scholarly journals Legal Framework of the Space Activity Cybersecurity in the USA: Experience for Ukraine

2020 ◽  
pp. 325-335
Author(s):  
Nataliia Malysheva ◽  
Anna Hurova
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Space Activity ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Space Activities ◽  
Law Making

The article depict the timeline of the development of the cybersecurity legislation in the USA, which divided into two stages. Thefirst one rises as a response to the large-scale terroristic threats in 2001 and lasted until 2014. The second one starts with the massiveand multisectoral cyber incidents and cyber-attacks the US faced in the last five years. In addition, it was analyzed the changes in institutionalstructure aimed to support the cybersecurity in the US and their branched connections with public and private actors. The mainattention was paid to the content of the Memorandum on Space Policy Directive-5 “Cybersecurity Principles for Space Systems”, whichcould be the example of the best law-making practice not only for space actors within the US, but also for law-making actors of allspace-faring nations.The chronology of the elaboration of cybersecurity legislation and the institutional structure of their support in Ukraine analyzedin the second part of this article. On this ground, we observed some weak aspects of national cyber legislation. First is duplication andinconsistency of the basic terms, like “cyberattack”, “critical infrastructure”. The second one is the absence of an approved list of cri -tical infrastructure facilities and clear requirements for conducting an independent information security audit. The third one is by-lawsare aimed primarily at protecting public information resources and do not take into account the requirements for cooperation betweenthe public and private sectors in the protection of critical infrastructure, regardless of its affiliation to any form of ownership.Analysis of the draft law concerned critical infrastructure permits to make a conclusion about coming to the second stage in thedevelopment of cyber legislation in Ukraine, which will enhance the development of particular legislation within to each sector of criticalinfrastructure. In this regard, it is necessary to elaborate legal background for cybersecurity of space activity. For this aim, we supposeas necessary to designate the State Space Agency of Ukraine as a responsible entity in the field of space activities for the specifiedsector of critical infrastructure. Furthermore, the article suggested prescribing plans to protect against cyber threats (cyber attacks orcyber incidents) as one of the necessary documents for obtaining a permit to conduct certain types of space activities.

scholarly journals Legal Framework of the Space Activity Cybersecurity in the USA: Experience for Ukraine

2020 ◽  
pp. 325-335
Author(s):  
Nataliia Malysheva ◽  
Anna Hurova
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Space Activity ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Space Activities ◽  
Law Making

The article depict the timeline of the development of the cybersecurity legislation in the USA, which divided into two stages. Thefirst one rises as a response to the large-scale terroristic threats in 2001 and lasted until 2014. The second one starts with the massiveand multisectoral cyber incidents and cyber-attacks the US faced in the last five years. In addition, it was analyzed the changes in institutionalstructure aimed to support the cybersecurity in the US and their branched connections with public and private actors. The mainattention was paid to the content of the Memorandum on Space Policy Directive-5 “Cybersecurity Principles for Space Systems”, whichcould be the example of the best law-making practice not only for space actors within the US, but also for law-making actors of allspace-faring nations.The chronology of the elaboration of cybersecurity legislation and the institutional structure of their support in Ukraine analyzedin the second part of this article. On this ground, we observed some weak aspects of national cyber legislation. First is duplication andinconsistency of the basic terms, like “cyberattack”, “critical infrastructure”. The second one is the absence of an approved list of cri -tical infrastructure facilities and clear requirements for conducting an independent information security audit. The third one is by-lawsare aimed primarily at protecting public information resources and do not take into account the requirements for cooperation betweenthe public and private sectors in the protection of critical infrastructure, regardless of its affiliation to any form of ownership.Analysis of the draft law concerned critical infrastructure permits to make a conclusion about coming to the second stage in thedevelopment of cyber legislation in Ukraine, which will enhance the development of particular legislation within to each sector of criticalinfrastructure. In this regard, it is necessary to elaborate legal background for cybersecurity of space activity. For this aim, we supposeas necessary to designate the State Space Agency of Ukraine as a responsible entity in the field of space activities for the specifiedsector of critical infrastructure. Furthermore, the article suggested prescribing plans to protect against cyber threats (cyber attacks orcyber incidents) as one of the necessary documents for obtaining a permit to conduct certain types of space activities.

scholarly journals Solar Thermochemical Hydrogen Production in the USA

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (14) ◽  
pp. 7804
Author(s):  
Christoph Falter ◽  
Andreas Sizmann
Keyword(s):  
Hydrogen Production ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
The United States ◽  
Solar Irradiation ◽  
Transport Sector ◽  
Fossil Energy ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Solar Thermochemical

Hydrogen produced from renewable energy has the potential to decarbonize parts of the transport sector and many other industries. For a sustainable replacement of fossil energy carriers, both the environmental and economic performance of its production are important. Here, the solar thermochemical hydrogen pathway is characterized with a techno-economic and life-cycle analysis. Assuming a further increase of conversion efficiency and a reduction of investment costs, it is found that hydrogen can be produced in the United States of America at costs of 2.1–3.2 EUR/kg (2.4–3.6 USD/kg) at specific greenhouse gas emissions of 1.4 kg CO2-eq/kg. A geographical potential analysis shows that a maximum of 8.4 × 1011 kg per year can be produced, which corresponds to about twelve times the current global and about 80 times the current US hydrogen production. The best locations are found in the Southwest of the US, which have a high solar irradiation and short distances to the sea, which is beneficial for access to desalinated water. Unlike for petrochemical products, the transport of hydrogen could potentially present an obstacle in terms of cost and emissions under unfavorable circumstances. Given a large-scale deployment, low-cost transport seems, however, feasible.

Regulacja górnictwa kosmicznego w polskiej ustawie o działalności kosmicznej

2021 ◽  
pp. 171-186
Author(s):  
Mariusz Tomasz Kłoda ◽  
Katarzyna Malinowska ◽  
Bartosz Malinowski ◽  
Małgorzata Polkowska
Keyword(s):  
Polish Space ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
International Space ◽  
National Space ◽  
Space Activity ◽  
Space Law ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Polish Law ◽  
Space Activities ◽  
Do So

Work on the content of the law on space activities has been going in Poland for several years. So far, the drafters have not directly referred to the issue of space mining in the content of the proposed legal act. In this context, it is worth asking whether it is valuable and permissible, in terms of international space law and EU law, to regulate in the future (Polish) law on space activity the matter of prospecting, acquiring and using space resources, i.e. so-called space mining. If space mining were regulated in the Polish space law, Poland would not be the first country to do so. The discussed issues have already been regulated in the national space legislation of the USA, Luxemburg, UAE and Japan. This paper will analyze the issues of space mining as expressed in the current drafts of the Polish space law and foreign space legislation, of space mining as a means of achieving various goals and of the compatibility of space mining with international space law and EU law.

Cigarette and cigar sales in Hawaii before and after implementation of a Tobacco 21 Law

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca Glover-Kudon ◽  
Doris G Gammon ◽  
Todd Rogers ◽  
Ellen M Coats ◽  
Brett Loomis ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Geographical Area ◽  
Upward Trend ◽  
Food Stores ◽  
The Us ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Youth And Young Adults ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Product Sales ◽  
The Impact

IntroductionOn 1 January 2016, Hawaii raised the minimum legal age for tobacco access from 18 to 21 years (‘Tobacco 21 (T21)’) statewide, with no special population exemptions. We assessed the impact of Hawaii’s T21 policy on sales of cigarettes and large cigars/cigarillos in civilian food stores, including menthol/flavoured product sales share.MethodsCigarette and large cigar/cigarillo sales and menthol/flavoured sales share were assessed in Hawaii, California (implemented T21 in June 2016 with a military exemption), and the US mainland using the only Nielsen data consistently available for each geographical area. Approximate monthly sales data from large-scale food stores with sales greater than US$2 million/year covered June 2012 to February 2017. Segmented regression analyses estimated changes in sales from prepolicy to postpolicy implementation periods.ResultsFollowing T21 in Hawaii, average monthly cigarette unit sales dropped significantly (−4.4%, p<0.01) coupled with a significant decrease in menthol market share (−0.8, p<0.01). This combination of effects was not observed in comparison areas. Unit sales of large cigars/cigarillos decreased significantly in each region following T21 implementation. T21 policies in Hawaii and California showed no association with flavoured/menthol cigar sales share, but there was a significant increase in flavoured/menthol cigar sales share in the USA (7.1%, p<0.01) relative to Hawaii’s implementation date, suggesting T21 may have attenuated an otherwise upward trend.ConclusionsAs part of a comprehensive approach to prevent or delay tobacco use initiation, T21 laws may help to reduce sales of cigarette and large cigar products most preferred by US youth and young adults.

Tsunami Forces and Effects on Structures

2009 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 375-376 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harry Yeh ◽  
Nobuo Shuto
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Impact Force ◽  
The Other ◽  
Coastal Hazards ◽  
Local Source ◽  
Design Guideline ◽  
Ground Shaking ◽  
Oil Storage ◽  
The Us

The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami claimed more than 220,000 lives. It was a low-probability high-consequence event. A similar disaster could strike elsewhere, particularly in the Pacific but also in Caribbean, Atlantic, and Mediterranean regions. Unlike in seismic ground shaking, there is usually a short lead-time precedes tsunami attack: from a few minutes for a local source to several hours for a distant source. Because mega-tsunamis are rare and because forewarning of these events is possible, the primary mitigation tactic to date has been evacuation. Hence, most efforts have focused on the development of effective warning systems, inundation maps, and tsunami awareness. This strategy makes sense from the standpoint of saving human lives. However, it does not address the devastating damage to buildings and critical coastal infrastructure, such as major coastal bridges, oil and LNG storage facilities, power plants, and ports and harbors. Failure in critical infrastructure creates enormous economic setbacks and collateral damage. The accelerating construction of critical infrastructure in the coastal zone demands a better understanding of design methodology in building tsunamiresistant structures. In some coastal areas such as low-elevation coastal spits or plains, evacuating people to higher ground may be impractical because they have no time to reach safety. In these situations, the only feasible way to minimize human casualties is to evacuate people to the upper floors of tsunami-resistant buildings. Such buildings must be designed and constructed to survive strong seismic ground shaking and subsequent tsunami impacts. The primary causes of structural failure subject to tsunami attack can be categorized into three groups: 1) hydrodynamic force, 2) impact force by water-born objects, and 3) scour and foundation failure. Tsunami behaviors are quite distinct, however, from other coastal hazards such as storm waves; hence the effects cannot be inferred from common knowledge or intuition. Recent research has addressed tsunami forces acting on coastal structures to develop appropriate design guidelines, and mechanisms leading to tsunamigenerated scour and foundation failures. This special issue is a compilation of 14 papers addressing tsunami effects on buildings and infrastructure. The four main groupings begin with two papers on tsunami force acting on vertical walls. Arikawa experimentally investigates the structural performance of wooden and concrete walls using a large-scale laboratory tank in Japan. Also using a similar large-scale tsunami flume but in the US, Oshnack et al. study force reduction by small onshore seawalls in front of a vertical wall. The second grouping focuses on tsunami force on 3-D structures. Arnason et al. present a basic laboratory study on the hydrodynamics of bore impingement on a vertical column. Fujima et al. examine the two types of formulae for tsunami force evaluation: the one calculated from flow depth alone and the other based on the Euler number. Lukkunaprasit et al. demonstrate the validity of force computation recommended in a recently published design guideline (FEMA P646) by the US Federal Emergency Management Agency. The other two papers look into the specific types of structures: one is for light-frame wood buildings by van de Lindt et al, and the other is for oil storage tanks by Sakakiyama et al. The topic of debris impact force is the focus of the third grouping. Matsutomi summarizes his previous research on impact force by driftwoods, followed by the collision force of shipping containers by Yeom et al. Yim and Zhang numerically simulate tsunami impact on a vertical cylinder; this paper is included in this grouping because their numerical approach is similar to that of Yeom et al. As for the fourth grouping, Shuto presents field observations on foundation failures and scours, and Fujii et al. discuss the erosion processes of soil embankments. There are two more papers: those are the application of fragility analysis to tsunami damage assessment by Koshimura et al. and evaluation of an offshore cabled observatory by Matsumoto and Kaneda. The topics presented here are undoubtedly in progress, and many revisions and improvements are still needed in order to achieve better predictability for tsunami effects on buildings and infrastructure. We hope you find the papers in this issue intriguing and the information useful, and become further interested in this important natural hazard. Lastly, we wish to express our appreciation to the authors for their timely contributions, and to the reviewers for their diligent and time-consuming efforts.

Satellite Network Security

2011 ◽  
pp. 3350-3355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marlyn Kemper Littman
Keyword(s):  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Satellite Networks ◽  
Satellite Network ◽  
Cyber Terrorism ◽  
Department Of Homeland Security ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Government Accounting ◽  
Terrestrial Networks ◽  
Electromagnetic Signals

Satellite networks play a vital role in enabling essential critical infrastructure services that include public safety; environmental monitoring; maritime disaster recovery and reconnaissance; electronic surveillance; and intelligence operations for law enforcement, the military, and government agencies (Jamalipour & Tung, 2001). As demonstrated by the events following the terrorist attacks in the U.S. on the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. and the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001, satellite networks also provide redundant communications services when terrestrial networks are disrupted and/or unavailable. Despite their merits, satellite networks are nonetheless vulnerable to cyber attacks that pose threats to national security and the economy. Satellite networks transport voice, video, images, and data through the air as electromagnetic signals, thereby making these transmissions susceptible to interception. Technical advances enable the interconnectivity of satellite systems to public and private wireless and terrestrial networks including the Internet. These advances, however, amplify the risk of cyber attacks that can compromise critical infrastructure functions dependent on satellite networks in sectors that include information technology (IT) and telecommunications; defense; government; banking and finance; utilities; agriculture; emergency services; public health; and transportation (U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 2003; U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO), 2004). As a consequence, satellite networks employ an array of security tools and mechanisms for countering costly and widespread cyber incursions and, thereby, ensuring the continuity of critical infrastructure operations. Those cyber attacks that are politically motivated and specifically designed to disrupt essential services are generally attributed to cyber terrorism. This chapter describes the technical fundamentals of satellite networks; examines security vulnerabilities; and explores initiatives for protecting the integrity of satellite network transmissions and operations from cyber incursions and physical attacks. Standards and protocols that safeguard satellite networks from unauthorized use and intentional disruptions and policies, and legislation that facilitate cyberspace asset protection are described. Capabilities of encryption in supporting secure satellite services and the distinctive attributes of the InterPlanetary Internet (IPN), also called the InterPlanetary Network, are explored.

Oil Imports

1983 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 255-268
Author(s):  
Markus Fritz
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Eastern Bloc ◽  
Scale Production ◽  
Political Strategy ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Oil Reserves ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Oil Embargo

While the Eastern bloc countries (in particular the USSR) are self-sufficient (i.e. non-vulnerable) in terms of energy (a basic prerequisite for state existence) at least up to the turn of the century, the Western democracies cannot survive on their own reserves of energy, on which their economies and infrastructures are primarily based. This is especially true for the USA. In case of an oil embargo (as happened almost a decade ago), if the US oil reserves are subsequently depleted, at least the US transportation system (based almost completely on oil) could break down, and with it micro- and macroeconomic supply of the country. This has never occurred in history before, but it may happen tomorrow, showing kore devastating consequences than any nuclear war. The only way out of this ‘vicious circle’ is the large-scale production of synfuels from domestic coal and oil shale reserves. This however, requires a political strategy which is excluded from daily politics and not dependent on free market forces only.

scholarly journals Innovation Safety Management by Shaping the Law on Non-Practising Entities (Patent Trolls) in the USA and EU

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-171
Author(s):  
Tomasz Odzimek
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Safety Management ◽  
Patent Law ◽  
Knowledge Based ◽  
Knowledge Based Economy ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The Law ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Eu

AbstractIn a knowledge-based economy, innovation resulting from R & D activities and subsequent management of their legal safety are of particular importance. Incorrect patent law can lead to abuse in the area of innovation security on a large scale through the activities of the NPE organization (patent trolls). This phenomenon is particularly noticeable in the US while in the EU it is at a negligible level.The aim of the article is to demonstrate and prove by using comparative literature and documents analysis of US and EU, that inappropriate law leads to violations of innovation safety through the unhampered activity of patent trolls, while a change of the law to more restrictive law is a right step to reduce the patent trolling. On the other hand, the author proves that in an area with a less liberal definition of patentability, there are no many violations of innovation safety through patent trolling.

scholarly journals Cyberspace as a domain of conflict: The case of the United States - Iran and North Korea

Vojno delo ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Dejan Vuletić ◽  
Miloš Milenković ◽  
Anđelija Đukić
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The United States ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Information And Communications Technology ◽  
Communications Technology ◽  
Military Conflict ◽  
The Us

Modern society is critically dependent on information as a strategic resource and information and communications technology, which carries out its transmission, processing and exchange. Information and communications technology has created a new environment, cyberspace, in which tensions, disagreements and incidents are becoming more frequent. In recent years, the mentioned area has increasingly appeared as a domain of conflict between the leading world and regional powers. The paper gives a brief description of the concept of operations in several domains and elements of the new concept of joint warfare of the US Armed Forces. The importance of cyberspace for the US has been pointed out with a review of organizational changes and the adoption of certain strategic and doctrinal documents. The paper presents certain events and activities in cyberspace, in recent years, between the United States on the one hand, and Iran and North Korea on the other. The United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was created in 2009. USCYBERCOM was elevated to the status of a full and independent unified command in May 2018. It indicates the importance of cyberspace for the Pentagon. In many ways, the separation of USCYBERCOM from Strategic Commands, which oversees strategic rejection, is a symbol of the change in the US attitude in cyberspace from "defensive" to "persistent engagement." The United States is still the strongest force in cyberspace and shows ambition to carry out cyber operations at all levels of command. It is unlikely that Iran will provoke the United States into a large-scale military conflict and wage a direct war in cyberspace. Iran has rapidly improved its ability to operate in cyberspace, and it is estimated that this trend will continue. The imbalance can prevent Iran from a direct military conflict with the United States and its allies. Greater action is expected with an asymmetric arsenal such as e.g. cyber attacks. Iranian and North Korean operations are similar in target selection, planning and exploitation of attacks. Both countries undertake different variants of phishing attacks in an attempt to deceive their victims into downloading malicious software by presenting it as a legitimate link or file. Whereas Iran usually had a motive only to cause disruption to the functioning of financial institutions, North Korean motive was both financial and political retaliation. Certain discovered incidents indicate that North Korea devotes much more time to conducting invasive surveillance before carrying out attacks. Numerous examples show that some activities have been prepared over the years and with the support of certain state bodies. Regardless of the fact that an investigation has been launched against certain groups, most often sponsored by states, it is unlikely that this will deter countries such as North Korea and Iran from giving up further activities and will pose an increasing threat to the US security.

scholarly journals Sanctus: An Architecture for Trusted Products

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 58-84
Author(s):  
Malcolm Shore ◽  
Andy Clark ◽  
Sherali Zeadally
Keyword(s):  
Cyber Security ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
State Security ◽  
Product Engineering ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Government ◽  
Commercial Networks ◽  
Engineering Practices ◽  
Fundamental Shift

The last two decades have seen a fundamental shift in the manufacturing, sourcing and operation of technology, which has raised concerns in state security agencies about the cybersecurity risk to government and critical infrastructure. Sophisticated cyber attacks continue to be launched by state actors worldwide, while the engineering practices in common use have failed to deliver a commensurate improvement in technology cyber security. Cyber attacks continue to be successful against commercial networks, leading the US Government to encourage government agencies to look towards models such as zero-trust networking and tailored trustworthy spaces. There has been progress in product engineering, with formal methodologies such as Correctness by Construction (CbyC) successfully producing commercial products with increased trustworthiness. However, the adoption of these techniques has been limited, and governments are now increasingly resorting to an approach of technology Balkanization, where import and use of products and components may be restricted based on their country of origin. Even in the early stages of this strategy, the effect upon the economy is significantly adverse. We propose an alternative to technology Balkanization by combining trustworthy engineering approaches with the use of a national security component we call a sanctum which together can deliver sovereign trust.

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