Why Uninformed Agents (Pretend to) Know More
2013 ◽
Vol 4
(3)
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pp. 32-53
Keyword(s):
Many social interactions (examples are market overreactions, high rates of acquisitions, strikes, wars) are the result of agents' overconfidence. Agents are in particular overconfident for difficult tasks. This paper analyzes overconfidence in the context of a statistical estimation problem. The authors find that it is rational to (i) be overconfident and (ii) to be notably overconfident if the task is difficult. The counterintuitive finding that uninformed agents which should be the least confident ones show the highest degree of overconfidence can be explained as a rational behavior.
2010 ◽
Vol 19
(4)
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pp. 108-114
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2006 ◽
Vol 27
(2)
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pp. 108-115
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1996 ◽
Vol 12
(2)
◽
pp. 124-131
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2007 ◽
Vol 28
(4)
◽
pp. 240-251
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