scholarly journals On the clock of the combinatorial clock auction

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 1271-1307
Author(s):  
Maarten Janssen ◽  
Bernhard Kasberger

The combinatorial clock auction (CCA) has frequently been used in recent spectrum auctions. It combines a dynamic clock phase and a one‐off supplementary round. The winning allocation and the corresponding prices are determined by the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves rules. These rules should encourage truthful bidding, whereas the clock phase is intended to reveal information. We inquire into the role of the clock when bidders have lexicographic preferences for raising rivals' costs. We show that in an efficient equilibrium, the clock cannot fully reveal bidders' types. In the spirit of the ratchet effect, in the supplementary round competitors extract surplus from strong bidders whose type is revealed. We also show that if there is substantial room for information revelation, that is, if the uncertainty about the final allocation is large, all equilibria of the CCA are inefficient. Qualitative features of our equilibria are in line with evidence concerning bidding behavior in some recent CCAs.


2009 ◽  
Vol 119 (536) ◽  
pp. 613-641 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Zhang ◽  
Ruqu Wang


Author(s):  
Anna Alexandrova ◽  
Robert Northcott

This article begins by surveying existing work on scientific models, with an eye to the specific case of economics. It reviews four accounts in particular—the satisfaction-of-assumptions account, the capacities account, the credible-worlds account, and the partial-structures account. It tells the detailed story of the 1994 Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auction in the United States, highlighting the crucial role of experiment as well as theory. In the light of this case study, this article presents its own open-formula account of economic models. It then turns to the issue of economic progress. Finally, it concludes that empirical progress in economic theory might not be discussed here, or at least that the success of the spectrum auction provides no warrant for doing so. Rather, progress is better seen as more akin to the worthy but piecemeal variety typical of engineering.



2004 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 457-486 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Bajari ◽  
Ali Hortaçsu

This paper surveys recent studies of internet auctions. Four main areas of research are summarized. First, we survey several studies that document and attempt to explain the frequently observed sniping, or last-second bidding behavior, in these auctions. Second, we summarize several methods proposed to quantify the distortions caused by asymmetric information in these markets, most notably due to the winner's curse. Third, we explore research about the role of reputation mechanisms installed to help combat these distortions. Finally, we discuss what internet auctions have to teach us about auction design.



2021 ◽  
pp. 87-98
Author(s):  
Marc T. P. Adam ◽  
Jan Krämer

AbstractThe design of electronic auction platforms is an important field of electronic commerce research. It requires not only a profound understanding of the role of human cognition in human bidding behavior but also of the role of human affect. In this chapter, we focus specifically on the emotional aspects of human bidding behavior and the results of empirical studies that have employed neurophysiological measurements in this regard. By synthesizing the results of these studies, we are able to provide a coherent picture of the role of affective processes in human bidding behavior along four distinct theoretical pathways.





Author(s):  
Philip Mirowski ◽  
Edward Nik-Khah

In this chapter we describe the supposed greatest triumph of the market designers, the FCC spectrum auctions. Careful recap of the history reveals that none of the touted benefits of the auction finally settled upon actually were realized; and further, the supposed central role of game theory in the choice of auction was dubious. What economists did accomplish was to deliver the types of licenses preferred by their patrons at good prices. This suggests market design has mostly delivered a new role for economists in the political economy, rather than some generic public benefit.



1999 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rekha Jain


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Rollano ◽  
A. Gomez ◽  
A. Muñoz-Noval ◽  
M. Velez ◽  
M. C. de Ory ◽  
...  

AbstractRatchet devices allow turning an ac input signal into a dc output signal. A ratchet device is set by moving particles driven by zero averages forces on asymmetric potentials. Hybrid nanostructures combining artificially fabricated spin ice nanomagnet arrays with superconducting films have been identified as a good choice to develop ratchet nanodevices. In the current device, the asymmetric potentials are provided by charged Néel walls located in the vertices of spin ice magnetic honeycomb array, whereas the role of moving particles is played by superconducting vortices. We have experimentally obtained ratchet effect for different spin ice I configurations and for vortex lattice moving parallel or perpendicular to magnetic easy axes. Remarkably, the ratchet magnitudes are similar in all the experimental runs; i. e. different spin ice I configurations and in both relevant directions of the vortex lattice motion. We have simulated the interplay between vortex motion directions and a single asymmetric potential. It turns out vortices interact with uneven asymmetric potentials, since they move with trajectories crossing charged Néel walls with different orientations. Moreover, we have found out the asymmetric pair potentials which generate the local ratchet effect. In this rocking ratchet the particles (vortices) on the move are interacting each other (vortex lattice); therefore, the ratchet local effect turns into a global macroscopic effect. In summary, this ratchet device benefits from interacting particles moving in robust and topological protected type I spin ice landscapes.



2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 187
Author(s):  
Anindyo Aji Susanto

ABSTRACTBudget variance plays important roles in Indonesian Local Government budgeting. The use of budget variance through budgeting highlight the incrementalism of budget which define the budget setter’s behavioral bias through ratchet effect. Ratchet effect occurs when budget setter use prior period performance (i.e budget variance)  as basis to determine the upcoming budget as a consequences of the dynamic incentives problems in agency relation context. This study aims to find whether ratchet effecct occur in public sector budgeting, especially in Indonesian local government budgeting. Further, this research examine the role of responsibility accounting in explaining the presence of ratchet effect in Local Government budget. This study use Local Government Task Force (SKPD) of Yogyakarta Special Region Province Government as research object for research period between 2012 to 2016. Selection of sample derived using purposive sampling to 31 SKPD and generates 17 sample which has Region Original Revenue (PAD) component and so 28 sample which has Direct Expenditure component in each of it’s budget structure. Multiple Linear Regresion and Independent Samples Test were used to test the hypotheses.The result shows that all research hypotheses statistically accepted. This research generate evidence the occurence of ratchet effect and the important role of responsibility accounting in local government budgeting.Keyword: Budget Variances, Ratchet Effect, Responsibility Accounting, Local Government Budgeting, Region Origin Revenue (PAD), Direct Expenditure.       INTISARI            Varian anggaran merupakan informasi penting dalam penyusunan anggaran pemerintah daerah di Indonesia. Penggunaan varian anggaran dalam penganggaran mengandung aspek inkrementalisme dalam bentuk efek ratchet yang muncul akibat bias perilaku penyusun anggaran. Efek ratchet muncul ketika perencana angggaran menentukan target anggaran berdasarkan capaian kinerja anggaran periode sebelumnya sebagai akibat adanya persoalan insentif dinamik dalam konteks hubungan keagenan. Penelitian ini dilakukan untuk mengetahui adanya efek ratchet dalam penganggaran pemerintah daerah di Indonesia. Lebih lanjut, penelitian ini mengevaluasi peran akuntansi pertanggungjawaban dalam menjelaskan munculnya efek ratchet dalam anggaran pemerintah daerah.            Penelitian ini menggunakan sampel Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah (SKPD) di lingkup Pemerintah Provinsi Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta pada periode 2012-2016. Pemilihan sampel dilakukan dengan metode sampel purposif atas 31 SKPD dan menghasilkan 17 sampel SKPD yang memiliki komponen Pendapatan Asli Daerah (PAD) dan 28 sampel SKPD yang memiliki komponen Belanja Langsung dalam struktur anggarannya. Analisis yang digunakan untuk pengujian hipotesis adalah analisis regresi linier berganda dan independent samples test.            Hasil penelitian menunjukkan semua hipotesis penelitian ini terdukung secara statistik. Hasil penelitian ini membuktikan adanya efek ratchet dan peran penting akuntansi pertanggungjawaban dalam penyusunan anggaran pemerintah daerah.Kata Kunci: Varian Anggaran, Efek Ratchet, Akuntansi Pertanggungjawaban, Penganggaran Pemerintah Daerah, Pendapatan Asli Daerah, Belanja Langsung.



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