Manganyi, Calvin/Liebenberg, Ian/Potgieter, Thean (eds), South Africa and Romania: transition to democracy and changing security paradigms. Durban: Just Done Productions 2013, 376 pp.

2020 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Eckardt

This volume is based on NRF-funded research cooperation between the Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History in Bucharest and the Faculty of Military Science at Stellenbosch University, dealing with the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. It discusses the transition to multi-party democracy, the consequent changes in the security environment and the current role and defensive posture of these countries in their respective regions. All contributions are abstracted separately in the introductory chapter (pp 1-11). The specific chapters discuss the joint experiences and challenges in facing the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy (1. Liebenberg, I: "Transition from Authoritarian Rule to Democracy": 13-36; 2. Sasz, P V: "Transition to Democracy in Romania": 37-57; 4. Mangayani, C: "The Role of Youth in South Africa's Transition": 87-121), the reform of the armies (3. Ionesco, M: "Transition, Alliances and Military Reform in Romania in the post-Cold War Period": 59-86; 5. Ferreira, R: "South Africa: From Apartheid Army to a Post-Apartheid Defence Force": 123-135; 7. Mangayani, C: "Structures for Political Oversight of the Military": 171-204; 8. Otu, P: "Military Reform in Romania": 205-231) as well as the repositioning of Romania's security strategy (6. Cioculescu, S: "Romania's National Security Strategy in the Post-Cold War Period": 137-170). South Africa's change in strategy concerning its interests in the Indian Ocean is the main focus of T Potgieter in chapter 10 (pp 267-305)and Romania's status within the Euro-Atlantic security architecture after the end of the Cold War and its entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) has been dealt with by Carmen Rijnoveanu in chapter 11 (pp307-340). Worthy of special attention is chapter 9 (Liebenberg, I: "The Arms Industry, Reform and Civil-Military Relations in South Africa": 233-266), bridging the purchase of arms and ammunition during the inter-war years (1919-1939) to the period of World War II (1939-1945) and even further to the establishment of South Africa's own defence industry under apartheid rule (1948-1989), emphasising the  enormous cost of maintaining a military superiority in southern Africa paving the way for South Africa's economic decline by the end of the 1980s and leading to the political demise of apartheid in the 1994 elections. In chapter 12 ("Waves of Change, Military-Political Reorientation, Economic Alliances and Uncertain Futures": 341-357), the editors make a comparison Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 38, No 2 Book Reviews 181 of the different starting positions of both countries and the national security strategies that emerged from it.

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 639-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Brigevich

The rise of “new regionalism” is one of the most salient features of the post-Cold War international order. Despite the resurgence of regionalism in Europe, little consensus exists on how regional identity impacts public opinion toward the European Union. To remedy this problem, this study examines the impact of three types of individual-level regional identity on support for integration: parochialism (exclusive regionalism), inclusive regionalism, and pseudo-exclusive regionalism. Contrary to scholarly expectations, the multilevel analysis reveals that inclusive regionalists are as equally Eurosceptic as parochial regionalists. In general, regional identity depresses support for integration unless it is expressly combined with a supranational identity. This finding holds true even in minority nations, where respondents are, on the whole, less Euro-friendly.


2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo De Rezende Saturnino Braga

The foreign policy narrative of South Africa is strongly grounded in human rights issues, beginning with the transition from a racial segregation regime to a democracy. The worldwide notoriety of the apartheid South Africa case was one factor that overestimated the expectations of the role the country would play in the world after apartheid. Global circumstances also fostered this perception, due to the optimistic scenario of the post-Cold War world order. The release of Nelson Mandela and the collapse of apartheid became the perfect illustration of the victory of liberal ideas, democracy, and human rights. More than 20 years after the victory of Mandela and the first South African democratic elections, the criticism to the country's foreign policy on human rights is eminently informed by those origin myths, and it generates a variety of analytical distortions. The weight of expectations, coupled with the historical background that led the African National Congress (ANC) to power in South Africa, underestimated the traditional tensions of the relationship between sovereignty and human rights. Post-apartheid South Africa presented an iconic image of a new bastion for the defence of human rights in the post-Cold War world. The legacy of the miraculous transition in South Africa, though, seems to have a deeper influence on the role of the country as a mediator in African crises rather than in a liberal-oriented human rights approach. This is more evident in cases where the African agenda clashes with liberal conceptions of human rights, especially due to the politicisation of the international human rights regime. 


Author(s):  
Timothy Stapleton

Since independence from France in 1960, the Central African Republic (CAR) has experienced numerous military coups both successful and unsuccessful, mutinies by disgruntled soldiers and civil wars that have had terrible impacts on civilians. Three career military officers took power by force and led the country for a total of 36 years: Bokassa (1965–1979), Kolingba (1981–1993), and Bozize (2003–2013). From the 1960s to 1990s, both military and civilian rulers politicized, regionalized, and weakened the CAR military by packing it with supporters from their home areas and ethnic groups, and establishing alternative security structures and bringing in foreign troops to secure their regimes. In this period, the CAR military became a Praetorian force obsessed with the country’s internal political power struggles. In the 1990s, in the context of the post-Cold War political liberalization of Africa, the CAR’s transition to democracy was undermined by a succession of army mutinies over lack of pay and other grievances that fatally weakened an already fragile state. A series of civil wars in the 2000s and 2010s resulted in the near dissolution of the CAR military and the partition of the country into a network of fiefdoms dominated by antagonistic local armed factions separated from each other by beleaguered UN peacekeepers.


2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 575-594 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Massie

AbstractCanada has taken part in six wars since 1945, all of which have been conducted under US leadership. Despite such military interventionism, there have been no systematic comparative analyses of Canada's decisions to take part in US-led wars. The objective of this article is to develop and test a theoretical framework about why Canada goes to war. More specifically, it seeks to account for variations in Canada's provision of combat forces to multinational interventions led by the United States. It assesses leading theoretical explanations by examining five post–Cold War cases: the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya; the war against ISIS; and the refusal to take part in the invasion of Iraq. The article concludes that Canada's willingness to go to war is shaped primarily by a desire to maintain transatlantic alliance unity and enhance Canada's alliance credibility. Threats to national security, the legitimacy of the intervention, government ideology and public opinion are not found to consistently or meaningfully shape Canadian decisions to take part in US-led wars.


2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 680-695 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Maxey

Conventional wisdom assumes the best way to mobilize public support for military action is through the lens of national security. Humanitarian justifications provide a helpful substitute when US interests are not at stake, but are less reliable. However, US presidents have provided humanitarian explanations for every military intervention of the post-Cold War period. What, if any, power do humanitarian justifications have in security-driven interventions? The article answers this question by developing a domestic coalition framework that evaluates justifications in terms of whose support matters most in the build-up to intervention. Survey experiments demonstrate that humanitarian narratives are necessary to build the largest possible coalition of support. However, presidents risk backlash if they stretch humanitarian claims too far. Data from thirteen waves of Chicago Council surveys and an original dataset of justifications for US interventions confirm that humanitarian justifications are a common and politically relevant tool. The findings challenge both the folk realist expectation that the public responds primarily to threats to its own security and the constructivist tendency to limit the power of humanitarian justifications to cases of humanitarian intervention. Instead, humanitarian justifications are equally, if not more, important than security explanations for mobilizing domestic support, even in security-driven interventions.


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