Collective Action Problems and Direct Democracy: An Analysis of Georgia’s 2010 Trauma Care Funding Amendment

In 2010, Georgians voted on a proposed constitutional amendment that would have increased motor vehicle licensing fees by USD 10 with the proceeds dedicated to maintaining and expanding the state’s trauma care centers. This paper examines voter support for the referendum across counties and finds (1) that counties located near trauma centers in neighboring states had significantly lower support for the amendment and (2) that counties already having trauma centers had higher support for the amendment. These results are, respectively, consistent with free-riding and rent-seeking on the part of voters.

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How chimpanzees solve collective action problems

Proceedings of The Royal Society B Biological Sciences ◽

10.1098/rspb.2012.1948 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 279 (1749) ◽

pp. 4946-4954 ◽

Cited By ~ 15

Author(s):

Anna-Claire Schneider ◽

Alicia P. Melis ◽

Michael Tomasello

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Group Size ◽

Small Groups ◽

Positive Relationship ◽

Free Riding ◽

Personal Relationships ◽

Social Tolerance ◽

Significant Variability ◽

Collective Action Problems ◽

The Individual

We presented small groups of chimpanzees with two collective action situations, in which action was necessary for reward but there was a disincentive for individuals to act owing to the possibility of free-riding on the efforts of others. We found that in simpler scenarios (experiment 1) in which group size was small, there was a positive relationship between rank and action with more dominant individuals volunteering to act more often, particularly when the reward was less dispersed. Social tolerance also seemed to mediate action whereby higher tolerance levels within a group resulted in individuals of lower ranks sometimes acting and appropriating more of the reward. In more complex scenarios, when group size was larger and cooperation was necessary (experiment 2), overcoming the problem was more challenging. There was highly significant variability in the action rates of different individuals as well as between dyads, suggesting success was more greatly influenced by the individual personalities and personal relationships present in the group.

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The Effect of Incentives: The Problem of Collective Action

10.1093/oso/9780190076559.003.0009 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 141-165

Author(s):

Jason Brennan ◽

William English ◽

John Hasnas ◽

Peter Jaworski

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Property Rights ◽

Public Goods ◽

Rent Seeking ◽

The Rule Of Law ◽

Firm Structure ◽

Group Interest ◽

Group Settings ◽

Collective Action Problems ◽

Group Members

Even if cooperating will make everyone better off, cooperation won’t happen if people lack certain kinds of knowledge and motivation. In group settings, individuals will often have incentives to promote their own interest at the expense of the group, either by exploiting others or by failing to contribute to public goods. There are two ways to overcome these “collective action” problems: (1) the incentives that individuals face can be changed so that individual and group interest no longer conflict, and/or (2) group members can embrace norms that enable them to exercise self-restraint and forego opportunities to get ahead at the expense of others. The rule of law, property rights, and proper firm structure can help overcome collective action problems. However, these same structures can also create new opportunities for rent seeking.

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Openness and Its Discontents

Four Internets ◽

10.1093/oso/9780197523681.003.0006 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 71-76

Author(s):

Kieron O’Hara

Keyword(s):

Social Networks ◽

Collective Action ◽

Data Protection ◽

Free Riding ◽

The Internet ◽

Net Neutrality ◽

Bad Faith ◽

Collective Action Problems ◽

Hard Cases

Although openness has many good arguments for it, it has led to a string of hard cases, including data protection and privacy, copyright, censorship, the externalities of social networks, and net neutrality. Openness brings three problematic effects: it is hard to keep out bad actors without centralized gatekeeping; openness does not ensure representativeness or diversity; collective action problems, such as free-riding, can occur. Some technologies enable the efficiencies of openness to be reproduced in systems that are not open, and governments have a number of levers they can pull to restrict Internet freedoms. Some governments even dream of total sovereignty over the Internet. There are various specific complaints about openness, including the need to treat different media differently, the problems of bad faith at scale, a large threat surface, and bias.

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Collective-Action Problems and Institutional Systems

The Political Economy of Collective Action, Inequality, and Development ◽

10.11126/stanford/9781503604612.003.0002 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 13-42

Author(s):

William D. Ferguson

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Large Scale ◽

Free Riding ◽

Second Order ◽

First Order ◽

Organized Violence ◽

Collective Action Problems ◽

Institutional Contexts ◽

Structured Groups ◽

Social Orders

A society’s prospects for development depend on its ability to resolve collective-action problems (CAPs). Resolution depends on underlying institutional contexts. Inequality permeates these interactions. This chapter introduces CAPs, institutions, institutional systems, social orders, and political settlements. CAPs arise when individuals, pursuing their own goals, generate undesirable outcomes for some group. First-order CAPs concern forms of free riding; second-order CAPs concern orchestrating the coordination and enforcement that render agreements to limit free riding credible. Discussion proceeds to distinguish informal and formal institutions (norms and rules) from organizations (structured groups of individuals that can take action). Institutional systems are complementary mixes of institutions and organizations, where the latter play critical roles in resolving second-order CAPs. Social orders are large-scale institutional systems. Political settlements are mutual understandings that limit organized violence by addressing broad allocations of authority and benefits.

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Globalisation and National Incentives for Protecting Environmental Goods: Types of Goods, Trade Effects, and International Collective Action Problems

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.539422 ◽

2004 ◽

Author(s):

Alkuin Kolliker

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Environmental Goods ◽

Collective Action Problems ◽

Trade Effects

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Collective Action

The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 ◽

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.23 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 466-488

Author(s):

Jac C. Heckelman

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Critical Appraisal ◽

Slow Growth ◽

Policy Reform ◽

Free Riding ◽

Institutional Instability ◽

Selective Incentives ◽

Mancur Olson

The theory of collective action, as outlined by Mancur Olson, is presented. Olson argued that individuals are subject to free-riding behavior, which can be overcome by selective incentives. The larger is the potential group, the greater the hurdles to successful formation. Thus, smaller groups with more narrow interests are more likely to form, leading to an emphasis on policy reform that concentrates benefits to the group while diffusing the costs on greater society. The accumulation of such groups will slow growth, and this sclerotic effect is reversed due to institutional instability. This chapter develops a critical appraisal of the theory and the accumulated evidence in the literature that follows from Olson.

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The impact of regionalized trauma care on the distribution of severely injured patients in the Netherlands

European Journal of Trauma and Emergency Surgery ◽

10.1007/s00068-021-01615-1 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Suzan Dijkink ◽

Erik W. van Zwet ◽

Pieta Krijnen ◽

Luke P. H. Leenen ◽

Frank W. Bloemers ◽

...

Keyword(s):

The Netherlands ◽

Trauma Care ◽

Trauma System ◽

Future Research ◽

Severely Injured ◽

Trauma Centers ◽

Severely Injured Patients ◽

The Right ◽

Injured Patients ◽

The Impact

Abstract Background Twenty years ago, an inclusive trauma system was implemented in the Netherlands. The goal of this study was to evaluate the impact of structured trauma care on the concentration of severely injured patients over time. Methods All severely injured patients (Injury Severity Score [ISS] ≥ 16) documented in the Dutch Trauma Registry (DTR) in the calendar period 2008–2018 were included for analysis. We compared severely injured patients, with and without severe neurotrauma, directly brought to trauma centers (TC) and non-trauma centers (NTC). The proportion of patients being directly transported to a trauma center was determined, as was the total Abbreviated Injury Score (AIS), and ISS. Results The documented number of severely injured patients increased from 2350 in 2008 to 4694 in 2018. During this period, on average, 70% of these patients were directly admitted to a TC (range 63–74%). Patients without severe neurotrauma had a lower chance of being brought to a TC compared to those with severe neurotrauma. Patients directly presented to a TC were more severely injured, reflected by a higher total AIS and ISS, than those directly transported to a NTC. Conclusion Since the introduction of a well-organized trauma system in the Netherlands, trauma care has become progressively centralized, with more severely injured patients being directly presented to a TC. However, still 30% of these patients is initially brought to a NTC. Future research should focus on improving pre-hospital triage to facilitate swift transfer of the right patient to the right hospital.

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Agency in historical institutionalism coalitional work in the creation, maintenance, and change of institutions

Theory and Society ◽

10.1007/s11186-021-09433-5 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Patrick Emmenegger

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Conceptual Framework ◽

Historical Institutionalism ◽

Sociological Institutionalism ◽

Collective Action Problems ◽

The Creation

AbstractInstitutionalism gives priority to structure over agency. Yet institutions have never developed and operated without the intervention of interested groups. This paper develops a conceptual framework for the role of agency in historical institutionalism. Based on recent contributions following the coalitional turn and drawing on insights from sociological institutionalism, it argues that agency plays a key role in the creation and maintenance of social coalitions that stabilize but also challenge institutions. Without such agency, no coalition can be created, maintained, or changed. Similarly, without a supporting coalition, no contested institution can survive. Yet, due to collective action problems, such coalitional work is challenging. This coalitional perspective offers a robust role for agency in historical institutionalism, but it also explains why institutions remain stable despite agency. In addition, this paper forwards several portable propositions that allow for the identification of who is likely to develop agency and what these actors do.

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