Issues and Strategies in Reconciling the Malaysia-EU Palm Oil Discord

2022 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Ratnaria Wahid ◽  
Norafidah Ismail
Keyword(s):  
Palm Oil ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Political Processes ◽  
Bilateral Relations ◽  
Policy Interventions ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Oil Sector ◽  
The Many ◽  
The Eu

The EU has decided to phase out imports of palm oil used in biofuels in the EU by 2030. This affects people in Malaysia who rely on the palm oil business for their livelihood. This chapter examines the events leading up to the EU's anti-palm oil actions and the many ways in which Malaysia has responded to defend its palm oil sector. This includes 1) countering EU's allegation through scientific research, 2) demonstrating its commitment to transform the palm oil industry toward sustainability through certification standards, 3) fostering the commitment to grow palm oil sustainably, 4) garnering support from ASEAN and the international community, 5) expressing its opposition and warnings for retaliatory measures against the EU, and 6) requesting consultation under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. It presents the political processes that generate policy interventions aimed at defending palm oil trade with the EU alerting that economic decoupling and direct conflict may exacerbate the problem, weaken bilateral relations, and elude good improvements in the palm oil business.

scholarly journals The Relative Success of WTO Dispute Settlement and What Planet Would the EU Investment Court System Be On? A Rejoinder to AJIL Unbound Comments

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 316-318
Author(s):  
Joost Pauwelyn
Keyword(s):  
World Trade ◽  
Public Perception ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
The Other ◽  
Court System ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Many ◽  
Better Than ◽  
The Eu

I am extremely grateful, and humbled, by the wealth of comments received on my AJIL article through this AJIL Unbound Symposium. One of the many points I take away from these reactions is, indeed, that my analysis offers a snapshot and that many of the critiques now leveled against Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) are, in Catherine Rogers’s words, “effectively recycled versions of criticisms that were originally leveled against the WTO and its decision-makers.” (Freya Baetens makes a similar point.)In this rejoinder, I would only like to make two points. Firstly, many commentators seem to think that in this article I took the normative position that World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement is “better” than ISDS. Although I did point to the current discrepancy in public perception of the respective regimes, I purposefully avoided expressing any personal, normative position on one being “better” than the other (but apparently not explicitly enough).

Enforcing WTO Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonello Tancredi
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Wto Agreements ◽  
The Eu

This chapter provides a brief analysis of the enforcement tools foreseen in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. It focuses in particular on some of the peculiarities which differentiate them from the EU legal system. As the analysis shows, the relevance of reciprocity and post-litigation negotiations between States influences the legal nature of the WTO dispute settlement system, which today remains to a large extent a mixed or hybrid system. This contrasts one of the mantras diffused in the legal scholarship immediately after the entry into force of the Uruguay Round Agreements. It also represents a vehicle for the potential fragmentation of the multilateral legal framework governing international trade, which contributes to undermining the idea of uniformity of the obligations arising under the WTO Agreements for all Members.

The WTO Bananas Decision: Cutting Through the Thicket

1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce R. Hirsh
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade In Services ◽  
Allocation System ◽  
Goods And Services ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Quota Allocation ◽  
The Eu

The Bananas decision demonstrated that WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body are capable of effectively and clearly analyzing whether extremely complex measures are consistent with WTO rules. The trade-liberalizing decision established the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) as a meaningful constraint on discriminatory measures with an impact on both goods and services and clarified the nature of the GATS Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) obligation. The decision also severely constrained the ability of the EU to justify non-tariff discriminatory measures such as the quota allocation system at issue in Bananas based on the Lomé waiver.

Revisiting African States Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement through Intra-Africa RTA Dispute Settlement

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Malebakeng Forere
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
East African ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
East African Community ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Southern Africa Development Community

AbstractWhereas developed countries were the main players in the GATT dispute settlement mechanism, the era of the WTO saw a sharp increase in the developing countries’ participation in trade disputes. Thus, developing countries are active complainants and defendants in the WTO dispute settlement processes. Nevertheless, African states are still marginalised, and this situation has attracted attention of many scholars. As a result, scholars in the field have come up with many reasons to explain why African states do not appear as either complainants or respondents. The reasons for Africa’s non-participation have been argued to include cost of WTO litigation relative to the gains, low trade volumes, legal knowledge and non-integration of African countries in the WTO system. This article seeks to contribute to the existing literature on Africa’s non-participation in the WTO dispute settlement. The goal in this article is to confirm or dispel assumptions that African states have interests that they need to safeguard through dispute settlement but are inhibited from doing so because of the reasons mentioned above. Unlike other studies, the determination on Africa’s non-participation in the WTO dispute settlement will be approached from African states’ participation in intra-Africa RTA dispute settlement mechanisms. While there are six intra-Africa RTAs notified to the WTO, this work focuses on only two – East African Community and Southern Africa Development Community.

scholarly journals When the hegemon goes rogue: leadership amid the US assault on the liberal trading order

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristen Hopewell
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Leadership Role ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Trading System ◽  
Lead System ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The Us ◽  
Multilateral Trading System ◽  
The Eu

Abstract Under President Trump, the United States abdicated its traditional leadership role in the trading system, abandoning multilateralism for aggressive unilateralism and launching an active assault on the World Trade Organization (WTO). Most strikingly, the US blocked appointments to the Appellate Body, jeopardizing the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism. With the trade regime in crisis, a key question has been whether other states would have the will and capacity to lead system-preserving initiatives. While most attention has focused on whether China—widely seen as the chief hegemonic challenger to the US—would assume the mantle of leadership, there has been considerable scepticism about the European Union's capacity to exercise leadership amid the crisis. The EU has generally been seen as punching below its weight in terms of leadership at the WTO. In this article, however, I argue that it is the EU, rather than China, that has taken the lead in advancing concrete initiatives directed at defending and maintaining the multilateral trading system. The EU led the creation of an interim appeals arrangement to replace the defunct Appellate Body—in effect, creating an ‘Appellate Body minus the US’. Although the rules-based multilateral trading system remains under threat, it is the EU, not China, that is acting as a system-preserving power, leading efforts to defend the established order.

Exploring Aggressive Legalism: Is Now A Good Time to Promote This Approach in Greater Asia?

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi Lu
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Good Time ◽  
Asian Countries ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Status ◽  
Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Asian Developing Countries

AbstractAggressive legalism, a trade policy-making strategy targeted at actively utilizing WTO rules to defend trade interests, has greatly benefited major Eastern Asian countries in past years. This paper examines whether this strategy should be promoted around greater Asia in this era. First, this paper updates the status of adoption of aggressive legalism in East Asian countries including Japan, Korea and China. Second, it looks into the current and possible future utilization of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism by selected countries which are frequent “targets” of trade remedy measures, namely India, Thailand and Indonesia. Finally, it discusses the participation of Asian developing countries in the WTO. Relying upon case studies and statistical analysis, the author finds that Asian countries’ rising image in international trade signals a trend of adopting aggressive legalism in Great Asia. This trend will undoubtedly promote the energetic development of international trade globally. However, room for more progressive participation in the WTO still exists, especially in developing countries.

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