Ecceity, Ipseity and Existents

Author(s):  
John Llewelyn

Although Scotus sometimes seems to teach the opposite, he argues, like his compatriot David Hume will, that existence is really the same as essence. This is a doctrine that makes it easier to understand how, against Aquinas, Scotus can endorse Anselm’s argument for the necessity of the existence of God provided it includes a clause specifying that the concept of the highest thinkable being is free from contradiction. But the assertion of the sameness of essence and existence is not obviously true of finite existents. But it is existence as such to which attention must be given if it is to play the role envisaged for it in the blank ecology sketched out for it in the closing chapters of this book. Here it is sheer existence, not predicates, that ground the author’s hope for a widened and more just notion of ecological responsibility, one that listens to the teachings of Scotus and Hopkins and that holds for all the inscapes of the world simply because a thing’s own existence is a good for that existent and therefore calls for our aesthethical (sic) regard.

Author(s):  
Christine M. Korsgaard

This chapter criticizes the familiar idea that humans are more important than animals. After examining some reasons why we treat humans and animals differently, and showing that they do not imply the superior importance of humans, it argues that the claim of superior human importance is not so much false as (nearly) incoherent. Importance and goodness are “tethered” values: things are only important or good when they are important-to or good-for some creature. To be important or good absolutely is to be important-to or good-for all creatures. One kind of creature could be absolutely more important than others only if the fate of that kind of creature were more important to others than their own fates. Only a teleological picture of the world that made human good the ultimate purpose of the world could support the conclusion that humans are more important than the other animals.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Nils Franzén

Abstract This article discusses why it is the case that we refuse to accept strange evaluative claims as being true in fictions, even though we are happy to go along with other types of absurdities in such contexts. For instance, we would refuse to accept the following statement as true, even in the context of a fiction: (i) In killing her baby, Giselda did the right thing; after all, it was a girl. This article offers a sensibilist diagnosis of this puzzle, inspired by an observation first made by David Hume. According to sensibilism, the way we feel about things settles their evaluative properties. Thus, when confronted with a fictional scenario where the configuration of non-evaluative facts and properties is relevantly similar to the actual world, we refuse to go along with evaluative properties being instantiated according to a different pattern. It is the attitudes we hold in the actual world that fix the extension of evaluative terms, even in nonactual worlds. When engaging with a fiction, we (to some extent) leave our beliefs about what the world is like behind, while taking our emotional attitudes with us into the fiction. To substantiate this diagnosis, this paper outlines a sensibilist semantics for evaluative terms based on recent discussion regarding predicates of personal taste, and explains how, together with standard assumptions about the nature of fictional discourse, it makes the relevant predictions with respect to engagement with fictions.


1971 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lenn E. Goodman

If, as Ghazâlî presumes, the fact of creation can serve as evidence of the existence of God, and if, as he attempts to show, creation is the only binding, reasoned proof of God's existence, Ghazâlî must, to fulfill his program of reconstructing the intellectual basis of Islam, somehow find arguments adequate to prove that creation did in fact take place. He must disprove what was in his time the still vital claim that the Universe had not come to be but had existed forever differing in no essential way from the world we know today.


2019 ◽  
pp. 46-74
Author(s):  
Marc Crépon ◽  
James Martel

This chapter discusses not only how the fabric of relations binds people to all others, but also how its fissures are a part of the “nature” or the “essence of life,” at least “human life.” If it is true that all life, however it defines its belonging, is protected by the ideals and the institutions that constitute a common good for humanity, and if it is true, more importantly, that no one can elude murderous consent, then the paradox of murderous consent is that humanity's common good turns against life itself. Rather than merely accept, encourage, and promote the destruction of life, the fabric of relations that should prevent such annihilation assists it. All wars, all acts of violence, whether civil or between states, trample on the ideals of humanity, even as those who are responsible for the abuse proclaim these same ideals as their own. Nothing that safeguards life is immune from being invoked and exploited so as to effect this kind of reversal. This was the bitter conclusion—as expressed in his Reflections on War and Death—that Sigmund Freud reached in 1915 after the first of four long years of mutual devastation by Europe's nations. Stefan Zweig—in The World of Yesterday: Memories of a European, a retrospective on the war—came to this same conclusion regarding literature, though twenty-five years later.


Gersonides ◽  
2010 ◽  
pp. 59-80
Author(s):  
Seymour Feldman

This chapter explains how the existence of God is philosophically provable. It adopts the terminology of Thomas Aquinas about some of the basic beliefs of monotheistic religion. In attempting to delineate the distinct domain of theology, Aquinas distinguished between the “preambles of faith” and the “articles of faith.” This chapter analyzes the underlying assumption that human reason can prove and explain some of the basic beliefs of monotheistic religion. Not only does it discuss the common ground for philosophy and faith, but it explains monotheistic religions without religiously based assumptions. It describes the ontological proof of Anselm of Canterbury and points out various arguments about the world and how they cannot be explained without positing the existence of God.


2019 ◽  
pp. 130-150
Author(s):  
David Cunning

This chapter features a selection of excerpts from Cavendish’s book, Grounds of Natural Philosophy. The passages treat a number of topics and issues: materialism; empty space and the impossibility of vacuum; the identity of a body and its location; the impossibility of immaterial motion; the different kinds of matter; order vs. disorder; active regions of the world that we do not notice; self-motion; self-knowledge; panpsychism; sensory perception and patterning; dreams; occasionalism; causality; chance; freedom, the cooperation of the parts of nature; individuation; natural productions vs. artefacts; imagination; fame; the afterlife; God; and belief in the existence of God. Cavendish enters into a wide spectrum of philosophical debates in Grounds of Natural Philosophy, but much of the focus is on arguments for materialism, the distinction between rational matter and sensitive matter, the knowledge and information that is shared among creatures, individuation, and the sophistication of natural (as opposed to artificial) productions.


Author(s):  
Alister E. McGrath

How do we move from observing the world to developing more complex and sophisticated ways of representing and understanding it? This chapter examines the intellectual journey from observing our world to representing it in theory, focussing on three distinct processes that are widely believed to be important in this process—deduction, induction, and abduction. Each of these rational strategies is used in theological or philosophical arguments relating to the existence of God. In each case, careful consideration is given to its application both in the natural sciences and in Christian theology. Particular attention is given to the American philosopher Charles S. Peirce’s use of abduction, and its potential significance for Christian theology.


Author(s):  
William P. Alston

The philosophy of religion comprises any philosophical discussion of questions arising from religion. This has primarily consisted in the clarification and critical evaluation of fundamental beliefs and concepts from one or another religious tradition. Major issues of concern in the philosophy of religion include arguments for and against the existence of God, problems about the attributes of God, the problem of evil, and the epistemology of religious belief. Of arguments for the existence of God, the most prominent ones can be assigned to four types. First, cosmological arguments, which go back to Plato and Aristotle, explain the existence of the universe by reference to a being on whom all else depends for its existence. Second, teleological arguments seek to explain adaptation in the world, for example, the way organisms have structures adapted to their needs, by positing an intelligent designer of the world. Third, ontological arguments, first introduced by Anselm, focus on the concept of a perfect being and argue that it is incoherent to deny that such a being exists. Finally, moral arguments maintain that objective moral statuses, distinctions or principles presuppose a divine being as the locus of their objectivity. Discussions of the attributes of God have focused on omniscience and omnipotence. These raise various problems, for example, whether complete divine foreknowledge of human actions is compatible with human free will. Moreover, these attributes, together with God’s perfect goodness give rise to the problem of evil. If God is all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good, how can there be wickedness, suffering and other undesirable states of affairs in the world? This problem has been repeatedly discussed from ancient times to the present. The epistemology of religious belief has to do with the questions of what is the proper approach to the assessment of religious belief (for rationality, justification, or whatever) and with the carrying out of such assessments. Much of the discussion has turned on the contrast between the roles of human reason and God’s revelation to us. A variety of views have been held on this. Many, such as Aquinas, have tried to forge a synthesis of the two; Kant and his followers have sought to ground religion solely on reason; others, most notably Kierkegaard, have held that the subjecting of religious belief to rational scrutiny is subversive of true religious faith. Recently, a group of ‘Reformed epistemologists’ (so-called because of the heavy influence of the Reformed theology of Calvin and his followers on their thinking) has attacked ‘evidentialism’ and has argued that religious beliefs can be rationally justified even if one has no reasons or evidence for them.


Author(s):  
Alison Roberts Miculan

One of the most pervasive problems in theoretical ethics has been the attempt to reconcile the good for the individual with the good for all. It is a problem which appears in contemporary discussions (like those initiated by Alasdair MacIntyre in After Virtue) as a debate between emotivism and rationalism, and in more traditional debates between relativism and absolutism. I believe that a vital cause of this difficulty arises from a failure to ground ethics in metaphysics. It is crucial, it seems to me, to begin with "the way the world is" before we begin to speculate about the way it ought to be. And, the most significant "way the world is" for ethics is that it is individuals in community. This paper attempts to develop an ethical theory based solidly on Whitehead’s metaphysics, and to address precisely the problem of the relation between the good for the individual and the common good, in such a way as to be sympathetic to both.


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