scholarly journals Joint Emission Reduction Dynamic Decisions and Coordination in a Supply Chain Considering Altruistic Behavior and Reference Low-Carbon Effect

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
ziyuan zhang ◽  
Liying Yu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Intensity Increase ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Reduce Emissions ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

Abstract In the context of low-carbon economy, supply chain members’ joint emission reduction issue has become a research hotspot, while there are few researches which synthetically studies the effect of consumers’ reference low-carbon effect and supply chain members’ altruistic behavior on their decisions. To study the impact of supply chain members’ altruistic behavior and consumers’ reference low-carbon effect on their joint emission reduction decisions and profits, we build optimization models under four decision scenarios, in which we solve the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s optimal emission reduction strategies and other equilibrium solutions by differential game theory. We obtain some findings. First, consumers' reference low-carbon effect will harm the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer, discourage the manufacturer's enthusiasm to reduce emissions and retailer's enthusiasm for low-carbon publicity. Second, the altruistic behavior of the manufacturer and the retailer can not only weaken the negative impact of the reference low-carbon effect, but also promote both parties to actively reduce emissions, help achieve Pareto improvement of their own profits and utilities, and obtain additional social welfare. Third, the cost-sharing contract can encourage the manufacturer to increase emission reduction investment without affecting the retailer’s low-carbon publicity investment, and can achieve a Pareto improvement of both parties’ profits and utilities. In addition, the cost-sharing ratio is only proportional to the marginal profits and altruistic intensity of both parties, and is not affected by the reference low-carbon effect. Meanwhile, the cost-sharing ratio will decrease as the manufacturer’s marginal profit and altruistic intensity increase, and will increase as the retailer’s marginal profit and altruistic intensity increase. In particular, when the retailer is completely altruistic, the cost-sharing contract can achieve perfect coordination of the supply chain.

scholarly journals Knowledge Sharing Strategy and Emission Reduction Benefits of Low Carbon Technology Collaborative Innovation in the Green Supply Chain

2022 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fuqiang Wang ◽  
Huimin Li ◽  
Yongchao Cao ◽  
Chengyi Zhang ◽  
Yunlong Ran
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Knowledge Sharing ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Knowledge Stock ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
The Cost

Knowledge sharing (KS) in the green supply chain (GSC) is jointly determined by the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers. This study uses the differential game method to explore the dynamic strategy of KS and the benefits of emission reduction in the process of low carbon (LC) technology in the GSC. The optimal trajectory of the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of suppliers and manufacturers under different strategies are obtained. The validity of the model and the results are verified by numerical simulation analysis, and the sensitivity analysis of the main parameters in the case of collaborative sharing is carried out. The results show that in the case of centralized decision-making, the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers are the highest, and the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of GSC are also the best. The cost-sharing mechanism can realize the Pareto improvement of GSC’s knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits, but the cost-sharing mechanism can only increase the supplier’s KS effort level. In addition, this study found that the price of carbon trading and the rate of knowledge decay have a significant impact on KS. The study provides a theoretical basis for promoting KS in the GSC and LC technology innovation.

scholarly journals Joint emission reduction dynamic optimization and coordination in the supply chain considering fairness concern and reference low-carbon effect

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Ziyuan Zhang ◽  
Liying Yu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Optimization ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
The Impact

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>In the context of low-carbon economy, in order to explore the impact of the fairness concern and reference low-carbon effect on supply chain members' balanced emission reduction decisions and profits, supply chain joint emission reduction dynamic optimization models under four different scenarios are built, in which the manufacturer's optimal emission reduction strategy, the retailer's optimal low-carbon promotion strategy and other equilibrium solutions are solved by differential game theory. On the basis of analysis, a contract is designed to achieve the coordination of the supply chain when members are fairness concern. Some findings are as follows. First, when consumers' purchasing behavior is significantly affected by the reference low-carbon effect, and they have higher expectations for the product's emission reduction level, consumers' reference low-carbon effect will discourage the manufacturer's enthusiasm to reduce emissions, and do harm to the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer. Second, the fairness concern behavior of both parties will aggravate the adverse effects of reference low-carbon effect, bring a detrimental effect on the performance of the supply chain, aggravate the double marginal effect of the supply chain, and cause continuous negative social influence. Third, the bilateral cost-sharing contract can encourage the manufacturer to increase emission reduction investment, the retailer to increase low-carbon promotion investment, and can achieve a Pareto improvement of both parties' profits and utilities. In addition, the two cost-sharing ratios are only proportional to the marginal revenue and fairness concern intensity of both parties. Finally, when the two cost-sharing ratios and the revenue-sharing coefficient meet a certain relationship and are within a reasonable range, the bilateral cost sharing-revenue sharing hybrid contract can reduce the double marginal effect and achieve supply chain coordination.</p>

scholarly journals Supply Chain Investment in Carbon Emission-Reducing Technology Based on Stochasticity and Low-Carbon Preferences

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Shan Yu ◽  
Qiang Hou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Dynamic Perspective ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

Due to excessive greenhouse gas emissions, carbon emission-reducing measures are urgently needed. Important emission-reduction measures mainly include carbon trading and low-carbon cost subsidies. Comprehensive consideration of these two policies is a research hotspot in the field of low-carbon technology investment. Based on this background, this paper considers the impact of consumer low-carbon preferences on market demand and the impact of uncertainty in carbon emission-reduction behaviour. We construct a stochastic differential game model with upstream and downstream enterprises based on cost-sharing coordination under a cost subsidy. From a dynamic perspective, this paper researches the optimal equilibrium strategy and evolution characteristics of the joint emission-reduction mechanism in a supply chain. This paper discusses the sensitivity of the parameters and uses numerical simulation to verify the impact of each parameter on the emission-reduction decision-making activities of stakeholders after introducing the cost subsidy. The results show that a cost subsidy policy can promote carbon emission-reduction investment and supply chain profit. Thus, it is important to strengthen technical cooperation and exchange among enterprises.

scholarly journals The Low-Carbon Supply Chain Coordination Problem with Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 3591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Wu ◽  
Yuxiang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Emission Abatement ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

In this paper, we study the supply chain coordination problem between a manufacturer and a retailer regarding consumers’ low-carbon preferences. The retailer considers the market demand to determine the order quantity; the manufacturer chooses how to reduce emissions according to the retailer’s order quantity. We consider four cases, including the non-emission abatement, the emission abatement of decentralized decision-making, the centralized decision-making and the retailer providing a cost-sharing contract. By comparing the four cases, we find that the case of a retailer providing a cost-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain, achieving a Pareto improvement for the manufacturer and retailer. In addition, we use the Rubinstein bargaining model to determine the cost-sharing ratio. Finally, numerical simulations are given to analyze the impact of the cost-sharing ratio on the equilibrium results, including the profit and the emission abatement level. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of the cost-sharing ratio and consumers’ low-carbon awareness on the profits of the members in the supply chain. We find that the equilibrium results, including the order quantity, the emission abatement level and the profits of the members in the supply chain under contract, are higher than the ones under centralized decision-making. The results show that in the higher low-carbon awareness market, retailers should formulate a reasonable cost-sharing ratio to achieve emission reduction coordination.

scholarly journals Dynamic Optimization and Coordination of Cooperative Emission Reduction in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Reference Low-Carbon Effect and Low-Carbon Goodwill

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 539
Author(s):  
Ziyuan Zhang ◽  
Liying Yu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Optimization ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

Although the issue of cooperative emission reduction in supply chains has been extensively studied, there is little literature that considers the impact of consumers’ reference low-carbon effect and product low-carbon goodwill on their purchasing behavior in the issue of dual-channel supply chain cooperative emission reduction. In order to explore the impact of consumers’ reference low-carbon effect and product low-carbon goodwill on the balanced emission reduction decisions and profit of dual-channel supply chain members, we establish a dual-channel supply chain emission reduction dynamic optimization model, use differential game theory to solve the manufacturer’s optimal emission reduction investment and the retailer’s optimal low-carbon publicity investment strategies under four different decision scenarios, and analyze them in detail. In addition, we also design an effective low-carbon publicity cost-sharing contract to achieve coordination of the supply chain. The research results show that the equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and retailer and the overall profit of the supply chain under the centralized decision scenario are better than those of decentralized decision scenario. When the initial reference low-carbon level is low, the online and offline reference low-carbon effects are beneficial to the manufacturer and retailer. When the initial low-carbon goodwill is high, it is beneficial for both the manufacturer and retailer to increase consumer recognition of low-carbon goodwill. When the ratio of low-carbon publicity cost sharing provided by the manufacturer to the retailer is within a reasonable range, the cost-sharing contract can reduce the double marginal effect and achieve supply chain coordination.

scholarly journals A Two-Echelon Agricultural Product Supply Chain with Freshness and Greenness Concerns: A Cost-Sharing Contract Perspective

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Manyi Tan ◽  
Manli Tu ◽  
Bin Wang ◽  
Tianyue Zou ◽  
Hong Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Sensitivity Analyses ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

Agricultural products are basic needs of human beings, and whether they are cultivated in a green (or organic) manner has direct impact on environment and public health. This research incorporates product freshness and greenness into a two-echelon agricultural product supply chain (APSC). Game theoretic analyses are carried out to examine pricing, freshness, and greenness decisions of the supply chain members with and without cost-sharing for greenness investment. Subsequently, we conduct comparative and sensitivity analyses for these optimal decisions and profits of the APSC members under different cases. Numerical experiment is employed to investigate the impact of key parameters on equilibrium decisions and profitability. Analytical and experimental results show that the cost-sharing contract of greenness investment for agricultural products helps to strengthen the supply chain members’ effort in improving the greenness and freshness levels of the agricultural product, thereby enhancing both individual and channel profitability of the APSC under certain conditions. This research also reveals a widened profit gap between the producer and the retailer under the cost-sharing contract.

Cost-Sharing Contract in Low Carbonization Supply Chain Based on Improving Demand for Low-Carbon Products

2014 ◽  
Vol 1073-1076 ◽  
pp. 2539-2544
Author(s):  
Yan Ju Zhou ◽  
Yu Qing Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Reduction Cost

For the existence of carbon emission reduction cost, the retail price of the products is so high that the market demand is low, which restricts the promotion of low-carbon products. On the background of a bilateral-monopoly supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, we establish Stackelberg models based on the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing. And we analyze the changes of the order quantity, the profits of each member and the whole supply chain before and after the implementation of the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing contract. According to the research, when the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing contract is introduced into the model, it leads to a good consequence that the optimal order quantity of the low-carbon product increases, the retail price decreases, and the manufacturer and the retailer will get Pareto improvement on certain condition. Then we derivate the necessary conditions that the profit of the retailer and the manufacturer could both increase.

Contracting Emissions Reduction Supply Chain Based on Market Low-Carbon Preference and Carbon Intensity Constraint

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (02) ◽  
pp. 2050003
Author(s):  
Jiaping Xie ◽  
Jing Li ◽  
Ling Liang ◽  
Xu Fang ◽  
Guang Yang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Numerical Study ◽  
Carbon Intensity ◽  
Emissions Reduction ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Carbon Emissions Reduction ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
The Impact

Carbon emissions reduction has become a frequently discussed topic in industry and academia. However, how can reduction effects be enhanced with dominant brand and downstream manufacturer? This paper incorporates emissions reduction into a green supply chain which considers consumers’ low-carbon preference behavior and government intensity regulations, in order to discuss the impacts of consumers’ environmental awareness and government constraints on optimal emissions reduction and profit, respectively. The paper first constructs three reduction models on the basis of reality: independent reduction by manufacturer, contractual reduction by brand and collaborative reduction by both. Then it concludes the optimal decisions and compare the models. The results show that both the profits and emissions reduction will be decreased with the strengthened carbon intensity constraint, but the cost-sharing contract can mitigate this negative effect on dominant brand and society. Meanwhile, the acceptable range of cost-sharing ratio will be smaller with a lower cost coefficient of emissions reduction and a higher consumers’ preference. Furthermore, government should design the incentive method or regulate the carbon market to improve the social welfare level. Lastly, a numerical study is conducted, the impact of several key factors on supply chain performance and model selection are presented for management decisions.

scholarly journals Game Theoretic Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction and Sales Promotion in Dyadic Supply Chain in Presence of Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liangjie Xia ◽  
Longfei He
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Sales Promotion ◽  
Side Payment ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Cost

The paper studies how the combination of the manufacturer’s carbon emission reduction and the retailer’s emission reduction relevant promotion impacts the performances of a dyadic supply chain in low-carbon environment. We consider three typical scenarios, that is, centralized and decentralized without or with side-payment. We compare measures of supply chain performances, such as profitabilities, emission reduction efficiencies, and effectiveness, in these scenarios. To improve chain-wide performances, a new side-payment contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain and numerical experiments are also conducted. We find the following. (1) In decentralized setting, the retailer will provide emission cutting allowance to the manufacturer only if their unit product profit margin is higher enough than the manufacturer’s, and the emission reduction level of per unit product is a monotonically increasing function with respect to the cost pooling proportion provided by the retailer; (2) the new side-payment contract can coordinate the dyadic supply chain successfully due to its integrating sales promotion effort and emission reduction input, which results in system pareto optimality under decentralized individual rationality but achieves a collective rationality effect in the centralized setting; (3) when without external force’s regulation, consumers’ low-carbon awareness is to enhance consumers’ utility and decrease profits of supply chain firms.

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