scholarly journals Mente Quântica / Problema Cérebro Classical

Author(s):  
Alfredo Pereira Júnior

The quantum theory of mind allows a shift from the Mind/Brain metaphysical problem to the Quantum Mind/Classical Brain scientific problem: how could systematic and coherent quantum processes - assumed to be the physical support of our conscious experiences - occur in a macroscopic system as the brain? I discuss a solution based on a neurobiological model that attributes to quantum computation in intra -neuronal protein networks the role of directly supporting phenomenal experience. In this model, quantum coherence is created or prepared by classical mechanisms as recurrent neuronal networks, oscillatory synchrony and gated membrane channels, thus avoiding common theoretical constraints for the existence of quantum communication and computation (ultra-cold temperatures and quasi-isolation from the environment).

Author(s):  
Yingxu Wang

Eyes as the unique organ possess intensively direct connections to the brain and dynamically perceptual accessibility to the mind. This paper analyzes the cognitive mechanisms of eyes not only as the sensory of vision, but also the browser of internal memory in thinking and perception. The browse function of eyes is created by abstract conditioning of the eye's tracking pathway for accessing internal memories, which enables eye movements to function as the driver of the perceptive thinking engine of the brain. The dual mechanisms of the eyes as both the external sensor of the brain and the internal browser of the mind are explained based on evidences and cognitive experiences in cognitive informatics, neuropsychology, cognitive science, and brain science. The finding on the experiment's internal browsing mechanism of eyes reveals a crucial role of eyes interacting with the brain for accessing internal memory and the cognitive knowledge base in thinking, perception, attention, consciousness, learning, memorization, and inference.


Author(s):  
Shaun Gallagher

An enactivist approach to understanding the mind, in its fullest sense, is not just a matter of action-oriented processes; enactivism is about more than action and sensory–motor contingencies. To understand cognition as richly embodied this chapter considers factors involving affectivity and intersubjectivity. Empirical studies show that affectivity, in a wide sense that includes hunger, fatigue, pain, respiration, as well as emotion, has an effect on perception, attention, and judgment. Likewise, intersubjective factors, including the role of bodily postures, movements, gestures, gaze and facial expressions, and dynamical aspects of interaction, have similar effects. This richer conception of embodied cognition also holds implications for understanding how the brain works.


Author(s):  
Shaun Gallagher

Enactivist Interventions explores central issues in the contemporary debates about embodied cognition, addressing interdisciplinary questions about intentionality, representation, affordances, the role of affect, and the problems of perception and cognitive penetration, action and free will, higher-order cognition, and intersubjectivity. It argues for a rethinking of the concept of mind, drawing on pragmatism, phenomenology, and cognitive science. It interprets enactivism as a philosophy of nature that has significant methodological and theoretical implications for the scientific investigation of the mind. Enactivist Interventions argues that, like the basic phenomena of perception and action, sophisticated cognitive phenomena like reflection, imagining, and mathematical reasoning are best explained in terms of an affordance-based skilled coping. It thus argues for a continuity that runs between basic action, affectivity, and a rationality that in every case remains embodied. It also discusses recent predictive models of brain function and outlines an alternative, enactivist interpretation that emphasizes the close coupling of brain, body, and environment rather than a strong boundary that isolates the brain in its internal processes. The extensive relational dynamics that integrates the brain with the extra-neural body opens into an environment that is physical, social, and cultural and that recycles back into the enactive process. Cognitive processes are in the world, situated in affordance spaces defined across evolutionary, developmental, and individual histories, and are constrained by affective processes and normative dimensions of social and cultural practices.


We know that the brain is the seat of the mind. Constructing the reductive model of the conscious mind requires an indication of the laws according to which the mind emerges from biophysical processes occurring in natural brains. Because in Part I, the authors presented the theoretical model referring to the ideal structures of the imagined neural network, we now have easier task, because we need to indicate in the brains of the living beings those processes that functionally correspond to our postulates. Such suitability is not guaranteed by known processes occurring in specialized parts of the brain. The role of the primary sensory areas is a detailed analysis of sensory stimuli with specific modality. They result in analysis of the meaning of all useful stimuli and their interpretation used in various parts of the cortex. The high specialization of individual cortex areas is striking and are the result of evolutionary development of the brain. New brain structures, such as the new cortex, were added on the outskirts of existing structures, improving their performance in the ever more demanding environments, where other intelligent beings ravened. But even as we know the brain organization, we struggle to understand how it works. How neurons that make the brain work together to create the conscious mind. To discover functionally effective processes in the brain, one need to reach for the biophysical properties of the astrocyt-neural network. In this chapter, the authors suggest that some concepts of neuro-electro-dynamics and the phenomena of neuro- and synapto-genesis as well as synaptic couplings may explain the processes of categorization, generalization and association leading to the formation of extensive, semihierarchical brain structures constituting neural representations of perceptions, objects and phenomena. Natural brains meet the embodiment condition. They are products of evolution, so they have intentionality, their own goals and needs. So they can naturally show emotions, drives and instincts that motivate to act. This determines the nature of constructed mental representations. They are the subject of psychological research, which shows the motivation of pain and pleasure in the field of intelligent activities, as well as the motivation of curiosity and the need for understanding in the domain of propositional and phenomenal consciousness. They describe the way pain is felt in organisms as basic quale. The role of other qualia for “how-it-is-like to feel something” and their subjective character was explained, as well as their interspecies specificity was characterized. In this chapter, the authors present an elementary biophysical phenomenon, that is a flash of consciousness. This phenomenon is synaptic coupling formed in the course of learning. They justify that the stream of such phenomena is the foundation of consciousness. They also point out that the astrocytic-neural network meets all the conditions required to generate conscious sensations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 477-491
Author(s):  
Mark Germine

The Mind is described in terms of our individual and collective experiences. The role of observation by Mind is supported by empirical data that quantum states can be created and changed by the process of repeated observation, and is described by a classical equation, which defines the genesis of information from reduction of uncertainty. This uncertainty is then generalized to the uncertainty of quantum processes. The state of consciousness is always “now,” with a unitary movement forward of Mind in time. This movement involves irreversible processes, which produce mixture of states, such that choices of states are enabled to occur. Such processes appear nowhere in physics, but rather reflect the role of the observer. Within the duration of the mental state, experience arises by repeated observation of the mind/brain state. The processes of conscious experience involve movement from the uncertain unconscious to the certain consciousness, the outgoing process, and vice-versa in dreaming, the inward-going process. Psychopathology is the result of an imbalance and/or dysfunction of one or both processes. In dreaming, in the absence of consciousness, subjective time moves equitably forward and backward in time. This kind of temporal movement is discussed in relation to the Dreamtime of the Australian Aborigines.


Author(s):  
Gary Hatfield

This chapter reviews the basic tenets of Descartes’s mind–body dualism and its context, including the epistemological role of mind in its capacity as a pure intellect and as part of a being with sensory perception. Then, putting aside the metaphysics of dualism, it focuses on the functional aspects of mind and its relation to body, and on the role of the bodily machine in Descartes’s psychology. Within this large territory, it examines mind and psychology as categories applicable to Descartes’s writings before turning to the active role of the brain in Descartes’s theory of mind and machine psychology, including his “natural geometry”, his theory of the passions, and the machine psychology of mindless non-human animals—and of human beings, when the body acts without direction from the mind.


2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 157-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marjaana Lindeman ◽  
Tapani Riekki ◽  
Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen

We examined how people see the role of the brain, the mind, and the soul in biological, psychobiological, and mental states. Three clusters of participants were identified. The monists attributed biological, psychobiological, and mental processes only to the brain, the emergentists attributed the processes to the brain and to the mind, and the spiritualists attributed the processes to the brain, the mind, and the soul. Most participants attributed all states more to the brain than to the mind or soul. Beliefs, desires, and emotions were thought of as more likely to continue after death than other states, but belief in immortal souls was rare and only found among those who also held religious and paranormal beliefs. The results indicate that laypeople may see beliefs, desires, and emotions as both states of the mind, of the soul, and of the brain; that there are large individual differences in how the concept of the soul is understood, and that in lay conceptions, the idea that the processes of mind are processes of brain does not exclude supernatural brain-soul dualism.


Author(s):  
Alexander Kluge

This chapter focuses on fantasy and reaches back to Alexander Kluge's days as an honorary professor lecturing on film and television at Goethe University Frankfurt in 1973. Kluge explains that fantasy is a divided product in the society. He then looks at what Karl Marx has to say about the original concept of labor. Marx mentions it twice, for example, when he explains that a craftsman, when making something like a chair, first forms an image of the chair in his mind and makes a plan before then setting to work with his hands to make this plan a reality. This is an example of the unified path of labor between the activity of the mind and the activity of the hands. Kluge also discusses the imaginative capacity. Sigmund Freud described this imaginative capacity not only in terms of psychoanalytic theory or out of a specific therapeutic interest. Rather, Freud described it and pursued it on account of a general theoretical interest. Freud said that the law of this imaginative capacity exists in people. It is the law of the human mind. Freud said not only that it is influenced by libidinal control and the negotiation of reality, but also that the brain triggers the perception of actual circumstance and then remembers something from the past, a conflict, a desired situation, or a wish. From there, a projection of a concrete action is cast onto the future.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (6) ◽  
pp. 356-366
Author(s):  
C. Susan Mizen ◽  
John Hook

SUMMARYWe consider some advances in relational and affective neuroscience and related disciplines that attempt to resolve some fundamental aspects of the mind–brain problem. We consider the key role of affect in generating consciousness and in meeting our essential survival needs; the neural correlates of relating; how self and other are represented in the brain and awareness of self and other is generated through interoceptive predictive processes. We describe some leading models of the generation and purpose of consciousness, linking theories of affective and cognitive consciousness. We discuss psychiatric and psychotherapeutic innovations arising from this research, new integrated biopsychosocial interventions and the obstacles to be overcome in applying these models in practice.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 419-421
Author(s):  
Ricardo Vieira Teles Filho

ABSTRACT. The case of Phineas Gage is an integral part of medical folklore. His accident still causes astonishment and curiosity and can be considered as the case that most influenced and contributed to the nineteenth century's neuropsychiatric discussion on the mind-brain relationship and brain topography. It was perhaps the first case to suggest the role of brain areas in determining personality and which specific parts of the brain, when affected, can induce specific mental changes. In addition, his case contributed to the emergence of the scientific approaches that would later culminate in psychosurgery. Gage is a fixed element in the studies of neurology, psychology, and neuroscience, having been solidified as one of the greatest medical curiosities of all time, deserving its prominence.


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