scholarly journals SEIS PERCEPCIONES EN BUSCA DE UN YO: TEATRO Y SUBJETIVIDAD EN DAVID HUME Y LUIGI PIRANDELLO

Author(s):  
Germán Osvaldo Prósperi

En este artículo nos proponemos mostrar, por un lado, que resulta factible (y esclarecedor) explicar el capítulo “Of personal identity” del Treatise of Human Nature de David Hume a partir de la obra Sei personaggi in cerca d’autore de Luigi Pirandello, así como esta última obra a partir del texto de Hume; y, por otro lado, que tomando como eje la comparación de la mente con el teatro que propone Hume en dicho capítulo es también posible individuar, según el modo en el que se piensa la relación del pensamiento y la experiencia con el sujeto, dos grandes corrientes en la filosofía moderna: una que podríamos denominar teatro de Autor y otra teatro sin Autor.

2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 249-268
Author(s):  
Linda M. Austin

THE IDEA OF THE SELFin its various constructions–political, economic, psychological–has always been shadowed by an English tradition of skepticism about the persistence of a conscious and stable identity. Voiced most disconcertingly by David Hume in his section, “Of personal identity” fromA Treatise of Human Nature(1739–40; I.iv.vi), this attitude was significantly advanced during the second half of the nineteenth century by a group of physiological psychologists who argued for the corporeal basis of mental functions, including memory. Henry Maudsley and George Henry Lewes, among others, challenged the metaphysical notion of a mind and drew instead from controversial and often suppressed theories of neuroscience to describe the physiological operation of memory. These theories, which located impressions and sensations in the brain or spinal chord, produced a form of identity that could endure alterations of consciousness. They offered, in addition, a new understanding of an adult's physical connection to the personal past.


2007 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-30
Author(s):  
Alan Schwerin

In the discussion of personal identity, from his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume reaches a famous, if notorious conclusion: there is no self. We are “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions” (T 252). My argument is that Hume's thesis on the self rests on a questionable rejection of a rival view that appears to commit the fallacy of equivocation. Along the way I identify a few possible problems with Hume's overall analysis of the self. My argument is that these diffi culties center around the conceptual apparatus Hume relies on to explain and analyze consciousness.


2019 ◽  
pp. 39-76
Author(s):  
Peter S. Fosl

Chapter Two of Hume’s Scepticism charts the development of Academic scepticism from Cicero and Augustine, through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and into early modernity. The exposition is organized around sceptical ideas that anticipated or may have influenced David Hume, who describes himself an ‘academical’ sceptic. The chapter also sets out Cicero’s influence upon Hume, scepticism at the college in La Flèche where Hume wrote much of A Treatise of Human Nature, and Hume’s self-conception of Academic scepticism. Accounts of sceptical ideas in Marin Mersenne, Simon Foucher, John Locke, Pierre-Daniel Huet, and Pierre Bayle set the stage for Hume’s own Academicism. The chapter closes with a five-point General Framework defining Academic Scepticism.


2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 202-215
Author(s):  
Evgeniy N. Blinov ◽  

The present article analyzes an ambitious attempt to revisit and reevaluate Hume’s metaphysical project in the early 21th century, proposed by Vadim Vasilyev. His claim is to demonstrate that the problems raised by the author of Treatise of Human Nature and Enquiry concerning Human Understanding are far from being completely resolved and could provide us some valuable hints into the problems of contemporary analytical metaphysics. Against a widespread consensus that the evolution in Hume’s had been insignificant, Vasilyev maintains that his philosophical project underwent crucial transformations. He provides evidence of a gradual shift from a radical empiricism to a moderate rationalism by re-examining some classical problems of Hume’s studies and providing a critical analysis of the problems of causality and personal identity. This review provides some arguments for and against Vasilyev’s claims.


Author(s):  
Pablo Henrique Santos Figueiredo

David Hume, em seus livros Tratado da Natureza Humana e Investigação Acerca do Entendimento Humano, propõe a divisão da mente humana em percepções fortes e vivas, as quais recebem o nome de impressões, e suas cópias, que, por sua vez, recebem o nome de ideias. Estas percepções da mente também se dividem em duas: memória e imaginação. A primeira, com maiores graus de força e vivacidade, e a segunda com menores graus de força e vivacidade. As percepções da mente se relacionam a partir das relações filosóficas, que são princípios de associação e dissociação de ideias. A relação da imaginação com as ciências empíricas é o principal aspecto deste trabalho, de modo que, no decorrer do texto, os aspectos que fomentam esta relação serão trabalhados, ilustrando a importância que tem a imaginação no advento das ciências experimentais. Abstract: David Hume, in his books A Treatise Of Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, proposes the division of human mind in in strong, lively perceptions, which are called impressions, and their copies, which, in turn, receive the name of ideas. These perceptions of the mind are also divided into two: memory and imagination. The first, with higher degrees of force and vivacity, and the second with lower degrees of force and vivacity.  The perceptions of the mind are related from the philosophical relations, which are the principles of association and dissociation of ideas. The ratio of the imagination with the empirical sciences is the main aspect of this work, so that, throughout the text, aspects that foster this relationship will be worked out, illustrating the importance of the imagination in the advent of experimental sciences.


2006 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER VANDERSCHRAAF

I propose a dynamical analysis of interaction in anarchy, and argue that this kind of dynamical analysis is a more promising route to predicting the outcome of anarchy than the more traditional a priori analyses of anarchy in the literature. I criticize previous a priori analyses of anarchy on the grounds that these analyses assume that the individuals in anarchy share a unique set of preferences over the possible outcomes of war, peace, exploiting others and suffering exploitation. Following Hobbes' classic analysis of anarchy, I maintain that typically in anarchy some moderate individuals will most desire mutual cooperation while other dominators will most desire to exploit others' cooperation. I argue that once one allows for different types of individuals in anarchy, any a priori analysis of anarchy requires unrealistic assumptions regarding the agents' common knowledge of their situation. However, this move also suggests a dynamical analysis of anarchy, one that assumes no common knowledge. In the Variable Anticipation threshold model developed here, individuals modify their behavior as they learn from repeated interactions. I present specific instances of this model where the individuals in anarchy converge to different equilibria corresponding to either peace or war, depending on the initial conditions. I show that individuals are liable to converge to Hobbes' war of all against all even if only a small percentage of are dominators. The presence of only a few “nasty” individuals gradually drives all, including those inclined to be “nicer”, to imitate the “nasty” conduct of these few. This dynamic analysis suggests that the Hobbesian war in anarchy is indeed inevitable in most realistic circumstances.You have the same propension, that I have, in favor of what is contiguous above what is remote. You are, therefore, naturally carry'd to commit acts of injustice as well as I. Your example both pushes me forward in this way by imitation, and also affords me a new reason for any breach of equity, by showing me, that I shou'd be the cully of my integrity, if I alone shou'd impose on myself a severe restraint amidst the licentiousness of others. (David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature)


2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-79
Author(s):  
Michael B. Gill

AbstractIn the Introduction to his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume credits “my Lord Shaftesbury” as one of the “philosophers in England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing.” I describe aspects of Shaftesbury’s philosophy that justify the credit Hume gives him. I focus on Shaftesbury’s refutation of psychological egoism, his examination of partiality, and his views on how to promote impartial virtue. I also discuss Shaftesbury’s political commitments, and raise questions about recent interpretations that have taken his Characteristicks to be a polemic, partisan text.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (02) ◽  
pp. 201-214
Author(s):  
M Suyudi ◽  
Wahyu Hanafi Putra

This research aims at explaining David Hume’s logical critique of causality and knowledge. As library research, the method used is descriptive-qualitative. Data and data sources were obtained from his important works Why Cause is Always A Need and A Treatise of Human Nature and several secondary literatures on causality. The data was carried out through documentation, started by the researcher documenting Hume's thoughts, especially criticism of the law of causality (cause-effect) and knowledge of both of Hume's primary works. The study results explained that Hume criticized the performance of the law of causality, which explained that the existence of a second essence and after it was an impact or certainty of the first essence. The second essential is the consequence and legitimacy of the first one. According to Hume, it cannot serve empirically as the law of causality occurs because the sequential process is stagnant. Hume's skepticism and doubts over dogmatic and metaphysical matters then affect that all knowledge can only be explored with the five senses and is empirical. All irrational and non-empirical characteristics cannot be attributed to a belief and truth. In conclusion, real truths in knowledge are those that can be investigated empirically. Keywords: Causality, Hume, Knowledge, The five senses.   Penelitian ini bertujuan menjelaskan kritik nalar kausalitas dan pengetahuan David Hume. Sebagai penelitian pustaka, metode yang digunakan adalah deskriptif-kualitatif. Data dan sumber data didapat dari karya-karya Why Cause is Always Necessary dan A Treatise of Human Nature serta literatur-literatur sekunder yang berkaitan dengan tema kausalitas. Teknik pengumpulan data dilakukan dengan dokumentasi, yaitu peneliti mendokumentasikan pemikiran-pemikiran Hume terutama kritik atas hukum kausalitas (sebab-akibat) dan pengetahuan dari kedua karya primer Hume tersebut. Hasil penelitian menjelaskan bahwa Hume melakukan kritik atas kinerja hukum kausalitas yang menjelaskan bahwa adanya esensi kedua dan setelahnya merupakan dampak atau keniscayaan atas esensi pertama. Esensi kedua merupakan akibat dan legitimasi dari esensi pertama. Hal demikian yang menurut Hume tidak dapat dijelaskan secara empiris. Menurutnya, hukum kausalitas itu terjadi karena proses keterurutan secara stagnan. Sikap skeptis dan ragu-ragu Hume atas perihal yang sifatnya dogmatis dan metafisik membawa dampak bahwa segala pengetahuan hanya bisa digali dengan panca inderawi dan bersifat empiris. Semua perihal yang sifatnya irasional dan tidak empiris tidak dapat dinisbatkan pada suatu keyakinan dan kebenaran. Pada akhirnya, kebenaran sejati dalam pengetahuan adalah yang dapat diselidiki secara empiris. Kata kunci: Hume, Kausalitas, Pengetahuan, Panca Indera


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