scholarly journals CONFIANÇA SELETIVA EM CRIANÇAS PRÉ-ESCOLARES: UMA REVISÃO SISTEMÁTICA

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Débora de Hollanda Souza ◽  
Ana Carolina Messias

Embora o campo de estudos sobre confiança seletiva tenha ganhado destaque nos últimos anos, essa linha de pesquisa não é ainda suficientemente divulgada no Brasil. A presente revisão sistemática teve como objetivo avaliar a produção científica sobre confiança seletiva em crianças pré-escolares, bem como sobre possíveis variáveis que influenciam os julgamentos de confiança. A busca foi realizada nas bases de dados PSYCINFO, Scielo Brasil, PEPSIC e LILACS, utilizando-se as palavras-chave selective trust, epistemic trust e seus correspondentes em português ‘confiança seletiva’ e ‘confiança epistêmica’. De um total de 103 trabalhos, foram analisados 45 artigos empíricos, publicados entre 2008 e 2018, seguindo o protocolo PRISMA. Contrariando uma crença predominante em muitas culturas de que as crianças acreditam em tudo o que ouvem, elas não são consumidoras ingênuas de informação. Discutem-se os efeitos de variáveis individuais e contextuais sobre os julgamentos de confiança seletiva que apontam para direções futuras promissoras de pesquisa.

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (12) ◽  
pp. 1488-1496
Author(s):  
Qinggong Li ◽  
Wenyu Zhang ◽  
Gail D. Heyman ◽  
Brian J. Compton ◽  
Kang Lee

In this preregistered field study, we examined preschool children’s selective trust in a real-life situation. We investigated whether 3- to 6-year-old children (total N = 240) could be lured to a new location within their school grounds by an unfamiliar adult confederate. In a between-subjects manipulation, the confederate established either a high or a low level of personal credibility by providing information that the child knew to be either true or false. In Experiment 1, in which the confederate was female, children showed sensitivity to informational accuracy by being less willing to leave with an uninformed confederate, and this effect increased with age. In Experiment 2, in which the confederate was male, children were reluctant to leave regardless of informational accuracy. These findings point to real-world implications of epistemic-trust research and provide the first evidence regarding the early development of selective trust in a high-stakes naturalistic context.


Episteme ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 264-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melissa A. Koenig ◽  
Paul L. Harris

ABSTRACTWhat is the nature of children's trust in testimony? Is it based primarily on evidential correlations between statements and facts, as stated by Hume, or does it derive from an interest in the trustworthiness of particular speakers? In this essay, we explore these questions in an effort to understand the developmental course and cognitive bases of children's extensive reliance on testimony. Recent work shows that, from an early age, children monitor the reliability of particular informants, differentiate between those who make true and false claims and keep that differential accuracy in mind when evaluating new information from these people. We argue that this selective trust is likely to involve the mentalistic appraisal of speakers rather than surface generalizations of their behavior. Finally, we review the significance of children's deference to adult authority on issues of naming and categorization. In addition to challenging a purely inductive account of trust, these and other findings reflect a potentially rich set of tools brought by children to the task of learning from people's testimony.


Author(s):  
Inmaculada de Melo-Martín ◽  
Kristen Intemann

This chapter offers a brief overview of the importance of epistemic trust and the relevance that scientific institutions and practices have in promoting or undermining warranted public trust. Epistemic trust is crucial for the production of scientific knowledge, the ability of the public to make sense of scientific phenomena, and the development of public policy. Normatively inappropriate dissent is more likely to take hold and erroneously affect people’s beliefs and actions in a context where the trustworthiness of scientists is called into question and where there is an excessive reliance on scientific information when it comes to assessing policy decisions. Thus, finding ways to facilitate and sustain warranted epistemic trust, as well as increasing understanding of the proper role of science in public policy decisions can help mitigate the negative impact of dissenting views.


Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Schmidt

AbstractThe normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism.


2011 ◽  
Vol 366 (1567) ◽  
pp. 1179-1187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul L. Harris ◽  
Kathleen H. Corriveau

Young children readily act on information from adults, setting aside their own prior convictions and even continuing to trust informants who make claims that are manifestly false. Such credulity is consistent with a long-standing philosophical and scientific conception of young children as prone to indiscriminate trust. Against this conception, we argue that children trust some informants more than others. In particular, they use two major heuristics. First, they keep track of the history of potential informants. Faced with conflicting claims, they endorse claims made by someone who has provided reliable care or reliable information in the past. Second, they monitor the cultural standing of potential informants. Faced with conflicting claims, children endorse claims made by someone who belongs to a consensus and whose behaviour abides by, rather than deviating from, the norms of their group. The first heuristic is likely to promote receptivity to information offered by familiar caregivers, whereas the second heuristic is likely to promote a broader receptivity to informants from the same culture.


2013 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 579-590 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda J. Lucas ◽  
Charlie Lewis ◽  
F. Cansu Pala ◽  
Katie Wong ◽  
Damon Berridge

Author(s):  
Robbie Duschinsky ◽  
Sarah Foster

The theory of mentalizing and epistemic trust introduced by Peter Fonagy and colleagues at the Anna Freud Centre has been an important perspective on mental health and illness. This book is the first comprehensive account and evaluation of this perspective. The book explores 20 primary concepts that organize the contributions of Fonagy and colleagues: adaptation, aggression, the alien self, culture, disorganized attachment, epistemic trust, hypermentalizing, reflective function, the p-factor, pretend mode, the primary unconscious, psychic equivalence, mental illness, mentalizing, mentalization-based therapy, non-mentalizing, the self, sexuality, the social environment, and teleological mode. The biographical and social context of the development of these ideas is examined. The book also specifies the current strengths and limitations of the theory of mentalizing and epistemic trust, with attention to the implications for both clinicians and researchers.


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