Hume and The Self: A Critical Response

2007 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-30
Author(s):  
Alan Schwerin
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
David Hume ◽  
The Self ◽  
Critical Response ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Conceptual Apparatus ◽  
Fallacy Of Equivocation ◽  
Rival View ◽  
The Way

In the discussion of personal identity, from his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume reaches a famous, if notorious conclusion: there is no self. We are “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions” (T 252). My argument is that Hume's thesis on the self rests on a questionable rejection of a rival view that appears to commit the fallacy of equivocation. Along the way I identify a few possible problems with Hume's overall analysis of the self. My argument is that these diffi culties center around the conceptual apparatus Hume relies on to explain and analyze consciousness.

SELF AGAINST CHILDHOOD: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF ALICE MEYNELL TO A PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGY OF MEMORY

2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 249-268
Author(s):  
Linda M. Austin
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
David Hume ◽  
The Self ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Spinal Chord ◽  
Metaphysical Notion ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
The Brain

THE IDEA OF THE SELFin its various constructions–political, economic, psychological–has always been shadowed by an English tradition of skepticism about the persistence of a conscious and stable identity. Voiced most disconcertingly by David Hume in his section, “Of personal identity” fromA Treatise of Human Nature(1739–40; I.iv.vi), this attitude was significantly advanced during the second half of the nineteenth century by a group of physiological psychologists who argued for the corporeal basis of mental functions, including memory. Henry Maudsley and George Henry Lewes, among others, challenged the metaphysical notion of a mind and drew instead from controversial and often suppressed theories of neuroscience to describe the physiological operation of memory. These theories, which located impressions and sensations in the brain or spinal chord, produced a form of identity that could endure alterations of consciousness. They offered, in addition, a new understanding of an adult's physical connection to the personal past.

Mind, bundle theory of

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stewart Candlish
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
The Self ◽  
Bundle Theory ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Additional Burden ◽  
The Mind

This theory owes its name to Hume, who described the self or person (which he assumed to be the mind) as ’nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement’ (A Treatise of Human Nature I, IV, §VI). The theory begins by denying Descartes’s Second Meditation view that experiences belong to an immaterial soul; its distinguishing feature is its attempt to account for the unity of a single mind by employing only relations among the experiences themselves rather than their attribution to an independently persisting subject. The usual objection to the bundle theory is that no relations adequate to the task can be found. But empirical work suggests that the task itself may be illusory. Many bundle theorists follow Hume in taking their topic to be personal identity. But the theory can be disentangled from this additional burden.

scholarly journals SEIS PERCEPCIONES EN BUSCA DE UN YO: TEATRO Y SUBJETIVIDAD EN DAVID HUME Y LUIGI PIRANDELLO

2017 ◽  
pp. 59-80
Author(s):  
Germán Osvaldo Prósperi
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Luigi Pirandello ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature

En este artículo nos proponemos mostrar, por un lado, que resulta factible (y esclarecedor) explicar el capítulo “Of personal identity” del Treatise of Human Nature de David Hume a partir de la obra Sei personaggi in cerca d’autore de Luigi Pirandello, así como esta última obra a partir del texto de Hume; y, por otro lado, que tomando como eje la comparación de la mente con el teatro que propone Hume en dicho capítulo es también posible individuar, según el modo en el que se piensa la relación del pensamiento y la experiencia con el sujeto, dos grandes corrientes en la filosofía moderna: una que podríamos denominar teatro de Autor y otra teatro sin Autor.

Hume and the Legacy of Academic Scepticism

2019 ◽  
pp. 39-76
Author(s):  
Peter S. Fosl
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Middle Ages ◽  
David Hume ◽  
General Framework ◽  
John Locke ◽  
Early Modernity ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Pierre Bayle ◽  
The Middle Ages

Chapter Two of Hume’s Scepticism charts the development of Academic scepticism from Cicero and Augustine, through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and into early modernity. The exposition is organized around sceptical ideas that anticipated or may have influenced David Hume, who describes himself an ‘academical’ sceptic. The chapter also sets out Cicero’s influence upon Hume, scepticism at the college in La Flèche where Hume wrote much of A Treatise of Human Nature, and Hume’s self-conception of Academic scepticism. Accounts of sceptical ideas in Marin Mersenne, Simon Foucher, John Locke, Pierre-Daniel Huet, and Pierre Bayle set the stage for Hume’s own Academicism. The chapter closes with a five-point General Framework defining Academic Scepticism.

Deciphering Hume

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 202-215
Author(s):  
Evgeniy N. Blinov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Radical Empiricism ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Gradual Shift ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
Philosophical Project

The present article analyzes an ambitious attempt to revisit and reevaluate Hume’s metaphysical project in the early 21th century, proposed by Vadim Vasilyev. His claim is to demonstrate that the problems raised by the author of Treatise of Human Nature and Enquiry concerning Human Understanding are far from being completely resolved and could provide us some valuable hints into the problems of contemporary analytical metaphysics. Against a widespread consensus that the evolution in Hume’s had been insignificant, Vasilyev maintains that his philosophical project underwent crucial transformations. He provides evidence of a gradual shift from a radical empiricism to a moderate rationalism by re-examining some classical problems of Hume’s studies and providing a critical analysis of the problems of causality and personal identity. This review provides some arguments for and against Vasilyev’s claims.

scholarly journals A imaginação como fundamento das ciências experimentais

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Henrique Santos Figueiredo
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Main Aspect ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
The Mind

David Hume, em seus livros Tratado da Natureza Humana e Investigação Acerca do Entendimento Humano, propõe a divisão da mente humana em percepções fortes e vivas, as quais recebem o nome de impressões, e suas cópias, que, por sua vez, recebem o nome de ideias. Estas percepções da mente também se dividem em duas: memória e imaginação. A primeira, com maiores graus de força e vivacidade, e a segunda com menores graus de força e vivacidade. As percepções da mente se relacionam a partir das relações filosóficas, que são princípios de associação e dissociação de ideias. A relação da imaginação com as ciências empíricas é o principal aspecto deste trabalho, de modo que, no decorrer do texto, os aspectos que fomentam esta relação serão trabalhados, ilustrando a importância que tem a imaginação no advento das ciências experimentais. Abstract: David Hume, in his books A Treatise Of Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, proposes the division of human mind in in strong, lively perceptions, which are called impressions, and their copies, which, in turn, receive the name of ideas. These perceptions of the mind are also divided into two: memory and imagination. The first, with higher degrees of force and vivacity, and the second with lower degrees of force and vivacity.  The perceptions of the mind are related from the philosophical relations, which are the principles of association and dissociation of ideas. The ratio of the imagination with the empirical sciences is the main aspect of this work, so that, throughout the text, aspects that foster this relationship will be worked out, illustrating the importance of the imagination in the advent of experimental sciences.

Critical Self-Reflection

2020 ◽  
pp. 167-178
Author(s):  
Hsueh M. Qu
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Self Reflection ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
The Way

This chapter argues that the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding expresses Hume’s own dissatisfaction with the treatment of scepticism found in the Treatise of Human Nature. EHU 1.12 argues that curiosity, so crucial in THN 1.4.7, can in fact lead one to false metaphysics. EHU 5.1 is striking insofar as it states that Hume’s preferred Academical philosophy does not mingle with the passions. This is antithetical to the Title Principle (THN 1.4.7.11), which recommends assenting to reason when it mixes with the passions. Thus, the Enquiry seems to distinctly reject the anti-sceptical framework of the Treatise, paving the way for a new epistemology in the later work.

WAR OR PEACE?: A DYNAMICAL ANALYSIS OF ANARCHY

2006 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER VANDERSCHRAAF
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Analysis ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Initial Conditions ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Dynamical Analysis ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Different Types

I propose a dynamical analysis of interaction in anarchy, and argue that this kind of dynamical analysis is a more promising route to predicting the outcome of anarchy than the more traditional a priori analyses of anarchy in the literature. I criticize previous a priori analyses of anarchy on the grounds that these analyses assume that the individuals in anarchy share a unique set of preferences over the possible outcomes of war, peace, exploiting others and suffering exploitation. Following Hobbes' classic analysis of anarchy, I maintain that typically in anarchy some moderate individuals will most desire mutual cooperation while other dominators will most desire to exploit others' cooperation. I argue that once one allows for different types of individuals in anarchy, any a priori analysis of anarchy requires unrealistic assumptions regarding the agents' common knowledge of their situation. However, this move also suggests a dynamical analysis of anarchy, one that assumes no common knowledge. In the Variable Anticipation threshold model developed here, individuals modify their behavior as they learn from repeated interactions. I present specific instances of this model where the individuals in anarchy converge to different equilibria corresponding to either peace or war, depending on the initial conditions. I show that individuals are liable to converge to Hobbes' war of all against all even if only a small percentage of are dominators. The presence of only a few “nasty” individuals gradually drives all, including those inclined to be “nicer”, to imitate the “nasty” conduct of these few. This dynamic analysis suggests that the Hobbesian war in anarchy is indeed inevitable in most realistic circumstances.You have the same propension, that I have, in favor of what is contiguous above what is remote. You are, therefore, naturally carry'd to commit acts of injustice as well as I. Your example both pushes me forward in this way by imitation, and also affords me a new reason for any breach of equity, by showing me, that I shou'd be the cully of my integrity, if I alone shou'd impose on myself a severe restraint amidst the licentiousness of others. (David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature)

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