Smith

2019 ◽  
pp. 158-169
Author(s):  
Roger Crisp
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Scottish Enlightenment ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Divine Retribution ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Human Ethics ◽  
The Spectator

This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Adam Smith (1723–90). Smith’s theory of sympathy is explained. The notion of the impartial spectator is discussed, in connection with both propriety and utility, and it is shown how the view of the spectator itself incorporates certain aspects of the human point of view. Smith is claimed to be a deontologist, at least concerning human ethics. His version of the dualism of practical reason is outlined, and the difficulties of combining a utilitarian conception of God with the notion of divine retribution are noted.

scholarly journals What’s the problem, Mr. Smith? Shedding more light (than Heat) on Adam Smith’s view of man *

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Emmanoel de Oliveira Boff
Keyword(s):  
Adam Smith ◽  
Economic Thought ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Wealth Of Nations ◽  
Theory Of Moral Sentiments

Abstract Why has the “Adam Smith Problem” recently been discussed in the literature? Although most historians of economic thought regard the problem solved, these discussions cast doubt on this apparent solution. This article suggests that the “Adam Smith Problem” may originate from the concept of the human being developed by Smith in the “Theory of Moral Sentiments”: in this book, human beings can be understood as composed of an empirical and a (quasi) transcendental side, in the form of the impartial spectator. It is argued that it is the tension between these two parts which creates supposed inconsistencies between aspects of the “Theory of Moral Sentiments” and the “Wealth of Nations” like, for example, the role of sympathy and self-interest in each of these books.

The Adam Smith Problem: A Reinterpretation

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik Lundestad
Keyword(s):  
Adam Smith ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Self Interest

As long as the market is said to be based on the motive of self-interest, any argument in favor of expanding the market will have to be seen as an argument in favor of self-interest. Such an argument, however, clearly conflicts with the notion that this motive, when viewed from a practical-political point of view, must be deemed a vice and thus, at best is something to be tolerated. As long as the market is seen as presupposing the motive of self-interest, as the currently dominating interpretation of Adam Smith implies, it therefore appears virtually impossible to see how Smith – or anyone else for that manner – can possibly justify extending the market in practical-political terms.

scholarly journals Taming Egoism: Adam Smith on Empathy, Imagination and Justice

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (Special Issue) ◽  
pp. 29-37
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Czarnecka
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
Life Experiences ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Role Playing ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Social Morality ◽  
Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
The Social ◽  
Self Interest

I argue that the construction of the social order, as shown by Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, depends on people’s ability to tame their inborn egoism. According to the philosopher’s anthropological assumptions a human being learns through life experiences how to control his self- interest so that it does not threaten societal existence. During socialization, a human being – still an egoist to some extent – continues role-playing by the use of the psychological mechanisms of empathy and imagination. As a result he develops sympathy, at first, as a reaction to real people’s emotions experienced in a particular context. Finally, he naturally and more and more unconsciously takes under consideration the perspective of an impartial spectator. The gradually developing process brings about consequences that improve social morality, such as control over the expression of intense emotions, which is a condition for experiencing emotional harmony, or a refrain from pursuing one’s self-interest at the expense of someone else, so as not to become a subject of social contempt. One should also bear in mind that none of these consequences was carefully planned in advance nor purposefully executed.

scholarly journals Adam Smith and the contemporary world

2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amartya Sen
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Economic Activity ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Critical Distance ◽  
Comparative Approach ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Contemporary World ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Moment

This paper argues that many of Adam Smith's insights, particularly those in his Theory of moral sentiments, have a relevance to contemporary thought about economics and ethics that is currently underappreciated. In economics, for example, Smith was concerned not only with the sufficiency of self-interest at the moment of exchange but also with the wider moral motivations and institutions required to support economic activity in general. In ethics, Smith's concept of an impartial spectator who is able to view our situation from a critical distance has much to contribute to a fuller understanding of the requirements of justice, particularly through an understanding of impartiality as going beyond the interests and concerns of a local contracting group. Smith's open, realization-focussed and comparative approach to evaluation contrasts with what I call the "transcendental institutionalism" popular in contemporary political philosophy and associated particularly with the work of John Rawls.

From Moral Sentiments to Civic Engagement: Sociological Analysis as Responsible Spectatorship

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Wagner-Pacifici
Keyword(s):  
Social Action ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Social Scientist ◽  
Cultural Sociology ◽  
Subject Position ◽  
Sociological Analysis ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Spectator

This article proposes an entirely different understanding of the goals of cultural sociology, arguing that the subject position of the “spectator” should replace that of the “social scientist.” It contends that cultural sociology should aspire for fidelity—to moods and experiences, to locations and dramas, and to the truth of experience—and that this fidelity can be achieved through witnessing. In order to build the case for a new kind of cultural sociology, the article cites the works of Adam Smith, and especially his theory of social morality founded on the figure of the “impartial spectator.” It also examines four initial problems, including the problem of the alleged distinction between social action and spectatorship and the problem of identifying the appropriate “spectacle.” It concludes by highlighting some important lessons that need to be taken into account so that cultural sociology will continue to flourish.

Hume's General Point of View, Smith's Impartial Spectator, and the Moral Value of Interacting with Outsiders

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-37
Author(s):  
John McHugh
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
General Point ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Do So

Here is an appealing position: one reason to pursue interaction with people from backgrounds that differ from our own is that doing so can improve our moral judgment. As some scholars have noticed, this position seems pedigreed by support from the famed philosophers of human sociability, David Hume and Adam Smith. But regardless of whether Hume or Smith personally held anything like the appealing position, neither might have had theoretically grounded reason to do so. In fact, both philosophers explain moral judgment in ways that seem to present obstacles to the acceptance of the appealing position. This paper entertains the possibility that either of their moral theories contains resources to overcome these obstacles and implies the appealing position. I argue that Smith's theory does so more straightforwardly than Hume's does. This difference, I also argue, reveals something important about the Hume-Smith philosophical relationship. I close by sketching a way to fit the source of the appealing position in Smith's moral psychology with his focus on the desire for mutual sympathy.

scholarly journals SOBRE A FILOSOFIA MORAL DE ADAM SMITH

2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (111) ◽  
pp. 57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugo E. A. da Gama Cerqueira
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Scottish Enlightenment ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Theory Of Moral Sentiments

Este artigo discute a Teoria dos sentimentos morais de Adam Smith. O argumento central do texto é apresentado, tomando por base o contexto proporcionado pela filosofia moral do Iluminismo escocês. Os conceitos de simpatia e espectador imparcial são discutidos, apontando-se a maneira original como Smith concebe a relação entre a moralidade e a sociabilidade.Abstract: This article examines Adam Smith’s Theory of moral sentiments. The moral philosophy of the Scottish enlightenment is central to the argumentation developed in this paper which analyses the concepts of “sympathy” and of “impartial spectator” and points to the originality of Smith’s argument regarding the relationship between morality and sociality.

3. Sympathetic spectators

2018 ◽  
pp. 28-45
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Berry
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Moral Sense ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Francis Hutcheson ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Theory Of Moral Sentiments

Adam Smith published The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759. What the book sets out to do is investigate or analyse how, in practice, judgments and decisions about what is right or wrong are made. ‘Sympathetic spectators’ first discusses empiricism, a particular tradition of moral philosophy that was especially strong in Scotland. It goes on to consider the views of Francis Hutcheson and David Hume on moral sense and sympathy. It then examines Smith’s thoughts on sociality, morality, negotiated discord, self-interest, the impartial spectator and conscience (an internalized standard or benchmark of what is right or wrong), relativism, and moral judgment.

Hume's and Smith's Partial Sympathies and Impartial Stances

2007 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Rick
Keyword(s):  
Critical Analysis ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Critical Discussion ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
General Point ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Moral Point Of View

The moral psychology of sympathy is the linchpin of the sentimentalist moral theories of both David Hume and Adam Smith. In this paper, I attempt to diagnose the critical differences between Hume's and Smith's respective accounts of sympathy in order to argue that Smithian sympathy is more properly suited to serve as a basis for impartial moral evaluations and judgments than is Humean sympathy. By way of arguing this claim, I take up the problem of overcoming sympathetic partiality in the construction of a moral point of view, acknowledged by both writers, as my primary platform. My contention is that Humean sympathy is too mechanistic to actually deliver an impartial adjudicatory perspective, and that Smithian sympathy, with its evaluative, imaginative components, succeeds where Hume's account falls short. The paper is comprised of six sections: (i) introductory remarks, (ii) a discussion of Humean sympathy, (iii) a discussion of Smithian sympathy and its distinctness, (iv) a critical analysis of Hume's attempt to correct for sympathetic partiality in the construction of the judicial spectator's general point of view, (v) a critical discussion of sympathetic partiality in Smithian sympathy & (vi) a critical analysis of Smith's construction of the impartial spectator perspective as a moral point of view.

Adam Ferguson and the Idea of Civil Society

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig Smith
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Scottish Enlightenment ◽  
Commercial Society ◽  
University Of Edinburgh ◽  
English Speaking ◽  
English Speaking World ◽  
The University

Adam Ferguson was a Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh and a leading member of the Scottish Enlightenment. A friend of David Hume and Adam Smith, Ferguson was among the leading exponents of the Scottish Enlightenment’s attempts to develop a science of man and was among the first in the English speaking world to make use of the terms civilization, civil society, and political science. This book challenges many of the prevailing assumptions about Ferguson’s thinking. It explores how Ferguson sought to create a methodology for moral science that combined empirically based social theory with normative moralising with a view to supporting the virtuous education of the British elite. The Ferguson that emerges is far from the stereotyped image of a nostalgic republican sceptical about modernity, and instead is one much closer to the mainstream Scottish Enlightenment’s defence of eighteenth century British commercial society.

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