Satellite Network Security

2011 ◽  
pp. 3350-3355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marlyn Kemper Littman
Keyword(s):  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Satellite Networks ◽  
Satellite Network ◽  
Cyber Terrorism ◽  
Department Of Homeland Security ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Government Accounting ◽  
Terrestrial Networks ◽  
Electromagnetic Signals

Satellite networks play a vital role in enabling essential critical infrastructure services that include public safety; environmental monitoring; maritime disaster recovery and reconnaissance; electronic surveillance; and intelligence operations for law enforcement, the military, and government agencies (Jamalipour & Tung, 2001). As demonstrated by the events following the terrorist attacks in the U.S. on the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. and the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001, satellite networks also provide redundant communications services when terrestrial networks are disrupted and/or unavailable. Despite their merits, satellite networks are nonetheless vulnerable to cyber attacks that pose threats to national security and the economy. Satellite networks transport voice, video, images, and data through the air as electromagnetic signals, thereby making these transmissions susceptible to interception. Technical advances enable the interconnectivity of satellite systems to public and private wireless and terrestrial networks including the Internet. These advances, however, amplify the risk of cyber attacks that can compromise critical infrastructure functions dependent on satellite networks in sectors that include information technology (IT) and telecommunications; defense; government; banking and finance; utilities; agriculture; emergency services; public health; and transportation (U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 2003; U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO), 2004). As a consequence, satellite networks employ an array of security tools and mechanisms for countering costly and widespread cyber incursions and, thereby, ensuring the continuity of critical infrastructure operations. Those cyber attacks that are politically motivated and specifically designed to disrupt essential services are generally attributed to cyber terrorism. This chapter describes the technical fundamentals of satellite networks; examines security vulnerabilities; and explores initiatives for protecting the integrity of satellite network transmissions and operations from cyber incursions and physical attacks. Standards and protocols that safeguard satellite networks from unauthorized use and intentional disruptions and policies, and legislation that facilitate cyberspace asset protection are described. Capabilities of encryption in supporting secure satellite services and the distinctive attributes of the InterPlanetary Internet (IPN), also called the InterPlanetary Network, are explored.

scholarly journals Legal Framework of the Space Activity Cybersecurity in the USA: Experience for Ukraine

2020 ◽  
pp. 325-335
Author(s):  
Nataliia Malysheva ◽  
Anna Hurova
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Space Activity ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Space Activities ◽  
Law Making

The article depict the timeline of the development of the cybersecurity legislation in the USA, which divided into two stages. Thefirst one rises as a response to the large-scale terroristic threats in 2001 and lasted until 2014. The second one starts with the massiveand multisectoral cyber incidents and cyber-attacks the US faced in the last five years. In addition, it was analyzed the changes in institutionalstructure aimed to support the cybersecurity in the US and their branched connections with public and private actors. The mainattention was paid to the content of the Memorandum on Space Policy Directive-5 “Cybersecurity Principles for Space Systems”, whichcould be the example of the best law-making practice not only for space actors within the US, but also for law-making actors of allspace-faring nations.The chronology of the elaboration of cybersecurity legislation and the institutional structure of their support in Ukraine analyzedin the second part of this article. On this ground, we observed some weak aspects of national cyber legislation. First is duplication andinconsistency of the basic terms, like “cyberattack”, “critical infrastructure”. The second one is the absence of an approved list of cri -tical infrastructure facilities and clear requirements for conducting an independent information security audit. The third one is by-lawsare aimed primarily at protecting public information resources and do not take into account the requirements for cooperation betweenthe public and private sectors in the protection of critical infrastructure, regardless of its affiliation to any form of ownership.Analysis of the draft law concerned critical infrastructure permits to make a conclusion about coming to the second stage in thedevelopment of cyber legislation in Ukraine, which will enhance the development of particular legislation within to each sector of criticalinfrastructure. In this regard, it is necessary to elaborate legal background for cybersecurity of space activity. For this aim, we supposeas necessary to designate the State Space Agency of Ukraine as a responsible entity in the field of space activities for the specifiedsector of critical infrastructure. Furthermore, the article suggested prescribing plans to protect against cyber threats (cyber attacks orcyber incidents) as one of the necessary documents for obtaining a permit to conduct certain types of space activities.

Cyber Risk

2016 ◽  
pp. 292-307
Author(s):  
Maria Cristina Arcuri ◽  
Marina Brogi ◽  
Gino Gandolfi
Keyword(s):  
Banking Sector ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Economic Sectors ◽  
Cyber Terrorism ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Security Breaches ◽  
Reputational Risk ◽  
Cyber Espionage ◽  
Cyber Risk

The dependence on cyberspace has considerably increased over time, as such, people look at risk associated with cyber technology. This chapter focuses on the cyber risk issue. The authors aim to describe the global state of the art and point out the potential negative consequences of this type of systemic risk. Cyber risk increasingly affects both public and private institutions. Some of the risks that entities face are the following: computer security breaches, cyber theft, cyber terrorism, cyber espionage. Developed nations but also emerging markets suffer from cyber risk. It is therefore important to examine the different security regulation implemented across different markets. Moreover, cyber risk is a concern for all economic sectors. In particular, it is a crucial issue in banking sector because of the negative effects of cyber attacks, among others, the financial losses and the reputational risk. However, the awareness is increasing and cyber insurance is growing.

scholarly journals Dynamic Divide Grouping Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access in Terrestrial-Satellite Integrated Network

Sensors ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (18) ◽  
pp. 6199
Author(s):  
Yanjun Yan ◽  
Huihui Xu ◽  
Ning Zhang ◽  
Guangjie Han ◽  
Mingliu Liu
Keyword(s):  
Multiple Access ◽  
Elevation Angle ◽  
Base Station ◽  
Satellite Networks ◽  
Control Factor ◽  
Satellite Network ◽  
Total System ◽  
Integrated Network ◽  
User Pairing ◽  
Terrestrial Networks

Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) has been extensively studied to improve the performance of the Terrestrial-Satellite Integrated Network (TSIN) on account of the shortage of frequency band resources. In this paper, the terrestrial network and satellite network synergistically provide complete coverage for ground users, and based on the architecture, we first formulate a constrained optimization problem to maximize the sum rate of the TSIN under the limited spectrum resources. As the terrestrial networks and the satellite network will cause interference to each other, we first investigate the capacity performance of the terrestrial networks and the satellite networks separately, in which the optimal power control factor expression is derived. Then, by constructing the relationship model between user elevation angle, beam angle and distance, we develop a dynamic group pairing schemes to ensure the effective pairing of NOMA users. Based on the user pairing, to obtain the optimal resource allocation, a joint optimization algorithm of power allocation, beam channel and base station channel resource is proposed. Finally, simulation results are provided to evaluate the user paring scheme as well as the total system performance, in comparison with the existing works.

Cyber Risk

2016 ◽  
pp. 80-95
Author(s):  
Maria Cristina Arcuri ◽  
Marina Brogi ◽  
Gino Gandolfi
Keyword(s):  
Banking Sector ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Economic Sectors ◽  
Cyber Terrorism ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Security Breaches ◽  
Reputational Risk ◽  
Cyber Espionage ◽  
Cyber Risk

The dependence on cyberspace has considerably increased over time, as such, people look at risk associated with cyber technology. This chapter focuses on the cyber risk issue. The authors aim to describe the global state of the art and point out the potential negative consequences of this type of systemic risk. Cyber risk increasingly affects both public and private institutions. Some of the risks that entities face are the following: computer security breaches, cyber theft, cyber terrorism, cyber espionage. Developed nations but also emerging markets suffer from cyber risk. It is therefore important to examine the different security regulation implemented across different markets. Moreover, cyber risk is a concern for all economic sectors. In particular, it is a crucial issue in banking sector because of the negative effects of cyber attacks, among others, the financial losses and the reputational risk. However, the awareness is increasing and cyber insurance is growing.

US Foreign Policy Challenges of Non-State Actors’ Cyber Terrorism against Critical Infrastructure

2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 28-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natalia Tereshchenko
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Cyber Terrorism ◽  
Require Time ◽  
The Public ◽  
Policy Paper ◽  
State Actors ◽  
State Relations

What is cyber terrorism? The paper will examine how the fundamentalist interpretation of the Quran may affect the non-state actors’ terrorist approach to the cyber domain, the dangers of an assault and the possible side-effects in politics, international relations and the public domain. The author will approach the issue in political, legal and social terms, touching only slightly on issues such as espionage and inter-state relations. Examples of recent cyber attacks and probable future scenarios will be examined to produce a balanced US-oriented policy paper. Some problems are difficult to tackle and require time, skills and diplomacy, but this should not act as an abandonment of initiatives. Although the threat is not yet acute, it is worthwhile addressing at an early stage and preventing the vast harm that can be caused by cyber terrorism. Legislative and political initiatives should be advocated ensuring better cooperation and collaboration between parties.

scholarly journals Cyber-risk management: identification, prevention, and mitigation techniques

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naveen Kunnathuvalappil Hariharan
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Identity Theft ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Cyber Terrorism ◽  
Mitigation Techniques ◽  
Cyber Risk ◽  
Careful Management

Cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure, as well as the possibility of cyber-terrorism and even cyberwarfare, pose a threat to societies on a larger scale. Stakeholders are vulnerable to information theft,service disruptions, privacy and identity theft, fraud, espionage and sabotage. This article provides abrief overview of risk management, with a particular emphasis on cyber security and cyber-riskassessment. This article provides an overview of risk management, with a particular emphasis oncyber security detection, prevention, and mitigation techniques. We showed how organizations couldmitigate their cyber risk with careful management.

scholarly journals Legal Framework of the Space Activity Cybersecurity in the USA: Experience for Ukraine

2020 ◽  
pp. 325-335
Author(s):  
Nataliia Malysheva ◽  
Anna Hurova
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Space Activity ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Space Activities ◽  
Law Making

The article depict the timeline of the development of the cybersecurity legislation in the USA, which divided into two stages. Thefirst one rises as a response to the large-scale terroristic threats in 2001 and lasted until 2014. The second one starts with the massiveand multisectoral cyber incidents and cyber-attacks the US faced in the last five years. In addition, it was analyzed the changes in institutionalstructure aimed to support the cybersecurity in the US and their branched connections with public and private actors. The mainattention was paid to the content of the Memorandum on Space Policy Directive-5 “Cybersecurity Principles for Space Systems”, whichcould be the example of the best law-making practice not only for space actors within the US, but also for law-making actors of allspace-faring nations.The chronology of the elaboration of cybersecurity legislation and the institutional structure of their support in Ukraine analyzedin the second part of this article. On this ground, we observed some weak aspects of national cyber legislation. First is duplication andinconsistency of the basic terms, like “cyberattack”, “critical infrastructure”. The second one is the absence of an approved list of cri -tical infrastructure facilities and clear requirements for conducting an independent information security audit. The third one is by-lawsare aimed primarily at protecting public information resources and do not take into account the requirements for cooperation betweenthe public and private sectors in the protection of critical infrastructure, regardless of its affiliation to any form of ownership.Analysis of the draft law concerned critical infrastructure permits to make a conclusion about coming to the second stage in thedevelopment of cyber legislation in Ukraine, which will enhance the development of particular legislation within to each sector of criticalinfrastructure. In this regard, it is necessary to elaborate legal background for cybersecurity of space activity. For this aim, we supposeas necessary to designate the State Space Agency of Ukraine as a responsible entity in the field of space activities for the specifiedsector of critical infrastructure. Furthermore, the article suggested prescribing plans to protect against cyber threats (cyber attacks orcyber incidents) as one of the necessary documents for obtaining a permit to conduct certain types of space activities.

scholarly journals Reducing Cyber Incident Response to Protect CNI from Cyber Attacks using an N-SIEM Integration with an ICTI-CNI

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Igli Tafa ◽  
Kevin Shahollari
Keyword(s):  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Computer Systems ◽  
Rapid Evolution ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Digital Data ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Intelligence System ◽  
Evolution Of Technology ◽  
Automated Platform ◽  
Cyber Threat Intelligence

The rapid evolution of technology has increased the role of cybersecurity and put it at the center of nationalcritical infrastructure. This role supports and guarantees the vital services of (CNI) while provides the proper functionalities for running operations between the public and private sectors. This evolution has hadthe same impact on cyberattack tools, methods, techniques used to gain unauthorized access to these computer systems that contain confidential and high-value information in the digital data sales market or asit called "darkweb". As a result, it has become necessary to monitor all events of the National Critical Infrastructure (CNI) computer systems. This proposed system uses a centralized National SIEM (N-SIEM) specializing in the correlation of security events caused by cyber attacks, collected by CNIs systems while integrating with anInternational Cyber Threat Intelligence system (ICTI-CNI). In addition, this conceptual model collects security breach events of CNIs systems, analyzes only cyber attacks, and correlates these security events in real-time with an intelligent automated platform while reducing the response time of security analysts.

scholarly journals Cybersecurity Policy and the Legislative Context of the Water and Wastewater Sector in South Africa

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 291
Author(s):  
Masike Malatji ◽  
Annlizé L. Marnewick ◽  
Suné von Solms
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Computer Security ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Policy Framework ◽  
Economic Sectors ◽  
Cyber Terrorism ◽  
Electronic Communications ◽  
Response Team ◽  
Water And Wastewater ◽  
Security Incidents

The water and wastewater sector is an important lifeline upon which other economic sectors depend. Securing the sector’s critical infrastructure is therefore important for any country’s economy. Like many other nations, South Africa has an overarching national cybersecurity strategy aimed at addressing cyber terrorism, cybercriminal activities, cyber vandalism, and cyber sabotage. The aim of this study is to contextualise the water and wastewater sector’s cybersecurity responsibilities within the national cybersecurity legislative and policy environment. This is achieved by conducting a detailed analysis of the international, national and sector cybersecurity stakeholders; legislation and policies; and challenges pertaining to the protection of the water and wastewater sector. The study found some concerning challenges and improvement gaps regarding the complex manner in which the national government is implementing the cybersecurity strategy. The study also found that, along with the National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (the national cybersecurity strategy of South Africa), the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, and other supporting legislation and policies make provision for the water and wastewater sector’s computer security incidents response team to be established without the need to propose any new laws or amend existing ones. This is conducive for the immediate development of the sector-specific cybersecurity governance framework and resilience strategy to protect the water and wastewater assets.

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