scholarly journals Intellectual Humility: A Necessary Precondition to Building Trust in Courts

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Katie Miller

2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 171-182
Author(s):  
Allard R. Feddes ◽  
Kai J. Jonas

Abstract. LGBT-related hate crime is a conscious act of aggression against an LGBT citizen. The present research investigates associations between hate crime, psychological well-being, trust in the police and intentions to report future experiences of hate crime. A survey study was conducted among 391 LGBT respondents in the Netherlands. Sixteen percent experienced hate crime in the 12 months prior. Compared to non-victims, victims had significant lower psychological well-being, lower trust in the police and lower intentions to report future hate crime. Hate crime experience and lower psychological well-being were associated with lower reporting intentions through lower trust in the police. Helping hate crime victims cope with psychological distress in combination with building trust in the police could positively influence future reporting.





Author(s):  
Barend KLITSIE ◽  
Rebecca PRICE ◽  
Christine DE LILLE

Companies are organised to fulfil two distinctive functions: efficient and resilient exploitation of current business and parallel exploration of new possibilities. For the latter, companies require strong organisational infrastructure such as team compositions and functional structures to ensure exploration remains effective. This paper explores the potential for designing organisational infrastructure to be part of fourth order subject matter. In particular, it explores how organisational infrastructure could be designed in the context of an exploratory unit, operating in a large heritage airline. This paper leverages insights from a long-term action research project and finds that building trust and shared frames are crucial to designing infrastructure that affords the greater explorative agenda of an organisation.



2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 17-30
Author(s):  
Kelly James Clark

In Branden Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican’s challenging and provocative essay, we hear a considerably longer, more scholarly and less melodic rendition of John Lennon’s catchy tune—without religion, or at least without first-order supernaturalisms (the kinds of religion we find in the world), there’d be significantly less intra-group violence. First-order supernaturalist beliefs, as defined by Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican (hereafter M&M), are “beliefs that claim unique authority for some particular religious tradition in preference to all others” (3). According to M&M, first-order supernaturalist beliefs are exclusivist, dogmatic, empirically unsupported, and irrational. Moreover, again according to M&M, we have perfectly natural explanations of the causes that underlie such beliefs (they seem to conceive of such natural explanations as debunking explanations). They then make a case for second-order supernaturalism, “which maintains that the universe in general, and the religious sensitivities of humanity in particular, have been formed by supernatural powers working through natural processes” (3). Second-order supernaturalism is a kind of theism, more closely akin to deism than, say, Christianity or Buddhism. It is, as such, universal (according to contemporary psychology of religion), empirically supported (according to philosophy in the form of the Fine-Tuning Argument), and beneficial (and so justified pragmatically). With respect to its pragmatic value, second-order supernaturalism, according to M&M, gets the good(s) of religion (cooperation, trust, etc) without its bad(s) (conflict and violence). Second-order supernaturalism is thus rational (and possibly true) and inconducive to violence. In this paper, I will examine just one small but important part of M&M’s argument: the claim that (first-order) religion is a primary motivator of violence and that its elimination would eliminate or curtail a great deal of violence in the world. Imagine, they say, no religion, too.Janusz Salamon offers a friendly extension or clarification of M&M’s second-order theism, one that I think, with emendations, has promise. He argues that the core of first-order religions, the belief that Ultimate Reality is the Ultimate Good (agatheism), is rational (agreeing that their particular claims are not) and, if widely conceded and endorsed by adherents of first-order religions, would reduce conflict in the world.While I favor the virtue of intellectual humility endorsed in both papers, I will argue contra M&M that (a) belief in first-order religion is not a primary motivator of conflict and violence (and so eliminating first-order religion won’t reduce violence). Second, partly contra Salamon, who I think is half right (but not half wrong), I will argue that (b) the religious resources for compassion can and should come from within both the particular (often exclusivist) and the universal (agatheistic) aspects of religious beliefs. Finally, I will argue that (c) both are guilty, as I am, of the philosopher’s obsession with belief. 





Author(s):  
Richard Foley

This chapter makes a plea both for intellectual humility, which cautions against overconfidence in one’s opinions, and for deference to experts when one is not well positioned to reach an opinion on one’s own. The chapter also discusses how Descartes’s efforts to find a method that would inoculate inquirers against error encountered problems with the Cartesian Circle. The chapter concludes that intellectual humility and openness to new ideas are appropriate even for those who have immense expertise in their fields. All the more so, they are the appropriate attitudes for nonexperts to have; and since no one has expertise in all fields, they are the attitudes that specialists in one field should have when considering issues in other fields. The chapter concludes by pointing out, in particular, they are the attitudes those in the humanities ought to have toward work in the sciences, and vice versa.



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