scholarly journals The Vote with the Wallet Game: Responsible Consumerism as a Multiplayer Prisoner’s Dilemma

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 1109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonardo Becchetti ◽  
Francesco Salustri
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Coordination Failure ◽  
Socially Responsible ◽  
Policy Suggestions ◽  
Consumption And Saving ◽  
The Creation

Socially responsible consumers and investors are increasingly using their consumption and saving choices as a ‘vote with the wallet’ to award companies that are at vanguard in reconciling the creation of economic value with social and environmental sustainability. In our paper, we model the vote with the wallet as a multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma, outline equilibria and possible solutions to the related coordination failure problem in evolutionary games, apply our analysis to domains in which the vote with the wallet is empirically more relevant, and provide policy suggestions.

scholarly journals SATO–CRUTCHFIELD FORMULATION FOR SOME EVOLUTIONARY GAMES

2003 ◽  
Vol 14 (07) ◽  
pp. 963-971 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. AHMED ◽  
A. S. HEGAZI ◽  
A. S. ELGAZZAR
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Initial Conditions ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Theoretical Explanation ◽  
Battle Of The Sexes ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable ◽  
Rules Of The Game

The Sato–Crutchfield equations are analytically and numerically studied. The Sato–Crutchfield formulation corresponds to losing memory. Then the Sato–Crutchfield formulation is applied for some different types of games including hawk–dove, prisoner's dilemma and the battle of the sexes games. The Sato–Crutchfield formulation is found not to affect the evolutionarily stable strategy of the ordinary games. But choosing a strategy becomes purely random, independent of the previous experiences, initial conditions, and the rules of the game itself. The Sato–Crutchfield formulation for the prisoner's dilemma game can be considered as a theoretical explanation for the existence of cooperation in a population of defectors.

MORE SPATIAL GAMES

1994 ◽  
Vol 04 (01) ◽  
pp. 33-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARTIN A. NOWAK ◽  
SEBASTIAN BONHOEFFER ◽  
ROBERT M. MAY
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Reproductive Rate ◽  
Spatial Effects ◽  
Random Drift ◽  
Low Frequencies ◽  
Spatial Games

We extend our exploration of the dynamics of spatial evolutionary games [Nowak & May 1992, 1993] in three distinct but related ways. We analyse, first, deterministic versus stochastic rules; second, discrete versus continuous time (see Hubermann & Glance [1993]); and, third, different geometries of interaction in regular and random spatial arrays. We show that spatial effects can change some of the intuitive concepts in evolutionary game theory: (i) equilibria among strategies are no longer necessarily characterised by equal average payoffs; (ii) the strategy with the higher average payoff can steadily converge towards extinction; (iii) strategies can become extinct even though their basic reproductive rate (at very low frequencies) is larger than one. The equilibrium properties of spatial games are instead determined by “local relative payoffs.” We characterise the conditions for coexistence between cooperators and defectors in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. We find that cooperation can be maintained if the transition rules give more weight to the most successful neighbours, or if there is a certain probability that cells may remain unoccupied in the next generations when they are surrounded by players with low payoffs. In this second case the cooperators can survive despite a very large payoff advantage to defectors. We also compute average extinction times for random drift in neutral spatial models. Finally we briefly describe the spatial dynamics of an interaction among three species which dominate each other in a cyclic fashion. The emphasis of this paper is presenting a variety of ideas and possibilities for further research in the evolutionary dynamics of spatial games. The overall conclusion is that interactions with local neighbours in 2- or 3-dimensional spatial arrays can promote coexistence of different strategies (such as cooperators and defectors in the Prisoner’s Dilemma), in situations where one strategy would exclude all others if the interactions occurred randomly and homogeneously.

THE EFFECT OF A HISTORY-FITNESS-BASED UPDATING RULE ON EVOLUTIONARY GAMES

2010 ◽  
Vol 21 (12) ◽  
pp. 1433-1442 ◽  
Author(s):  
WEN-BO DU ◽  
XIAN-BIN CAO ◽  
RUN-RAN LIU ◽  
CHUN-XIAO JIA
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Numerical Results ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Cooperation Level ◽  
Mixing Proportion ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors ◽  
Updating Rule ◽  
Nature And Society

In this paper, we introduce a history-fitness-based updating rule into the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) on square lattices, and study how it works on the evolution of cooperation level. Under this updating rule, the player i will firstly select player j from its direct neighbors at random and then compare their fitness which is determined by the current payoff and history fitness. If player i's fitness is larger than that of j, player i will be more likely to keep its own strategy. Numerical results show that the cooperation level is remarkably promoted by the history-fitness-based updating rule. Moreover, there exists a moderate mixing proportion of current payoff and history fitness that can induce the optimal fitness, where the highest cooperation level is obtained. Our work may shed some new light on the ubiquitous cooperative behaviors in nature and society induced by the history factor.

scholarly journals Consensus towards Partially Cooperative Strategies in Self-Regulated Evolutionary Games on Networks

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 60
Author(s):  
Dario Madeo ◽  
Chiara Mocenni
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Balanced Development ◽  
Cooperative Strategies ◽  
Partial Cooperation ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Cooperation is widely recognized to be fundamental for the well-balanced development of human societies. Several different approaches have been proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in populations of individuals playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, characterized by two concurrent natural mechanisms: the temptation to defect and the fear to be betrayed by others. Few results are available for analyzing situations where only the temptation to defect (Chicken game) or the fear to be betrayed (Stag-Hunt game) is present. In this paper, we analyze the emergence of full and partial cooperation for these classes of games. We find the conditions for which these Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable, and we show that the partial one is also globally stable. Furthermore, in the Chicken and Stag-Hunt games, partial cooperation has been found to be more rewarding than the full one of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This result highlights the importance of such games for understanding and sustaining different levels of cooperation in social networks.

scholarly journals Firm’s Decisions Based on Consumers’ Choices in Ecocertified Food Markets

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippos Karipidis ◽  
Eftichios Sartzetakis
Keyword(s):  
Value Creation ◽  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Empirical Investigation ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Enterprise Management ◽  
Food Markets ◽  
Demand Theory ◽  
Consumer Data ◽  
Food Market ◽  
The Creation

The present paper proposes a framework for examining whether a food production enterprise, attempting to build an ecocertification strategy, connects the creation of environmental value with the creation of economic value, balancing environmental sustainability with economic sustainability. More specifically, the paper combines demand theory with a discreet choice consumers’ model in an embryonic ecocertified food market, to examine whether economic value is created and to identify the determinants of this value creation. An empirical investigation of the model using consumer data indicates that a variety of factors, such as consumer’s age and profession, family’s income and purchasing strategy, product quality association in consumers’ mind and the retailing outlet, play an important role in shaping the respondents’ intention to pay for the ecofriendliness of products. The proposed framework can help enterprise management to balance the consumers’ and enterprise owners’ claims in cases where certification schemes or standards exist that enable enterprises to communicate social responsibility to their customers.

scholarly journals Dynamics, morphogenesis and convergence of evolutionary quantum Prisoner's Dilemma games on networks

2016 ◽  
Vol 472 (2186) ◽  
pp. 20150280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angsheng Li ◽  
Xi Yong
Keyword(s):  
Phase Transition ◽  
Phase Transitions ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Natural Extension ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Many Body ◽  
The Many ◽  
First Time

The authors proposed a quantum Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game as a natural extension of the classic PD game to resolve the dilemma. Here, we establish a new Nash equilibrium principle of the game, propose the notion of convergence and discover the convergence and phase-transition phenomena of the evolutionary games on networks. We investigate the many-body extension of the game or evolutionary games in networks. For homogeneous networks, we show that entanglement guarantees a quick convergence of super cooperation, that there is a phase transition from the convergence of defection to the convergence of super cooperation, and that the threshold for the phase transitions is principally determined by the Nash equilibrium principle of the game, with an accompanying perturbation by the variations of structures of networks. For heterogeneous networks, we show that the equilibrium frequencies of super-cooperators are divergent, that entanglement guarantees emergence of super-cooperation and that there is a phase transition of the emergence with the threshold determined by the Nash equilibrium principle, accompanied by a perturbation by the variations of structures of networks. Our results explore systematically, for the first time, the dynamics, morphogenesis and convergence of evolutionary games in interacting and competing systems.

A Strategy with Novel Evolutionary Features for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiawei Li ◽  
Graham Kendall
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Features ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Identification Mechanism ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

In recent iterated prisoner's dilemma tournaments, the most successful strategies were those that had identification mechanisms. By playing a predetermined sequence of moves and learning from their opponents' responses, these strategies managed to identify their opponents. We believe that these identification mechanisms may be very useful in evolutionary games. In this paper one such strategy, which we call collective strategy, is analyzed. Collective strategies apply a simple but efficient identification mechanism (that just distinguishes themselves from other strategies), and this mechanism allows them to only cooperate with their group members and defect against any others. In this way, collective strategies are able to maintain a stable population in evolutionary iterated prisoner's dilemma. By means of an invasion barrier, this strategy is compared with other strategies in evolutionary dynamics in order to demonstrate its evolutionary features. We also find that this collective behavior assists the evolution of cooperation in specific evolutionary environments.

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