Reporting in support of supervision of online gambling services by the gambling regulatory authorities of the Member States

2021 ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-238
Author(s):  
Johannes Socher

With Britain’s decision to leave the European Union, the question of the lasting legacy of a specific English administrative culture in the remaining member states arises. Although often treated as an import from the United States, this article argues that the British model of independent regulatory authorities is one of the most formative contributions to a common European administrative culture, forcing other EU member states to rethink fundamental ideas of democratic legitimacy. Taking national regulatory authorities in the energy sector as an example, this contribution shows how British approaches towards organisation and independence of these authorities played a decisive role in the drafting of the relevant EU directives. Consequently, only few changes in UK national legislation where necessary to comply, while in Germany major reforms were due, being the only member state in which no regulatory authority existed in the energy sector prior to the implementation of the EU directives. The analysis of these European requirements, the British influence on them, and the different ways of their implementation in the United Kingdom and Germany are the subject of this article.


2021 ◽  
pp. 113-136
Author(s):  
Robert O’Donoghue

Chapter 5 provides a detailed and comprehensive description and analysis of the major exploitative abuses cases considered by the English courts and competition and regulatory authorities since the inception of the Competition Act 1998, including the High Court, the Competition Appeal Tribunal, and the Court of Appeal. This decisional practice and case law have been widely cited and adopted by the EU Courts in Advocate General opinions and in the judgments and opinions of overseas authorities and courts. The chapter also contains a critique of the case law and decisional practice and highlights important practical points and points of principle that have received insufficient (or no) attention, as well as issues on which the case law and decisional practice are arguably wrong. This analysis is timely, since it is clear that the topic of exploitative abuse remains an important one for the UK competition authorities, regulators, and courts, perhaps even more so than authorities and courts in EU Member States.


2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 533-545 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marek Szydło

The judgment of 3 December 2009 in Commission v Germany touches upon the issue of improper implementation by a Member State (Germany) of the EU regulatory framework in the electronic communications sector.1 In this sense, the judgment in question belongs to the relatively large group of rulings in which the European Court of Justice (ECJ) categorizes the legislative actions (or inactions) of Member States in the field of electronic communications as infringing the Union secondary legislation.2 Undoubtedly, however, Commission v Germany constitutes a judgment that is of paramount importance within the above-mentioned group of rulings and deserves a particularly close attention. Being confronted here with the German rules that generally exempted the so-called new (emerging) markets in the sector concerned from ex ante regulation, the Court had an opportunity to express its views on such key regulatory issues as: 1)the position of encouraging efficient investment in infrastructure, and promoting innovation within the hierarchy of objectives that the EU regulation in electronic communications sector aims to achieve;2)the scope of discretionary powers of national regulatory authorities (NRAs) in defining the markets susceptible to ex ante regulation, and in regulating those markets, including the markets having a new or emerging character;3)the role of national legislators in regulating electronic communications markets, and particularly the relationships between national legislators and NRAs in the field of regulation of the markets in question.It must be noted at once that this latter issue has its far-reaching implications at the constitutional level of the Member States, because the relations between legislative and executive (administrative) authorities are usually determined constitutionally. As a result, the annotated judgment concerns not only such teleological, procedural and institutional issues that are crucial for the Union's concept of regulation in the electronic communications sector, but also issues that are seminal from the constitutional perspective of the Member States. Moreover, the judgment in question is also of great relevance to other network-bound sectors subject to regulation at the EU and national levels, especially as far as the status of NRAs and their position vis-à-vis national legislators are concerned.


Author(s):  
Alison Harcourt

European communications policy is defined as European level coordination of national policies by institutions such as the European Union (EU), Council of Europe (CoE), European Broadcasting Union (EBU) and European Audiovisual Observatory (EAO). The focus in this article is on European Union initiatives that are, in general, directly binding on Member States. They comprise of policies governing cross-border broadcasting (television and radio), telecommunications relating to media, content distribution (networks and subsidies), public service definitions, advertising and quotas. The focus is on current policies, with historical accounts of how they came into being. It draws on primary source material and provides secondary reading suggestions under the section Further Reading. A distinction is made between hard law, which is directly binding, and soft policy coordination, which takes place between the European Union institutions and national regulatory authorities (NRAs). The policy areas under discussion are: cross-border broadcasting (television and radio), telecommunications relating to media, distribution (networks and subsidies), public service definitions, advertising and quotas. European Union initiatives are comprised of four main components: legislation (Directives, Regulations, and Decisions), soft governance (self-regulation and other forms of European level coordination), competition law and distributive policies (the MEDIA programme and Creative Europe). Directives, regulations, decisions and competition case rulings are directly binding on member states. Soft policy coordination takes place between the European institutions and national regulatory authorities (NRAs). It is used primarily to coordinate standard-setting between NRAs and establish common EU positions on international platforms. It has also been instrumental in setting benchmarking exercises and the exchange of best practice in areas where there is no EU legal basis for legislation such as media transparency, freedom, pluralism and independence.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 49-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nina Boeger ◽  
Joseph Corkin

AbstractThis chapter considers the evolving institutional responses to the challenge of regulating telecoms in the EU, taking in the Commission’s push for creating an EU agency versus the resilience of the transnationally networked model, which is usually attributed to the Member States’ sovereignty reflex. Were recent negotiations over the reform of the Regulatory Framework for telecoms, concluded in 2009, simply a turf-war in which the Commission sought to extend the EU’s role against resistance from the Member States, or did the national telecoms regulators and their existing transnational network influence the eventual compromise to retain the soft law, networked model, albeit with some hardening? Characterised as a classic integration struggle, the Member States’ intergovernmental instincts were pitched against the Commission’s supranational instincts and its preference for instruments of control premised on the centralised exercise of hierarchical power. But this chapter paints a more fine-grained picture of the negotiation’s dynamics and especially the influence of the national regulatory authorities (NRAs) and their existing transnational network; a community of expertise that stood to have its role either strengthened or diminished in the revised institutional architecture. In doing so, the chapter moves beyond orthodox (intergovernmental and neofunctionalist) accounts of these dynamics to take an institutionalist approach that is better suited to analysing the EU as a mature system of governance.


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