scholarly journals Biologics Under a New NAFTA

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-320
Author(s):  
Jordan Jensen
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Pharmaceutical Drugs ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Investment Protection ◽  
The North ◽  
Patent Rights ◽  
Medical Advances

Scientific developments, such as biologics and personalized medicine, have created an entirely new category of pharmaceutical drugs that were not considered when the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) was adopted in 1994. However, the rise of biologics has increased demand for a reconfigured NAFTA, particularly with respect to Chapter 17, which outlines NAFTA’s robust intellectual property standards, as well as Chapter 11, which both lays out the framework for foreign investment under NAFTA and introduces a controversial mechanism referred to as the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism (“ISDS”). The intellectual property provisions of the original NAFTA should be revised to mirror the similar provisions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) Agreement, which better accommodates new medical advances. However, despite criticism of their lack of transparency, the investment provisions of the original NAFTA are likely sufficient to grant medical patent-rights holders the investment protection that they seek because they strengthen transparency, which is ultimately good for business.

Trade, Investment and Risk

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 586-590
Author(s):  
Valentina S. Vadi
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Scientific Evidence ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Toxic Chemicals ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Risk Regulation ◽  
Host State ◽  
The North ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter NAFTA) was successfully negotiated in 1993, the provisions for investor-state arbitration under its Chapter 11 have put pressure on the regulatory spaces of the State Parties. Under Chapter 11, any investor alleging a breach of the treaty norms by a host State can file an arbitration claim. This diagonal dispute settlement mechanism has determined a growing stream of arbitrations, focusing inter alia on the interplay between the regulation of toxic chemicals by the host State and the substantive provisions of Chapter 11. The arbitration claims filed by investors against host States regarding the regulation of toxic chemicals by the latter include those related to the adoption of discriminatory policies, the expropriation of investments and the violation of the fair and equitable standard (FET). In a nutshell, the question is how to reconcile environmental protection with the promotion of foreign direct investment (FDI). Can the host State adopt precautionary policies? To what extent can and should policy influence risk regulation? Should investors be compensated if their toxic chemicals are banned from the market? Which standard of review should arbitral tribunals adopt to assess scientific evidence? This note explores all of these issues through an analysis of the Chemtura award.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement under NAFTA Chapter 11: The Shape of Things to Come?

1998 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 263-290
Author(s):  
J. Anthony VanDuzer
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Minimum Standards ◽  
The North ◽  
State Behaviour ◽  
Nafta Chapter 11 ◽  
To Come ◽  
The Right

SummaryRecently, there has been a proliferation of international agreements imposing minimum standards on states in respect of their treatment of foreign investors and allowing investors to initiate dispute settlement proceedings where a state violates these standards. Of greatest significance to Canada is Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, which provides both standards for state behaviour and the right to initiate binding arbitration. Since 1996, four cases have been brought under Chapter 11. This note describes the Chapter 11 process and suggests some of the issues that may arise as it is increasingly resorted to by investors.

scholarly journals NAFTA 2.0: The Greenest Trade Agreement Ever?

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 659-677
Author(s):  
NOEMIE LAURENS ◽  
ZACHARY DOVE ◽  
JEAN FREDERIC MORIN ◽  
SIKINA JINNAH
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Environmental Issues ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Environmental Agreements ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Multilateral Environmental Agreements ◽  
The Core ◽  
The North ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

AbstractThe renegotiation of what US President Trump called ‘the worst trade deal ever’ has resulted in the most detailed environmental chapter in any trade agreement in history. The USMCA mentions dozens of environmental issues that its predecessor, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), overlooked, and in line with contemporary US practice, brings the vast majority of environmental provisions into the core of the agreement, and subjects these provisions to a sanction-based dispute settlement mechanism. It also jettisons two controversial NAFTA measures potentially harmful to the environment. However, this paper argues that the USMCA only makes limited contributions to environmental protection. It primarily replicates most of the environmental provisions included in recent agreements, and only introduces three unprecedented environmental provisions. Moreover, it avoids important issues such as climate change, it does not mention the precautionary principle, and it scales back some environmental provisions related to multilateral environmental agreements.

scholarly journals Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership's Investment Chapter the new "Gold Standard"?

2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 503 ◽  
Author(s):  
José E Alvarez
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Gold Standard ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Investment Protection ◽  
The North ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Fair And Equitable Treatment ◽  
Equitable Treatment

The Trans-Pacific Partnership's Investment Chapter, and particularly its inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), has been the focus of considerable criticism both in the United States and New Zealand. Despite huge differences between these two potential TPP partners, the anticipated economic and political benefits offered by the pact – but also the threats to democracy posed – have been expressed in similar ways by distinct stakeholders in both countries. This essay describes how this chapter is the culmination of reforms to United States investment protection treaties that began with the investment chapter of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994 and that are now evident in the latest United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (of 2012). The TPP's Investment Chapter borrows heavily from prior United States efforts to narrow investor rights (as with respect to fair and equitable treatment), expand sovereign policy space, and incorporate certain rule of law reforms. For its critics, the pact falls far short of achieving a new "gold standard" precisely because it merely reforms – but does not abandon – ISDS for its enforcement.Editor's note: The text of this article was originally accepted for publication in March 2016. Recent statements by President-elect Donald Trump indicate that the United States will likely withdraw from further participation in the Trans Pacific Partnership and refrain from ratifying the agreed text. Without the United States' ratification, the agreement will not come into force. Despite this apparent ending to the Trans Pacific Partnership, the editors consider that Professor Alvarez's article remains an extremely useful analysis of investment provisions that may well serve as a model for the negotiation of such provisions in other mega-regional trade agreements in the future.

System-Building in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Lawmaking

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 1083-1110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephan W. Schill
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
State Level ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Investment Protection ◽  
The North ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Investment Treaty Arbitration

Since the late 1990s investment treaty arbitration has developed into one of the most vibrant fields of international dispute settlement with now almost 400 known cases. It involves claims by foreign investors against host States for breach of obligations assumed under one of the more than 2700 bilateral investment treaties (BITs), under the numerous investment chapters in bilateral or regional free trade agreements, including the North American Free Trade Agreement, or under sectoral treaties such as the Energy Charter Treaty. All of these instruments offer comprehensive protection to foreign investors by setting down principles of substantive investment protection, including national and most-favored-nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, protection against expropriation without compensation, and free capital transfer. They also allow investors to enforce these standards in arbitral proceedings directly against the host State, most commonly under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention). Investment treaty arbitration thereby not only empowers foreign investors under international law, but also introduces investment treaty tribunals as novel actors into the arena of international investment law. Although arbitration has been a classic form of dispute settlement on the State-to-State level, including for the settlement of investment-related disputes, modern investment treaty tribunals have wider jurisdiction and are more removed from State control than any of their predecessors.

Who Settles Disputes? Treaty Design and Trade Attitudes Toward the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)

2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 881-900 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hyeonho Hahm ◽  
Thomas König ◽  
Moritz Osnabrügge ◽  
Elena Frech
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Market Access ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Public Support ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Design Elements ◽  
Transatlantic Trade ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
Trade And Investment

AbstractWhat type of trade agreement is the public willing to accept? Instead of focusing on individual concerns about market access and trade barriers, we argue that specific treaty design and, in particular, the characteristics of the dispute settlement mechanism, play a critical role in shaping public support for trade agreements. To examine this theoretical expectation, we conduct a conjoint experiment that varies diverse treaty-design elements and estimate preferences over multiple dimensions of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) based on a nationally representative sample in Germany. We find that compared to other alternatives, private arbitration, known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), generates strong opposition to the trade agreement. As the single most important factor, this effect of dispute settlement characteristic is strikingly large and consistent across individuals’ key attributes, including skill levels, information, and national sentiment, among others.

The CETA Opinion of the European Court of Justice and its Implications—Not that Selfish After All

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 503-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Riffel
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Court System ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Investment Protection ◽  
Constitutional Principle ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Eu

Abstract In Opinion 1/17, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) found the investment court system compatible with European Union (EU) law. The ruling concerned the mechanism in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) but the Court’s reasoning is equally applicable to other investment courts as established, for example, in the EU’s investment protection agreements with Singapore and Vietnam. This outcome was far from clear, given that in the past the accession to international dispute settlement bodies regularly foundered on the autonomy of the EU legal order. The present article parses the CETA Opinion and explores its implications. It particularly focuses on autonomy as a constitutional principle and its advancement in Opinion 1/17. Importantly, the ECJ accepted the superiority of a court created by international agreement in relation to the said agreement. Furthermore, it clarified that it is not prerequisite for the Court to rule first on the meaning to be given to an act of EU law before that act can be the subject matter of an investment dispute. Finally, the pdrerogative of the EU to autonomously set the level of protection of a public welfare goal must be secured in a treaty for the EU to join it.

Crafting the International Economic Order: The Public Function of Investment Treaty Arbitration and Its Significance for the Role of the Arbitrator

2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 401-430 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEPHAN W. SCHILL
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
International Economic Order ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Commercial Arbitration ◽  
Party Autonomy ◽  
The Public ◽  
Investment Protection ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Investment Treaty Arbitration

AbstractInvestment treaty arbitration, unlike commercial arbitration, is not a purely private dispute settlement mechanism that is entirely subject to party autonomy and limited in its effects to the parties to the proceedings. Rather, it fulfils a public function in influencing the behaviour of foreign investors, states, and civil society more generally by crafting and concretizing international standards of investment protection. Investment treaty arbitration thus implements and operates as part of a public system of investment protection. Arbitrators, as a result, incur obligations not only towards the parties to the proceedings, but vis-à-vis the whole system of investment protection. These obligations can be conceptualized as part of the public law implications of investment treaty arbitration and affect, inter alia, the role and status of arbitrators in investment treaty disputes, the procedural maxims that such arbitrations should follow, and the way arbitral awards should be crafted.

Nafta Chapter Eleven Arbitral Tribunal: Methanex Corporation V. United States of America, Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits

2005 ◽  
Vol 44 (6) ◽  
pp. 1345-1464 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United States Of America ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Butyl Ether ◽  
Tertiary Butyl ◽  
The North ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Gasoline Additive

The Claimant, Methanex Corporation (“Methanex“), initiated this arbitration against the Respondent, the United States of America (the “USA“), on 3rd December 1999 under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA“), as a Canadian investor. As formulated in its Original Statement of Claim of 3rd December 1999, Methanex claimed compensation from the USA in the amount of approximately US$ 970 million (together with interest and costs), resulting from losses caused by the State of California's ban on the sale and use of the gasoline additive known as ‘ ‘MTBE'’ (methyl tertiary-butyl ether) which was then intended to become legally effective on 31st December 2002. MTBE is a synthetic, volatile, colourless and organic ether, with a turpentine-like taste and odour. Methanex was (and remains) the world's largest producer of methanol, a feedstock for MTBE. It has never produced or sold MTBE.

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