scholarly journals Conceptual framework for the best interests of the child in international law

Author(s):  
Vasyl DATSENKO

On today’s international law, there is a broad consensus on the idea of those who want to talk about all the children and the importance of guilty mother’s interests. Buti and the court at the right are guilty of the arrest of nikrashchikh іnterestіv ditini. Vrakhovuchi is the issue of clear legislative regulation of the law and practice of legal practice of securing terminology of the interest of children, the author has analyzed the law of international law. At the statutory international legal order, there is a need for ECHRL, in some ways there is a lack of food for the protection of interested children in case of a viable dispute about it. Analyzed the keys to the position of the court regarding disputes regarding the child’s privacy Order No. 14 (2013) of the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child “On the right of a child to receive respect for the rest of the world”. Вased on a systematic analysis of the provisions of General Comment No. 14, the author identified two blocks of key positions that the court must adhere to when resolving a child dispute to ensure its best interests: 1) basic positions; 2) the procedure for assessing and determining the best interests of the child. The Committee underlines that the child's best interests is a threefold concept: a substantive right; A fundamental, interpretative legal principle; A rule of procedure. Another main point is the idea of how to apply it to each child individually. One more fundamental principle of the application of the Convention is that the State has no discretion to determine whether to prioritize the best interests of the child and give them due weight in any action. When assessing and determining the best interests of the child in order to make a decision on a specific measure, the following steps should be followed: (a) First, within the specific factual context of the case, find out what are the relevant elements in a best-interests assessment, give them concrete content, and assign a weight to each in relation to one another; (b) Secondly, to do so, follow a procedure that ensures legal guarantees and proper application of the right. As a result of this scientific research, the author has come to the conclusion that providing the best interests of the child are not universal. It must be obtained by the court as a result of identifying and assessing the individual needs of the child, taking into account the specifics of the subject matter of the case being considered by the court. If the court correctly identified and assessed such needs, followed certain legal guarantees, then the decision taken as a result of the case should be considered to be made in the best interests of the child. Key words: concept of the best interests of the child, family law relations, evaluation and determination of the best interests of the child, legal guarantees.

Legal Ukraine ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 14-23
Author(s):  
Vasyl Datsenko

On today’s international law, there is a broad consensus on the idea of ​​those who want to talk about all the children and the importance of guilty mother’s interests. Buti and the court at the right are guilty of the arrest of nikrashchikh іnterestіv ditini. Vrakhovuchi is the issue of clear legislative regulation of the law and practice of legal practice of securing terminology of the interest of children, the author has analyzed the law of international law. At the statutory international legal order, there is a need for ECHRL, in some ways there is a lack of food for the protection of interested children in case of a viable dispute about it. Analyzed the keys to the position of the court regarding disputes regarding the child’s privacy Order No. 14 (2013) of the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child «On the right of a child to receive respect for the rest of the world». Вased on a systematic analysis of the provisions of General Comment No. 14, the author identified two blocks of key positions that the court must adhere to when resolving a child dispute to ensure its best interests: 1) basic positions; 2) the procedure for assessing and determining the best interests of the child. The Committee underlines that the child’s best interests is a threefold concept: a substantive right; A fundamental, interpretative legal principle; A rule of procedure. Another main point is the idea of how to apply it to each child individually. One more fundamental principle of the application of the Convention is that the State has no discretion to determine whether to prioritize the best interests of the child and give them due weight in any action. When assessing and determining the best interests of the child in order to make a decision on a specific measure, the following steps should be followed: (a) First, within the specific factual context of the case, find out what are the relevant elements in a best-interests assessment, give them concrete content, and assign a weight to each in relation to one another; (b) Secondly, to do so, follow a procedure that ensures legal guarantees and proper application of the right. As a result of this scientific research, the author has come to the conclusion that providing the best interests of the child are not universal. It must be obtained by the court as a result of identifying and assessing the individual needs of the child, taking into account the specifics of the subject matter of the case being considered by the court. If the court correctly identified and assessed such needs, followed certain legal guarantees, then the decision taken as a result of the case should be considered to be made in the best interests of the child. Key words: concept of the best interests of the child, family law relations, evaluation and determination of the best interests of the child, legal guarantees.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Robert Deuchars

<p>When the words good or bad are uttered the user generally takes their meaning derived from a system of ethics or morals. In this sense good and bad are particularist in nature and also socio-culturally specific. Let us take a simple example from Antiquity. At school in the West we learn of a figure called Alexander the Great, the Macedonian. By all accounts we are taught that he was a great, and by extension a good man. In modern day Iran Alexander of Macedonia is known as Alexander the Devil. So the question arises: was Alexander good or bad, or both? Is it possible to state unequivocally that the actions of Alexander were as a matter of fact morally good or morally bad? I think the answer to this question is fairly straightforward: it depends. Now this answer is not a simple descent into postmodern territory and moral relativism; there are genuine and empirical reasons to believe all three possibilities pertaining to the actions of Alexander. In short it is not possible to extrapolate from the particular to the general and it is not a question of semantics or even of critical hermeneutics. There is no either/or for Alexander of Macedonia. The binary opposition of good and bad cannot be applied to the particular actions of an individual and furthermore cannot be generalized as a principle, rule or otherwise. This distinction or argument between what can be deemed good and what can be deemed bad may at first sight seem irrelevant to the law but it is not. In moral philosophy natural law theory states that law is based on morality, therefore negating the possibility of a bad law. It is at this point that Jeremy Bentham comes to our attention. Bentham believed that law and morality, although connected need not necessarily be so. Under the principle of utility, which I will explore in more detail later in this essay, Bentham believed that individual intent of an action could be disassociated from the intent that ought to be in place. The principle of utility was this test. In other words when determining the right course of action and what laws should be obeyed for all circumstances and systems, the principle of utility was the foundation. And I will argue later on in this essay that although Bentham is identified as a legal positivist and a philosophical realist his negative idealism is based on an error, much in the same way that he thought he had identified the fallacy of natural law. Bentham’s foundations may not be on stilts but perhaps, more accurately, they were built on silt. Moreover Bentham’s position as a moral philosopher is rather unusual in that although he was indeed interested in the behavior of the individual he was insofar as that behavior might have some bearing on a general system of law. This essay is therefore concerned with this troubling problem. I will proceed as follows. Firstly, I will give an overview of Bentham’s criticism of natural law and of William Blackstone in particular. Secondly, I will look at Bentham’s contribution to the internationalization of the law and his use of the “principle of utility”; he coined the neologism “international” as one of many. I will then move on to see how Bentham expected to actualize his foundational principle through his efforts to persuade others of the efficacy of codifying international law as a form of ‘science’. I conclude by arguing that Bentham’s philosophical realism was, in fact a form of idealism, bordering on the religious; his ‘cosmic calculus’.</p>


2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 457-467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Lapidoth ◽  
Ofra Friesel

In 2003 Israel adopted the Nationality and Entry into Israel (Provisional Measure) Law, 5763-2003. The Provisional Measure deals generally with entry into Israel; at first it dealt only with entry into Israel of residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and later it was extended also to nationals and residents of Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. It is particularly relevant for cases of unification of families and immigration for the purpose of marriage.The following article offers a short summary of the law as it has been amended in 2005 and 2007, as well as its interpretation by the government (since 2008) and then examines its conformity with international law. The Provisional Measure involves a clash between the right of the individual to marry the person of his choice and establish a family on the one hand, and the right of the state to regulate freely immigration and entry into its territory on the other hand. Since international law has not established a right to family unification nor to immigration for the purpose of marriage, the right of the state prevails in this matter. Yet, the Provisional Measure deviates from international law in a different aspect, as it leads to a de facto discrimination, mostly of Israeli Arabs. This discrimination is not permitted by the Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, to which Israel is a party. It is recommended that Israel amends the law in order to bring it into conformity with international law.


Author(s):  
Chantelle Feldhaus

Section 28(2) of the Constitution states that a child's best interest is of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.  Section 9 further provides that every person is considered equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. Several grounds are listed relating to the unfair discrimination of persons, including their sexual orientation. The concept of care is incorporated in the Children's Act, and it entails a comprehensive description of parents' daily life regarding children and the powers and duties expected to ensure the general protection, well-being and best interests of the child. The aim of this contribution is to discuss the sexual orientation of a parent as a factor when considering care and the extent to which courts may give consideration to such a factor. The article will also address the question of whether or not the role of a parent's sexual orientation in determining the best interests of the child has changed since the common law concept of custody was replaced by the concept of care in the Children's Act. In this article, care and the best interests of the child will be discussed first. International law will be considered thereafter, followed by a discussion on the approach of our courts, pre- and post-1994, in order to come to a conclusion and make recommendations.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 116
Author(s):  
Sayel Mofleh Momani ◽  
Maher Saleh Al-Jubouri ◽  
Noor Akef Al-Dabbas

Each legal system has individuals who are addressed with its rules and that the legal rules of the legal system are designed to regulate the relationship between these individuals, and one individual can have legal personality in more than one legal system. The legal personality of these individuals is highlighted by the relationship between them and the legal system in which arranges for them rights and impose obligations on them. The rights and duties of a legal person are not the same; they vary from person to person within the same legal system, and vary from one legal system to another. With regard to the international legal order, it has its own international legal persons, foremost among them States. As for the individual, his legal status under general international law is still not clearly defined and is a subject of controversy among the jurists and interpreters of international law. We will present the position of international jurisprudence on the status of the individual in the first demand, the rules of international law that address individuals directly in a second demand, and the right to submit complaints and claims at the international level in a third demand.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 168
Author(s):  
Dyah Listyarini

Indonesia as a state of law has ratified several international human rights instruments, especially the Convention on the Rights of the Child, in which the state should ensure the protection, respect, fulfillment, promotion, and enforcement of children's rights. In fact, many children have been treated unjustly in the fulfillment of their rights when conflicting with the law.  Methods of legal protection of the rights of children conflicting with the law are based on the provision that “every child has the right to survive, grow and develop as well as the right to protection from violence and discrimination”. Other ways to protect children’s rights may also include the policy that children conflicting with the law should be treated humanely in accordance with their dignity and rights; special personnel should be provided for their companion and counseling; sanctions should be appropriated for the best interests of the children; and special facilities and infrastructure for children should be equally provided. This means that appropriate sanctions should hence be supported through the process of resolving cases using the principle of “diverse and restorative justice  The concept of diverse and restorative justice can be applied to the crime of under 7th-year punishments and non-repeated crime. Methods for handling children who have conflicts with the law have hitherto emphasized on normative juridical processes such as investigation, prosecution, and examination of the case by the judge (in court). The processes, however, have not guidelines or technical manuals for law enforcement officers to implement the non-litigation settlement for children cases


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-32
Author(s):  
Thomas Keenan

Abstract Despite the ubiquitous coverage of the Libyan revolution throughout the last six months, very little has been said regarding the legal foundations for the rebels’ actions. Within the international legal framework, it must be asked whether the Libyan people even had a legal right in the first place to overthrow the Gaddafi regime. In fact, the existence of a right to rebel under international law is very much an unsettled matter. Among the sources of international law, a right to rebel is not enumerated in any of the principal international instruments. In truth, the only significant mention of the right is a passing but ambiguous reference in the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A customary right of revolution is similarly absent, as many nations criminalize treason and other insurrectionary activities. Instead, if such a right exists in international law, it must derive from the well-enshrined right of self-determination. Th is right would thus constitute an additional exception to international law’s general prohibition on the use force, standing alongside self-defense and Security Council peace enforcement. Yet establishing a right of revolution would mark a significant departure from these other exemptions. In essence, the right of revolution represents an allowance for non-state actors to resort to force unilaterally for the protection of human rights. For this very reason, contemporary international law likely does not recognize a popular right to revolt. In light of international law’s fi rm restrictions on lawful uses of force, there is no evidence that the law currently acknowledges a novel exception for the individual enforcement of human rights. Th us, in the absence of a change in the law, the proper legal remedy for the Libyan people was not rebellion but rather an appeal to the international community.


2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 482-516
Author(s):  
Mariya Riekkinen ◽  
Serikhan Adilghazi ◽  
Aliya Tasbulatova

The aim of this article is to study the nexus between the autonomy of minors in implementing the right to peaceful assembly and the best interests of the child in safety. We consider the issue, taking Russia as an example, where the past tradition of denying children’s legal personality still surfaces in modern legislation dealing with the rights of the child. Pursuing child-sensitive practices of minors’ participation in protest are of special importance for Russia, where the legislation uses the term, “the legitimate interest of the child”, different in scope to, “the best interests of the child”. Our meta-question, hence, is whether the legal system of the Russian Federation allows full respect for minors’ autonomy in implementing participation rights while adequately addressing vulnerability of children. The article scrutinises a body of rules governing participation of under-aged persons in protest rallies which are stipulated by constitutional and administrative law going back to the practices of the Soviet era and referring to the standards of international law.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Robert Deuchars

<p>When the words good or bad are uttered the user generally takes their meaning derived from a system of ethics or morals. In this sense good and bad are particularist in nature and also socio-culturally specific. Let us take a simple example from Antiquity. At school in the West we learn of a figure called Alexander the Great, the Macedonian. By all accounts we are taught that he was a great, and by extension a good man. In modern day Iran Alexander of Macedonia is known as Alexander the Devil. So the question arises: was Alexander good or bad, or both? Is it possible to state unequivocally that the actions of Alexander were as a matter of fact morally good or morally bad? I think the answer to this question is fairly straightforward: it depends. Now this answer is not a simple descent into postmodern territory and moral relativism; there are genuine and empirical reasons to believe all three possibilities pertaining to the actions of Alexander. In short it is not possible to extrapolate from the particular to the general and it is not a question of semantics or even of critical hermeneutics. There is no either/or for Alexander of Macedonia. The binary opposition of good and bad cannot be applied to the particular actions of an individual and furthermore cannot be generalized as a principle, rule or otherwise. This distinction or argument between what can be deemed good and what can be deemed bad may at first sight seem irrelevant to the law but it is not. In moral philosophy natural law theory states that law is based on morality, therefore negating the possibility of a bad law. It is at this point that Jeremy Bentham comes to our attention. Bentham believed that law and morality, although connected need not necessarily be so. Under the principle of utility, which I will explore in more detail later in this essay, Bentham believed that individual intent of an action could be disassociated from the intent that ought to be in place. The principle of utility was this test. In other words when determining the right course of action and what laws should be obeyed for all circumstances and systems, the principle of utility was the foundation. And I will argue later on in this essay that although Bentham is identified as a legal positivist and a philosophical realist his negative idealism is based on an error, much in the same way that he thought he had identified the fallacy of natural law. Bentham’s foundations may not be on stilts but perhaps, more accurately, they were built on silt. Moreover Bentham’s position as a moral philosopher is rather unusual in that although he was indeed interested in the behavior of the individual he was insofar as that behavior might have some bearing on a general system of law. This essay is therefore concerned with this troubling problem. I will proceed as follows. Firstly, I will give an overview of Bentham’s criticism of natural law and of William Blackstone in particular. Secondly, I will look at Bentham’s contribution to the internationalization of the law and his use of the “principle of utility”; he coined the neologism “international” as one of many. I will then move on to see how Bentham expected to actualize his foundational principle through his efforts to persuade others of the efficacy of codifying international law as a form of ‘science’. I conclude by arguing that Bentham’s philosophical realism was, in fact a form of idealism, bordering on the religious; his ‘cosmic calculus’.</p>


Author(s):  
Carla Ferstman

This chapter considers the consequences of breaches of human rights and international humanitarian law for the responsible international organizations. It concentrates on the obligations owed to injured individuals. The obligation to make reparation arises automatically from a finding of responsibility and is an obligation of result. I analyse who has this obligation, to whom it is owed, and what it entails. I also consider the right of individuals to procedures by which they may vindicate their right to a remedy and the right of access to a court that may be implied from certain human rights treaties. In tandem, I consider the relationship between those obligations and individuals’ rights under international law. An overarching issue is how the law of responsibility intersects with the specialized regimes of human rights and international humanitarian law and particularly, their application to individuals.


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