Rationale for Cognitive Machines

Author(s):  
Farley Simon Nobre ◽  
Andrew M. Tobias ◽  
David S. Walker

This chapter outlines rationale for cognitive machines. It connects theories of bounded rationality of Herbert Simon with theories of fuzzy systems of Lotfi Zadeh in order to justify advantages of the participation of cognitive machines in organizations. The connections are derived by explaining why cognitive machines can extend limits of knowledge (lack of information) and limits of information processing and management (lack of cognition and computational capacity) of humans when participating in organizations.

Author(s):  
Farley Simon Nobre ◽  
Andrew M. Tobias ◽  
David S. Walker

This chapter presents rationale for a theory of organizational cognition on the basis of contingency theory and bounded rationality concepts. According to the bounded rationality theory (Simon, 1947, 1982a, 1997a, and 1997b), this book advocates that organizations have limitations of knowledge management and computational capacity. A theory of organizational cognition is important and necessary when we decide to design organizations with higher capabilities of information processing and uncertainty management. In such a way, organizational cognition is a discipline which contributes to improve the computational capacity of the organization and its ability for knowledge management. Moreover, the theory of organizational cognition as proposed in this book, plays an important part, and introduces a new perspective, in the analysis of the relations between the organization, its elements and the environment. Assuming such core rationale, this chapter introduces a methodology to support the choice of strategies of organization design which either reduces the amount of information that the organization needs to process, or increases the degree of cognition of the organization. The alternative of design that provides an increase in the degree of organizational cognition is the one selected from such a methodology. Moreover, technology and participants (both including cognitive machines) are the elements of design that we choose in order to improve the degree of cognition of the organization – that is in order to improve the organization capability of information processing and uncertainty management.


Author(s):  
Dan M. Kahan

AbstractThis commentary uses the dynamic of identity-protective cognition to pose a friendly challenge to Jussim (2012). Like other forms of information processing, this one is too readily characterized as a bias. It is no mistake, however, to view identity-protective cognition as generating inaccurate perceptions. The “bounded rationality” paradigm incorrectly equates rationality with forming accurate beliefs. But so does Jussim's critique.


2000 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 756-757 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raanan Lipshitz

Replacing logical coherence by effectiveness as criteria of rationality, Gigerenzer et al. show that simple heuristics can outperform comprehensive procedures (e.g., regression analysis) that overload human limited information processing capacity. Although their work casts long overdue doubt on the normative status of the Rational Choice Paradigm, their methodology leaves open its relevance as to how decisions are actually made.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (7) ◽  
pp. 64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniele Schilirò

Decision making in economics has been always intertwined with the concept of rationality. However, neoclassical economic literature has been dominated by a specific notion of rationality, namely, perfect rationality, characterized by the assumption of consistency and by the maximization hypothesis. Herbert Simon, in his long research activity, questioned this concept of perfect or global rationality, suggesting a different vision, based on empirical evidence and regarding an individual’s choices. He challenged the neoclassical theory of global rationality, suggesting his notion of bounded rationality, a satisficing (instead of optimizing) behavior, and the relevance of procedural rationality to understand the process of thought of decision makers.Thus, this paper focuses on Simon’s notion of bounded rationality, since bounded rationality remains the hallmark of his theoretical contribution. First, the paper examines the economic decision process in the neoclassical theory and Simon’s notion of bounded rationality. Then, it analyzes in depth Simon’s behavioral model of rational choice, underlining the relevance of satisficing behavior and procedural rationality. Finally, it suggests an assessment of the concept of bounded rationality.


Author(s):  
JoBeth Shafran ◽  
Bryan D. Jones ◽  
Connor Dye

Bounded rationality is the notion that while humans want to be fully rational beings and weigh the costs and benefits when making a decision, they cannot do so due to cognitive and emotional limitations. The role of human nature in the study and design of organizations can be examined through three general approaches that are explained using metaphors: organization as machine, organization as hierarchy, and organization as canal. The organization-as-machine approach ignores the principles of bounded rationality by assuming the organizational members perform straightforward cost–benefit responses to the incentives put forward by the operators. Later developments in organizational scholarship incorporate elements of bounded rationality and allowed researchers to link human cognitive capacities to the basic organizational features, giving us two new conceptions of organization: organization as hierarchy and organization as canal. Organization as hierarchy focuses on the organization’s use of subunits to create divisions of labor to expand the capacity to process information and problem-solve. Organization as canal recognizes that the weaknesses of human cognition are still channeled into the organizational structure, making it difficult for organizations to update their preferences and assumptions as they receive new information. These principles of bounded rationality in organizational theory can be applied to policy-making institutions. Hierarchical organizations delegate information processing to the subunits, allowing them to attend to the various policy environments and process incoming information. While the collective organization attends to many issues at once, the rules and procedures that are present within the organization and the cognitive limits of decision makers, prevent proportional information processing. Political institutions are unable to respond efficiently to changes in the environment. Thus, organizational adjustment to the environment is characterized as disjointed and episodic as opposed to smooth and incremental. Punctuated equilibrium theory applies these tenets of bounded rationality to a theory of policy change. Congress has been a vehicle for studying bounded rationality in organizations and theories of policy change, as it is a formal institution with bureaucratic elements and is subject to the constraints faced by any formal organization.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 14
Author(s):  
Matteo Cristofaro ◽  
Maria José Sousa ◽  
José Carlos Sanchéz-Garcia ◽  
Aron Larsson

Since the conceptualization of bounded rationality by Herbert Simon (1947), management scholars started investigating how people—managers and entrepreneurs—really make decisions within (and for) organizations [...]


Author(s):  
Sung-youn Kim

A growing body of research uses computational models to study political decision making and behavior such as voter turnout, vote choice, party competition, social networks, and cooperation in social dilemmas. Advances in the computational modeling of political decision making are closely related to the idea of bounded rationality. In effect, models of full rationality can usually be analyzed by hand, but models of bounded rationality are complex and require computer-assisted analysis. Most computational models used in the literature are agent based, that is, they specify how decisions are made by autonomous, interacting computational objects called “agents.” However, an important distinction can be made between two classes of models based on the approaches they take: behavioral and information processing. Behavioral models specify relatively simple behavioral rules to relax the standard rationality assumption and investigate the system-level consequences of these rules in conjunction with deductive, game-theoretic analysis. In contrast, information-processing models specify the underlying information processes of decision making—the way political actors receive, store, retrieve, and use information to make judgment and choice—within the structural constraints on human cognition, and examine whether and how these processes produce the observed behavior in question at the individual or aggregate level. Compared to behavioral models, information-processing computational models are relatively rare, new to political scientists, and underexplored. However, focusing on the underlying mental processes of decision making that must occur within the structural constraints on human cognition, they have the potential to provide a more general, psychologically realistic account for political decision making and behavior.


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