ethical theory, and represents a sampling of recent developments in this field. This 11th volume brings together 13 new essays that collectively cover a range of fundamental topics in the field, including moral conscientiousness and moral wrongness; impartiality and the boundaries of morality; moral testimony; Kant’s categorical imperative; and ethical theories as methods of ethics.


2019 ◽  
pp. 216-224
Author(s):  
Richard Corry

This final chapter puts the ontology of power and influence to use beyond metaphysics by suggesting that the concept of causal influence may be helpful in the field of normative ethics. In particular, it is argued that the ontology of causal influence opens up the possibility of a novel category of normative ethical theory called influentialism. Influentialism stands in contrast to the traditional categories of consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. The aim is not to argue that influentialism is preferable to these traditional categories, but simply to put the theory on the table for consideration. However, it is argued that influentialism has some promising features that make it worthy of consideration. In particular, influentialism seems to occupy a middle ground between consequentialism and deontology and is able to combine seemingly incompatible intuitions from these two categories.


Author(s):  
Mark Fedyk

This chapter rearticulates many of the major ideas and arguments in the proceeding chapters. But it also connects one of the primary conclusions of the book up with a debate in ethics over what the structure and form of ethical theories should look like. The proceeding chapters show that one possible form that an ethical theory can take is a loose confederacies of different models and frameworks that apply to different levels of social and psychological organization.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Christine Swanton

The Introduction summarizes the basic tenets of Target Centred Virtue Ethics. It begins with an account of the fundamental concepts of virtue ethics in general and shows that virtue ethics is a family of normative ethical theory with several genera and species. The target-centred version of virtue ethics developed in the book is one species of virtue ethics opposed to the orthodox neo-Aristotelian version in many respects. Central to all forms of virtue ethics is ‘Thick Concept Centralism’, and the ‘Centrality of Virtuousness’, whether the notion of virtuousness is applied to character, actions, rules or motives. The Introduction outlines these theses, and the notion of the targets of virtues, before summarizing the contents of the book, including the metaphysics of Target Centred Virtue Ethics, the nature of Target Centred Virtue Ethics, and broad issues surrounding the application of Target Centred Virtue Ethics.


2020 ◽  
pp. 87-108
Author(s):  
Anna L. Peterson

This chapter examines Marxist thought, which is primarily a sociological rather than an ethical framework. However, both Karl Marx and later Marxist thinkers developed theories with clear moral assumptions and goals, from their anthropology to visions of a revolutionized society. Marxist thought makes “human sensuous activities” central to everything, and that has to include its (implicit) ethical theory. Even though Marx showed little interest in moral theory, both meta-ethical and normative claims run throughout his work. This chapter reflects special interest in Marx’s emphases on the role of material forces in shaping ideas and on the creative tensions between individuals and structures. To explore these issues, the chapter engages the thought of Marx and some of his recent interpreters to understand the ways all ideas, including ideas about value, are grounded in material practices, experiences, and structures.


2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 441-443
Author(s):  
Rajesh Maheshwari ◽  
Yvonne Skinner

Objective: In inpatient forensic settings, a psychiatrist is expected to wear ‘Two Hats’, as a treating physician and as an expert to provide risk assessments and expert advice to the judicial authorities for leave and release decisions. Although dual roles have long been accepted as an inevitable part of independent forensic practice, there are additional ethical challenges for the treating psychiatrist to provide an expert opinion. This paper examines the specific ethical ambiguities for a treating psychiatrist at the interface of legal process related to leave and release decisions in the treatment of forensic patients. Conclusions: While respect for justice is the prevailing ethical paradigm for court-related forensic work, the medical paradigm should remain the key ethical framework for psychiatrists in treatment settings. Thus, psychiatrist should be aware of possible adverse consequences in acting as forensic experts for their patients. A conscientious adherence to clinical facts and awareness of the ‘Two Hats’ ethical pitfall can serve as important reference points in framing the psychiatric evidence in the decision-making process and safeguard treating psychiatrist’s role.


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