scholarly journals Stan wyjątkowy i stan bez nazwy w myśli Carla Schmitta. Propozycja rozdzielenia

Author(s):  
Wojciech Engelking

The concept of a state of emergency is one of the most frequently cited elements of the thought of the German philosopher of the law and political theorist Carl Schmitt. In its discussions, however, the conceptualization of the state of emergency, which Schmitt proposed in 1924 in his juridical comments on Article 48 of the Weimar Republic’s constitution, is often linked with the theory of Ausnahmezustand from Political Theology (1922). Such a juxtaposition is a mistake, because Schmitt was not a consistent thinker and his texts can be mutually contradictory. I propose, therefore, to separate the state of emergency from Ausnahmezustand – translated from German literally as a state without a name. The main difference between them consists in the different types of legitimacy. The state of emergency from the Constitution of the Weimar Republic finds its legitimacy in this document from 1919, however, read by Schmitt in a way that in his Constitutional Theory (1928) he referred to as relativization of the constitution. For the state without a name, as not being included in the legal order and the equivalent of a miracle in theology, such legitimacy is impossible. In order to find it, one must refer to other Schmitt’s works than the strictly judicial ones. I believe that the state without a name may be legally valid – in a word: not a coup d’état – if we acknowledge that Schmitt’s political theology is not just a methodological project that translates theological notions into political and legal ones, but a wider proposal rooted in the faith in Revelation. Therefore, this figure from the work of the German thinker in which the state of emergency finds its legitimacy is taken from St. Paul’s letters; it is the figure of a katechon: the one who comes and stops the world from disintegration. The use of such legitimacy emphasizes the reluctance to accept modernity, which Schmitt did exhibit, and presents him as a thinker who continued the medieval way of thinking, which is completely incompatible with the strictly modern concept of a state of emergency.

2019 ◽  
pp. 174387211988716
Author(s):  
Wojciech Engelking

The concept of the state of emergency is one of the most frequently evoked elements from Carl Schmitt’s thought. In discussions which are referring to it, however, the conceptualization of the state of emergency, which Schmitt proposed in his juridical comment on Article 48 of the Weimar Republic’s constitution, is often linked with the theory of Ausnahmezustand. In this article I propose to separate the state of emergency from Ausnahmezustand. The main difference between the two consists in the different types of legitimacy. The state of emergency from the Constitution of the Weimar Republic finds its legitimacy in this document, however, read by Schmitt in a way that in his Constitutional Theory, he referred to it as relativization. To find legitimacy of the state without a name, one must refer to Schmitt’s political theology as not just a proposal rooted in the faith in Revelation.


Author(s):  
Ted Jennings

By far the majority of Agamben’s books (about 23) make reference to Paul’s letters, often at key points in discussions of concepts that he finds important for his own work as a thinker of the political. This reliance upon Paul in the context of political philosophy goes back to Spinoza (and we should recall that Agamben has held the Baruch Spinoza chair at the European Graduate School). In his Theological-Political Treatise of 1670 Spinoza identified Paul as the most philosophical of the biblical writers and made use of Paul’s thought to advance a view of the constitution of a liberal or secular republic. Agamben also makes significant use of Paul, but this time as the major thinker of a messianic politics, a thinking with which Agamben identifies his own work. While in his reading of Paul Agamben occasionally refers to modern theologians such as Barth and Moltmann, as well as modern biblical scholars, the most important intellectual context within which he reads Paul is provided, on the one hand, by Carl Schmitt with his reflections on political theology and, on the other, by Walter Benjamin, especially the latter’s theses ‘On the Concept of History’.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 211-234
Author(s):  
Wojciech Engelking

The author examines the critique of the epoch, which German philosopher of law and political theoretician Carl Schmitt worked out in the 1920s. Since this topic is present in most of Schmitt’s works from that period, author chose to discuss three, in which this subject isn’t considered on the margins, but on the foreground: a text  concerning the poem by Theodor Däubler Nordlicht, Political Romanticism and Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations. While the latter is well known in Poland, the first two – a little worse, as well as the whole reflection and biography of Carl Schmitt in that period. The consistency with which Schmitt engaged in the criticism of the times in which he lived, allows us to show how he was born as a political thinker: main ideas of his political theology have their source in the criticism of the era. In addition, the author presents criticism created by Schmitt on the background of that one developed by other thinkers, to point out the differences between this two approaches to the same epoch. The aim of the study is, first, to bring Polish reader closer to the not-so-well-studied period of Schmitt’s reflection and biography (by reaching beyond the above-mentioned works also to the journal of Carl Schmitt, as well as his youthful literary work Schattenrisse, written together with Fritz Eisler), secondly: to present Schmitt as an original thinker of his era.


2019 ◽  
pp. 249-274
Author(s):  
Bernadette Meyler

Its historical association with monarchical sovereignty has tarred pardoning with an illiberal brush. This Postlude examines Carl Schmitt’s Constitutional Theory, Political Theology and other writings to argue that the pardon resembles the sovereign decision on the state of exception. The vision of pardoning as opposed to liberal constitutionalism dates further back than Schmitt, however; it appears as well in the writings of Immanuel Kant, one of the foundational figures of modern liberalism. Only by disassociating pardoning from sovereignty can it be reconciled with constitutionalism. The Postlude concludes by turning to the work of Hannah Arendt as one source for a non-sovereign vision of pardoning.


2021 ◽  
pp. 280-300
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Bennington

Beginning with a curious invocation of our line from Homer by one of the defendants at the so-called “Justices Trial” at Nuremberg, the chapter analyses the famous exchange over “political theology” between Carl Schmitt and Erik Peterson. The inconsistencies of Peterson’s argument are brought out, and attention is drawn to the importance of the use he makes in establishing the supposed impossiblity of a Christian political theology of a quotation about the Trinity from Gregory of Nazianzus. Schmitt’s own claim as to a “stasiology” at the heart of the doctrine of the Trinity, that would support the thought of a political theology of Christianity, is shown to rely on an egregious misreading of Gregory’s text, but doubt is nonetheless cast on the ability of that doctrine successfully to solve the problems associated with the self-destructive properties of the One, as more clearly brought out by Derrida.


Grotiana ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 396-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustaaf van Nifterik

AbstractAn important aspect of any constitutional theory is the state's power to punish transgressions of the law, or the ius gladii. Although Grotius never formulated a complete, comprehensive constitutional theory, traces of such a theory can be found in many of his writings not explicitly devoted to constitutional law. Punishment even plays an important role in his books on war (and peace), since to punish transgressions of the law is ranked among the just causes of war.Given the fact that a state may punish transgressions of the law – transgressions by individuals within and even outside the state, but also transgressions of the law by other states – the question may arise concerning the origin of such a right to punish. It will be shown that Grotius did not give the same answer to this question in his various works. As the right to punish is concerned, we find a theory that seems to be akin to the one of John Locke in the De iure praedae (around 1605), one akin to the theories of the Spanish late-scholastics in De satisfactione and De imperio (around 1615), and a theory coming close to what Thomas Hobbes had said on the ruler's right to punish in the De iure belli ac pacis (around 1625).Of course, Grotius can only have been familiar with the theory of the Spanish late-scholastics, since those of Locke and Hobbes were still to be written by the time Grotius had passed away.


Author(s):  
Marc de Wilde

AbstractThe article analyzes the debate on 'constitutional dictatorship' that took place at the first annual conference of the Association of German Constitutional Lawyers in Jena in 1924. In their keynote lectures, Carl Schmitt and Erwin Jacobi argued that Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution authorized the President of the Reich to derogate from the rule-of-law provisions of the constitution if this was necessary to save its 'political substance'. Advocating a 'doctrine of derogation', they implicitly criticized one of the main methodological assumptions of legal positivism, i.e., that legal norms and politics, law and power, had to remain strictly separated. They thereby set the stage for the emerging 'conflict of methods and directions' that was to haunt German jurisprudence in subsequent years.


1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde

The focus of this paper is not on the person, but on the work of Carl Schmitt, in particular the significance of Schmitt's concept of the political for an understanding of his legal and constitutional theory. Let me start with a short personal memory. When I was a third year law student, I read Carl Schmitt's Constitutional Theory. I came across the formulations that the state is the political unity of a people and that the rule of law component in a constitution is an unpolitical component. I was puzzled by these two remarks. I had learned from Georg Jellinek that the state, from a sociological perspective, is a purposeful corporative unit and, from a legal perspective, represents a territorially based corporation. I had also gathered some knowledge about “organic” state theories, especially that of Otto von Gierke who considers the state an organism and a real corporative personality rather than a mere legal fiction. On the basis of these theories, I felt unable to understand Schmitt's point that the state is the political unity of a people, because in those theories the political aspect is largely missing. It was only later that, by reading and studying Carl Schmitt's essay The Concept of the Political, I gradually learned to make sense of the above remarks. Thus I have discovered that that essay, and the understanding of the political elaborated in it, contains the key to understanding Carl Schmitt's constitutional theory in general. I would now like to explain this.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-300
Author(s):  
Jack David Eller

For millennia, a fundamental question of culture and law has been the relationship between religion and ruler, or more recently between church and state. Although the term “political theology” was not always known, the question remained and was answered in various ways: theocracy, the divine right of kings, the mandate of heaven, the rule of jurists, and so forth. Almost a century ago, Carl Schmitt revived political theology and reshaped it into a less theological and more political subject with his famous notions of sovereignty and the exception. Schmitt highlighted the eternal struggle between power or authority on the one hand and positive law and political institutions on the other, arguing that law can never entirely legitimize or constrain power or authority and that the real site and source of law is the moment of exception and of “the decision.” Trump and Political Theology applies this Schmittian lens to Donald Trump, an exceptional president who seems to use his executive and decision-making power to flaunt law and truth, to cripple and discredit institutions, and to bend reality to his will. The book considers first whether Trump is an aspiring Schmittian sovereign and therefore a threat to democracy. But it goes beyond Trump and Trumpism to critique and rethink political theology in the light of contemporary, especially populist and authoritarian, politics. Finally, it compels us to critique and rethink theology itself as a tool for understanding and organizing politics and society, restoring the relevance of myth and ritual and of pre-Christian and non-Christian characters like the shaman and the trickster for modern politics and social theory.


Author(s):  
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde ◽  
Mirjam Künkler ◽  
Tine Stein

In this article, Böckenförde tries to determine the proper means of conducting political theology. After dismissing juridical political theology in the vein of Carl Schmitt as not so much theological but rather sociological in its discussion of how original theological terms such as ‘sovereignty’ were transposed to the state, people, or government, he turns to two other models: Böckenförde sees a shift away from classical institutional political theology à la Augustine, which explores what Christianity has to say about a state’s status, legitimation, and structure, to what he calls appellative political theology. Immediately concerned with action, the latter manifests itself inter alia as liberation theology and tends to run the risk of dissolving into theologically justified, and ultimately arbitrary, politics. As an alternative model, Böckenförde extols the political theology of Pope John Paul II. By focusing on the words of Jesus and the Gospel and other topics that appear ‘nonpolitical’ at first glance, the pope makes the case for dignity, liberty, and the purpose of man, taking the side of the weak and rejecting violence. In Böckenförde’s view, such a political theology is not about to be rendered obsolete by modernity. Since politics is essentially concerned with relations between individuals and groups, religion cannot avoid being drawn into the political field and raise its voice there as well.


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