scholarly journals SEGRO and its Aftermath

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-88
Author(s):  
Xavier Groussot ◽  
Niels Kirst ◽  
Patrick Leisure
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Case Note ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Functional Perspective ◽  
National Courts ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Legislative Reforms ◽  
The Eu

The Court ofJustice ofthe European Union’s (CJEU, Court) SEGRO judgment is more than just a recent addition to the debate on the so-called rule of law crisis in the European Union. As this case note shows, SEGRO touches on the most fundamental aspects of the European Union and its relation to the Member States. From an economic perspective, the Court in SEGRO’s treatment ofproperty rights and the ability ofeconomic actors to rely on their lawfully concluded contracts forms the undercurrent of economic investment in the Union. From a functional perspective, the case is perhaps indicative of a wider change in the role of the Court with respect to national courts’ margin of discretion. From a normative perspective, SEGRO gives rise to an important discussion on the difference between fundamental rights and economic freedoms in the EU since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, as well as ‘constitutional homogeneity’ in the EU after Hungary’s legislative reforms. Finally, from an evolutionary perspective, SEGRO marks another iteration in perhaps a wider shift in the trajectory of the Court with respect to questions that menace the integrity of the functioning of the European Union. This case note first examines the background (I) and facts of the case (II). Then it analyses the Opinion of the Advocate General (III) and the findings of the Court (IV). It concludes with a discussion based not only on an analysis of the SEGRO case (V), but also going beyond the case by analysing the most recent jurisprudential developments concerning Hungary and the issue of the (non-respect) of the Rule of Law in the European Union(VI).

scholarly journals Hungary and the Indirect Protection of EU Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law

2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (10) ◽  
pp. 1959-1979 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Dawson ◽  
Elise Muir
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Central Place ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Far Right ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Fundamental Values ◽  
Eu Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Eu

According to Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, the European Union is a political and economic union founded on a respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law, referred to hereafter as EU fundamental values. The central place of this commitment in the EU Treaties suggests a founding assumption: That the EU is a Union of states who themselves see human rights and the rule of law as irrevocable parts of their political and legal order. Reminiscent of the entry of Jorg Haider's far-right Freedom Party into the Austrian government in 2000, the events of 2012 have done much to shake that assumption; questioning both how interwoven the rule of law tradition is across the present-day EU, and the role the EU ought to play in policing potential violations of fundamental rights carried out via the constitutional frameworks of its Member States. Much attention in this field, much like the focus of this paper, has been placed on events in one state in particular: Hungary.

scholarly journals An Old Procedure with new Solutions for the Rule of Law Crisis

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Franziska-Marie Laura Hilpert
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Enforcement Mechanism ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Strategic Approach ◽  
Small Things ◽  
The Eu

Suggested citation:  Franziska-Marie Laura Hilpert, 'An Old Procedure with new Solutions for the Rule of Law Crisis' (2019) 2(2) NJEL 1. While commentators for the past years, have highlighted that there is no effective enforcement mechanism after accession for the values of the European Union which are enshrined in Article 2 TEU, the Juncker Commission has announced in 2017 that it will be ‘bigger and more ambitious on big things, and smaller and more modest on small things’ thus applying a more strategic approach to enforcement in terms of handling infringements. This Article thus analyses two cases brought by the Juncker Commission after 2017 and on their bases seeks to show that the infringement procedure, when applied strategically, is and remains an effective enforcement mechanism even for the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU in the ‘rule of law crisis’. Thus, by way of analysis of the case C-619/18 Commission v Poland and its comparison with similar cases which have not been as effective, it is shown how the infringement procedure can prevent the enforcement of the most controversial provisions regarding the judiciary in Hungary and Poland and ensure the separation of powers, which is essential for the rule of law. Moreover, by comparison of the Commission’s request and the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in C-235/17 Commission v Hungary it is shown how the Charter could become a significant legal instrument in the Commissions infringement policy towards Member States that are undermining fundamental rights and the rule of law. This Article thereby aims to contribute to the discussion on how to effectively enforce the values of the EU enshrined in Article 2 TEU through an existing enforcement mechanism.

The EU’s (strategic) use of human rights tools and instruments

2020 ◽  
pp. 542-568
Author(s):  
Manfred Nowak ◽  
Karolina Podstawa
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Action Plans ◽  
The European Union ◽  
External Trade ◽  
Double Standards ◽  
Policy Setting ◽  
The Eu

The European Union (EU) disposes of a comprehensive toolbox of instruments allowing it to implement its human rights commitments in internal and external policies. And yet, in this contentious policy setting, the use of human and fundamental rights tools gives rise to criticism ranging from allegations of double standards to its lack of effectiveness and the sham commitment to the use of these tools. The question arises as to the design of the overall architecture for the use of these tools, and whether their use collectively brings the EU closer to its goal of promoting and protecting human rights worldwide. This chapter attempts to uncover the existing practices, and challenges the strategic and organised manner of the pursuit of EU human and fundamental rights objectives within the limits of the existing toolbox and with the due exploitation of opportunities it offers. To this end, we will present a comprehensive oversight and typology of the human rights-related tools but also challenge their use. Finally, the contribution engages in the discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the toolbox, in particular in the context of their implementation, coherence, and effectiveness. The chapter draws from the broad range of experiences of the EU and Member States’ internal and external policies. In particular, it focuses on the 2015–19 rule of law crisis, the implementation of human rights strategies, and action plans in a variety of settings, and the gradual changes in the external trade-human rights nexus.

scholarly journals Limits on Limitations: The Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 779-793 ◽  
Author(s):  
Koen Lenaerts
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Present Contribution ◽  
Competing Interests ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

AbstractThe concept of the essence of a fundamental right—set out in Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the “Charter”)—operates as a constant reminder that our core values as Europeans are absolute. In other words, they are not up for balancing. As the seminal judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the “CJEU”) in Schrems shows, where a measure imposes a limitation on the exercise of a fundamental right that is so intense and so comprehensive that it calls into question that right as such, that measure is incompatible with the Charter, as it deprives the right at issue of its essence. This is so without the need for a balancing exercise of competing interests, because a measure that compromises the very essence of a fundamental right is automatically disproportionate. Therefore, the present contribution supports the contention that in order for the concept of essence to function in a constitutionally meaningful way, both EU and national courts should apply the “respect-for-the-essence test” before undertaking a proportionality assessment.

A Hard Law Approach to States Systemic Violations of Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union

2020 ◽  
pp. 363-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel Poiares Maduro ◽  
Benedita Menezes Queiroz
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
National Level ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Eu

The rule of law is under threat in the European Union. Systemic violations of fundamental rights are affecting the rule of law, democracy, and judicial independence in some Member States and consequently the EU legal order. The level of interdependence between the Member States and the EU legal order is such that systemic violations of those principles in the Member States end up impacting on EU compliance with the same principles. Article 7 TEU did not prove, however, to be the most effective tool to face these problems due to its political nature. The EU’s intervention in the form of infringement actions to safeguard the rule of law at the national level may be a suitable action to address some these serious violations of fundamental rights. Despite of the earlier hesitation to take a bolder action in this regard, the EU Commission, after the Court of Justice’s recent decisions in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portuguese and LM, brought infringement proceedings against Poland challenging this country reforms that put into question the independence of its judiciary. The Court established its power of judicial review over the rule of law in the Member States in C-619/18 Commission v Poland. Ultimately, this decision highlighted the role of EU law in safeguarding the rule of law in its Member States, but more importantly in safeguarding the rule of law in the EU legal order as a whole.

scholarly journals The Taricco saga and the consolidation of judicial dialogue in the European Union

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 357-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonelli
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Case Note ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
The Past ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Common ◽  
Constitutional Identity ◽  
The Eu

In December 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered its awaited decision on the Taricco II case, responding to a preliminary reference from the Italian Corte Costituzionale. The latter, unhappy with the outcome of the earlier Taricco I decision, asked for a re-interpretation of Article 325 TFEU and threatened the Court of Justice with the possible activation of its controlimiti doctrine. The CJEU partially ‘corrected’ its previous ruling and prevented an open conflict between EU law and Italian constitutional law. This case note discusses the saga and its three episodes against the background of the growing constitutional conversation between top European courts. It argues that Taricco is a positive episode of judicial dialogue and may further contribute to its consolidation: on one hand, constitutional courts are increasingly willing to ‘play the game’ and refer to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU; on the other, the Court of Justice seems more reactive than in the past to constitutional courts’ claims and now considers them with increasing attention and detail. Finally, the case note reflects on the partially diverging languages for constitutional dialogue: national courts use the language of constitutional identity, while the CJEU prefers to refer to the ‘common constitutional principles of the EU’.

Review by Constitutional Courts of the Obligation of National Courts of Last Instance to Refer a Preliminary Question to the Court of Justice of the EU

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Member States ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Judicial Remedy ◽  
The Eu

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.

Human rights and the rule of law in judicial cooperation in criminal matters under the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement

2021 ◽  
pp. 203228442199593
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Schomburg ◽  
Anna Oehmichen ◽  
Katrin Kayß
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Cooperation Agreement ◽  
Judicial Cooperation ◽  
Human Rights Protection ◽  
Criminal Matters ◽  
The Eu

As human rights have increasingly gained importance at the European Union level, this article examines the remaining scope of human rights protection under the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement. While some international human rights instruments remain applicable, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union did not become part of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). The consequences, especially the inapplicability of the internationalised ne bis in idem principle, are analysed. Furthermore, the conditionality of the TCA in general as well as the specific conditionality for judicial cooperation in criminal matters are discussed. In this context, the risk that cooperation may cease at any moment if any Member State or the UK leave the European Convention of Human Rights is highlighted. Lastly, the authors raise the problem of the lack of judicial review, as the Court of Justice of the European Union is no longer competent.

Instrument of Mobilization or a Bridge towards Understanding? Religion and Values in the Reform Process of the European Union

2009 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christof Mandry
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Political Identity ◽  
Fundamental Question ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Self ◽  
Reform Process ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Eu

AbstractThe self-understanding of the Europeans has been profoundly put into question since 1989, and during the EU reform process, 'Europe' was confronted by the task of describing itself anew. In this context, the debate about the significance of the religious patrimony took on a key position in the discourse. The broad public discussions of the preambles to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Treaty establishing a Constitution for the European Union (ECT) indicate that the relationship between religion and political remains a controversial issue. The article argues that the 'preamble disputes' are part and parcel of the European Union's quest for a political identity and that the outcome of the identity debate—the self-description as a 'community of values'—deals in a specific way with this fundamental question.

scholarly journals TOWARDS MINIMUM PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES FOR THE DEFENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE EU

2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 1017-1038 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurens van Puyenbroeck ◽  
Gert Vermeulen
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Criminal Policy ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
Judicial Cooperation ◽  
Democratic Rule ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
The Eu

A critical observer would not deny that the practice of European Union (‘EU’) policy making in the field of criminal law in the past decade since the implementation of the Tampere Programme has been mainly repressive and prosecution-oriented.1 The idea of introducing a set of common (minimum) rules, guaranteeing the rights of defence at a EU-wide level, has not been accorded the same attention as the introduction of instruments aimed at improving the effectiveness of crime-fighting. What does this mean for the future of EU criminal policy? Will the EU succeed in the coming years in developing an area where freedom, security and justice are truly balanced? According to several authors, to date the EU has evolved in the opposite direction. As one observer put it:[I]f Procedural Criminal Law arises from the application of Constitutional Law, or indeed if it may be described as “a seismograph of the constitutional system of a State”, then as a consequence the Procedural Criminal Law of the European Union shows the extent of the Democratic Rule of Law, of the existence of a true “Rechtsstaat”, within an integrated Europe. This situation may be qualified as lamentable, as the main plank of the EU's criminal justice policy relates to the simplification and the speeding up of police and judicial cooperation—articles 30 and 31 of the Treaty of the EU—but without at the same time setting an acceptable standard for fundamental rights throughout a united Europe.2

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