scholarly journals Dynamic Optimization and Coordination of Cooperative Emission Reduction in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Reference Low-Carbon Effect and Low-Carbon Goodwill

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 539
Author(s):  
Ziyuan Zhang ◽  
Liying Yu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Optimization ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

Although the issue of cooperative emission reduction in supply chains has been extensively studied, there is little literature that considers the impact of consumers’ reference low-carbon effect and product low-carbon goodwill on their purchasing behavior in the issue of dual-channel supply chain cooperative emission reduction. In order to explore the impact of consumers’ reference low-carbon effect and product low-carbon goodwill on the balanced emission reduction decisions and profit of dual-channel supply chain members, we establish a dual-channel supply chain emission reduction dynamic optimization model, use differential game theory to solve the manufacturer’s optimal emission reduction investment and the retailer’s optimal low-carbon publicity investment strategies under four different decision scenarios, and analyze them in detail. In addition, we also design an effective low-carbon publicity cost-sharing contract to achieve coordination of the supply chain. The research results show that the equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and retailer and the overall profit of the supply chain under the centralized decision scenario are better than those of decentralized decision scenario. When the initial reference low-carbon level is low, the online and offline reference low-carbon effects are beneficial to the manufacturer and retailer. When the initial low-carbon goodwill is high, it is beneficial for both the manufacturer and retailer to increase consumer recognition of low-carbon goodwill. When the ratio of low-carbon publicity cost sharing provided by the manufacturer to the retailer is within a reasonable range, the cost-sharing contract can reduce the double marginal effect and achieve supply chain coordination.

scholarly journals Joint emission reduction dynamic optimization and coordination in the supply chain considering fairness concern and reference low-carbon effect

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Ziyuan Zhang ◽  
Liying Yu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Optimization ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
The Impact

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>In the context of low-carbon economy, in order to explore the impact of the fairness concern and reference low-carbon effect on supply chain members' balanced emission reduction decisions and profits, supply chain joint emission reduction dynamic optimization models under four different scenarios are built, in which the manufacturer's optimal emission reduction strategy, the retailer's optimal low-carbon promotion strategy and other equilibrium solutions are solved by differential game theory. On the basis of analysis, a contract is designed to achieve the coordination of the supply chain when members are fairness concern. Some findings are as follows. First, when consumers' purchasing behavior is significantly affected by the reference low-carbon effect, and they have higher expectations for the product's emission reduction level, consumers' reference low-carbon effect will discourage the manufacturer's enthusiasm to reduce emissions, and do harm to the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer. Second, the fairness concern behavior of both parties will aggravate the adverse effects of reference low-carbon effect, bring a detrimental effect on the performance of the supply chain, aggravate the double marginal effect of the supply chain, and cause continuous negative social influence. Third, the bilateral cost-sharing contract can encourage the manufacturer to increase emission reduction investment, the retailer to increase low-carbon promotion investment, and can achieve a Pareto improvement of both parties' profits and utilities. In addition, the two cost-sharing ratios are only proportional to the marginal revenue and fairness concern intensity of both parties. Finally, when the two cost-sharing ratios and the revenue-sharing coefficient meet a certain relationship and are within a reasonable range, the bilateral cost sharing-revenue sharing hybrid contract can reduce the double marginal effect and achieve supply chain coordination.</p>

scholarly journals Study on Emission Reduction Strategies of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Green Finance

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheng Che ◽  
Yi Chen ◽  
Xiaoguang Zhang ◽  
Liangyan Zhao ◽  
Peng Guo ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Green Finance ◽  
Emission Reduction Strategies ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

As a weapon for economic development, green finance plays an important supporting and promoting role in the economic recovery and transformation of enterprises in the post-epidemic era. By constructing a dual-channel supply chain model, this paper considers two situations in which manufacturers participate in carbon trading and green finance loans, and uses Stackelberg game to study the impact of different situations on participants’ profits and emission reduction decisions. The results show that: under the carbon trading mechanism, the carbon emission reduction level of the manufacturer is inversely proportional to the relevant price, and the demand and profit of the two channels increase with the increase in emission reduction; when carbon trading and green financial loans are carried out at the same time, participants have lower profits, but with the increase in emission reductions, it is still a growing trend.

scholarly journals The Low-Carbon Supply Chain Coordination Problem with Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 3591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Wu ◽  
Yuxiang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Emission Abatement ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

In this paper, we study the supply chain coordination problem between a manufacturer and a retailer regarding consumers’ low-carbon preferences. The retailer considers the market demand to determine the order quantity; the manufacturer chooses how to reduce emissions according to the retailer’s order quantity. We consider four cases, including the non-emission abatement, the emission abatement of decentralized decision-making, the centralized decision-making and the retailer providing a cost-sharing contract. By comparing the four cases, we find that the case of a retailer providing a cost-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain, achieving a Pareto improvement for the manufacturer and retailer. In addition, we use the Rubinstein bargaining model to determine the cost-sharing ratio. Finally, numerical simulations are given to analyze the impact of the cost-sharing ratio on the equilibrium results, including the profit and the emission abatement level. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of the cost-sharing ratio and consumers’ low-carbon awareness on the profits of the members in the supply chain. We find that the equilibrium results, including the order quantity, the emission abatement level and the profits of the members in the supply chain under contract, are higher than the ones under centralized decision-making. The results show that in the higher low-carbon awareness market, retailers should formulate a reasonable cost-sharing ratio to achieve emission reduction coordination.

scholarly journals The Impact of Different Government Subsidy Methods on Low-Carbon Emission Reduction Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Cheng Che ◽  
Yi Chen ◽  
Xiaoguang Zhang ◽  
Zhihong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Direct Sales ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Low Carbon Emission

With the implementation of national carbon emission reduction policies and the development of online shopping, manufacturers are making low-carbon efforts and selling products through dual channels. This paper constructs a dual-channel supply chain decision-making model composed of low-carbon emission reduction manufacturers and retailers and studies the optimal decision-making problem of the supply chain under subsidies by the government based on emission reduction R&D and per unit product emission reduction. The research results show the following: (1) when the government subsidizes emission reduction R&D, the emission reduction will have an impact on retailers’ optimal prices, manufacturers’ optimal wholesale prices, and optimal direct sales channel sales prices. The profit of the manufacturer increases with the increase in carbon emissions, and the profit of the manufacturer increases to a certain level and then appears to decline. (2) When the government adopts a subsidy method based on the emission reduction per unit product, the manufacturer’s wholesale price and the selling price of direct sales channels, as well as the retailer’s own optimal price, will increase with the increase in emission reductions. Retailers’ profits will increase linearly with the increase in carbon emissions. Manufacturers’ profits will first increase in a straight line and then increase in a curve.

scholarly journals Joint Emission Reduction Dynamic Decisions and Coordination in a Supply Chain Considering Altruistic Behavior and Reference Low-Carbon Effect

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
ziyuan zhang ◽  
Liying Yu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Intensity Increase ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Reduce Emissions ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

Abstract In the context of low-carbon economy, supply chain members’ joint emission reduction issue has become a research hotspot, while there are few researches which synthetically studies the effect of consumers’ reference low-carbon effect and supply chain members’ altruistic behavior on their decisions. To study the impact of supply chain members’ altruistic behavior and consumers’ reference low-carbon effect on their joint emission reduction decisions and profits, we build optimization models under four decision scenarios, in which we solve the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s optimal emission reduction strategies and other equilibrium solutions by differential game theory. We obtain some findings. First, consumers' reference low-carbon effect will harm the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer, discourage the manufacturer's enthusiasm to reduce emissions and retailer's enthusiasm for low-carbon publicity. Second, the altruistic behavior of the manufacturer and the retailer can not only weaken the negative impact of the reference low-carbon effect, but also promote both parties to actively reduce emissions, help achieve Pareto improvement of their own profits and utilities, and obtain additional social welfare. Third, the cost-sharing contract can encourage the manufacturer to increase emission reduction investment without affecting the retailer’s low-carbon publicity investment, and can achieve a Pareto improvement of both parties’ profits and utilities. In addition, the cost-sharing ratio is only proportional to the marginal profits and altruistic intensity of both parties, and is not affected by the reference low-carbon effect. Meanwhile, the cost-sharing ratio will decrease as the manufacturer’s marginal profit and altruistic intensity increase, and will increase as the retailer’s marginal profit and altruistic intensity increase. In particular, when the retailer is completely altruistic, the cost-sharing contract can achieve perfect coordination of the supply chain.

scholarly journals Fresh Food Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Consumers’ Low-Carbon and Freshness Preferences

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6445
Author(s):  
Jingci Xie ◽  
Jianjian Liu ◽  
Xin Huo ◽  
Qingchun Meng ◽  
Mengyu Chu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Channel Models ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fresh Food ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Due to growing concerns for environmental problems and food quality, consumers pay more attention to the carbon emission and freshness of fresh food. The booming e-commerce also accelerates the development of the dual-channel supply chain. In the dual-channel supply chain of fresh food, the carbon emission and freshness of fresh food are becoming important factors affecting consumers’ purchase demand. This paper focuses on the optimal decision of carbon emission reduction and pricing, which is investigated by a Stackelberg game-theoretic approach in three dual-channel supply chain sales models (retailer dual channel, producer dual channel, and mixed dual channel). A two-stage fresh food supply chain system composed of a producer and a retailer is explored. The sensitivity analysis and the comparison of three dual-channel models are carried out. The results show the following: (1) the sales price, carbon emission reduction, market demand, producer’s profit, retailer’s profit, and supply chain’s profit of fresh food under the three dual-channel supply chains show the same change on different levels of consumers’ low-carbon preference coefficient and freshness level, respectively; (2) the optimal decision of carbon emission reduction and pricing, demand, and profit of the three dual-channel models need to be determined according to the value of consumers’ purchasing preferences for the retailer’s offline channel. The paper gives some enlightenment to the decision-making members in the fresh dual-channel supply chain.

scholarly journals Coordination of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Dual-Source Supply and Low-Carbon Concern

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Li ◽  
Shuying Gong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Collection Efficiency ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Source ◽  
The Impact

Considering the impact of dual-source supply and low-carbon manufacturing on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system, this article constructs a CLSC model with two competitive dominant upstream suppliers and one following a downstream (re-)manufacturer, then coordinates supply chain through cost-sharing contract. Based on the industrial case in the area of power battery, we analyze the optimal strategies under competition, cooperation, and coordination structures separately and then investigate the influences of emission reduction effort and collection efficiency on supply chain performance. The results reveal that collection of used products can positively affect the (re-)manufacturer’s profit but has opposite impact on the new component supplier. Besides, recycling is beneficial to both low-carbon consumers’ utility and social welfare, but hurts the total profit of CLSC because of the high investment cost of collection. Therefore, the paper designs a cost-sharing contract, which is of applicability and efficiency for both economic and environmental development. Furthermore, it can also increase the profit of CLSC up to cooperation case and improve each member’s profit, eliminating double marginal effect and achieving supply chain coordination.

scholarly journals Knowledge Sharing Strategy and Emission Reduction Benefits of Low Carbon Technology Collaborative Innovation in the Green Supply Chain

2022 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fuqiang Wang ◽  
Huimin Li ◽  
Yongchao Cao ◽  
Chengyi Zhang ◽  
Yunlong Ran
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Knowledge Sharing ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Knowledge Stock ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
The Cost

Knowledge sharing (KS) in the green supply chain (GSC) is jointly determined by the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers. This study uses the differential game method to explore the dynamic strategy of KS and the benefits of emission reduction in the process of low carbon (LC) technology in the GSC. The optimal trajectory of the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of suppliers and manufacturers under different strategies are obtained. The validity of the model and the results are verified by numerical simulation analysis, and the sensitivity analysis of the main parameters in the case of collaborative sharing is carried out. The results show that in the case of centralized decision-making, the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers are the highest, and the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of GSC are also the best. The cost-sharing mechanism can realize the Pareto improvement of GSC’s knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits, but the cost-sharing mechanism can only increase the supplier’s KS effort level. In addition, this study found that the price of carbon trading and the rate of knowledge decay have a significant impact on KS. The study provides a theoretical basis for promoting KS in the GSC and LC technology innovation.

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