An Analysis of Enterprise Investment Decision Based on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium

2010 ◽  
Vol 40-41 ◽  
pp. 497-505
Author(s):  
Hua Qi Chai ◽  
De Qiang Song ◽  
Shu Juan Luo
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Numerical Method ◽  
Investment Decision ◽  
Sunk Costs ◽  
Operating Costs ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Comparative Advantages ◽  
Enterprise Investment ◽  
Higher Sensitivity

Cournot-Nash equilibrium is introduced into the traditional options game model, and the manifestation of this model under the condition is studied. Besides, a numerical method is used for solving investment values and thresholds of the leader enterprise and the follower enterprise. The results showed that both enterprises still have determined investment thresholds under Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In contrast, the follower enterprise investment threshold has a higher sensitivity to its own factors, but its present investment value is less subject to its own threshold and market demand; the leader enterprise performs contrary to the follower. Comparative advantages of marginal operating costs and investment sunk costs determine enterprise roles.

Manufacturing service order allocation in the context of social manufacturing based on Stackelberg game

2018 ◽  
Vol 233 (8) ◽  
pp. 1890-1901
Author(s):  
Wei Guo ◽  
Pingyu Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Quality Of Service ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Manufacturing Industry ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Service Cost ◽  
Order Allocation ◽  
Multi Objective ◽  
Bird Swarm Algorithm

For adapting the socialization, individuation and servitization in manufacturing industry, a new manufacturing paradigm called social manufacturing has received a lot of attention. Social manufacturing can be seen as a network that enterprises with socialized resources self-organized into communities that provide personalized machining and service capabilities to customers. Since a community of social manufacturing has multiple enterprises and emphasizes on the importance of service, manufacturing service order allocation must be studied from the new perspective considering objectives on service cost and quality of service. The manufacturing service order allocation can be seen as a one-to-many game model with multi-objective. In this article, a Stackelberg game model is proposed to tackle the manufacturing service order allocation problem with considering the payoffs on cost and quality of service. Since this Stackelberg game can be mapped to a multi-objective bi-level programming, a modified multi-objective hierarchical Bird Swarm Algorithm is used to find the Nash equilibrium of the game. Finally, a case from a professional printing firm is analyzed to validate the proposed methodology and model. The objective of this research is to find the Nash equilibrium on the manufacturing service order allocation and provide strategies guidance for customer and small- and medium-sized enterprises with optimal service cost and lead time. According to the game process and Nash equilibrium, some rules are revealed, and they are useful for guiding practical production.

Losing Face and Sinking Costs

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Renshon
Keyword(s):  
Social Dominance ◽  
Regression Models ◽  
Investment Decision ◽  
Social Dominance Orientation ◽  
Sunk Costs ◽  
Behavioral Measure ◽  
Decision Task ◽  
Escalation Of Commitment ◽  
Course Of Action

This chapter explores the behavioral microfoundations of status dissatisfaction theory by conducting two simultaneously fielded experiments in which status concerns were randomly assigned prior to an “escalation of commitment” task. The first study replicates and extends a sunk costs experiment that asks subjects to make a hypothetical investment decision, while the second introduces the “Island Game” to provide a behavioral measure of escalation of commitment. Several regression models are estimated to determine how leadership affects the tendency to escalate in the primary decision task. The chapter also considers additional mechanisms that link status concerns to war through individuals' willingness to escalate their commitment to a failing course of action, including power and social dominance orientation (SDO). The results show that subjects with stronger preferences for hierarchy—that is, high in SDO—are most affected by status concerns and correspondingly more likely to exhibit patterns of biased escalation.

The three kinds of degree distributions and nash equilibrium on the limiting random network

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (05) ◽  
pp. 2050033
Author(s):  
Dong Han ◽  
Min Xia
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Random Network ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Curved Surface ◽  
High Dimensional ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Curved Surfaces

A generalized dynamically evolving random network and a game model taking place on the evolving network are presented. We show that there exists a high-dimensional critical curved surface of the parameters related the probabilities of adding or removing vertices or edges such that the evolving network may exhibit three kinds of degree distributions as the time goes to infinity when the parameters belong to the super-critical, critical and sub-critical curved surfaces, respectively. Some sufficient conditions are given for the existence of a regular Nash equilibrium which depends on the three kinds of degree distributions in the game model on the limiting random network.

Model of Intrusion Detection Based on the Game Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 347-350 ◽  
pp. 3971-3974 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heng Xiao ◽  
Cao Fang Long
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Network Security ◽  
Intrusion Detection ◽  
Working Group ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Network Application ◽  
Stage Game

With the development of network application, network security is facing greater pressure. Based on the characteristics of intrusion detection in the wireless network of the Ad hoc working group, the article introduces the game theory, proposes a game model of network security, concluds the Nash equilibrium in the stage game, repeats game, the pareto Nash equilibrium, more attack both income and payment, so that they get the best choice.

A generalized Nash equilibrium game model for removing regional air pollutant

2019 ◽  
Vol 227 ◽  
pp. 522-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qin Wang ◽  
Laijun Zhao ◽  
Lei Guo ◽  
Ran Jiang ◽  
Lijun Zeng ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Air Pollutant ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Generalized Nash Equilibrium

An Uncertain Supply Chain Problem with Sales Effort

2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (7) ◽  
pp. 1037-1045
Author(s):  
Lengceng Gao ◽  
◽  
Jiayu Shen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Operating Costs ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Uncertain Variables ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Uncertain Supply ◽  
Constrained Models ◽  
Chain Problem

This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain problem that includes a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer plays a leading role in the supply chain and must make efforts to increase sales. Due to many uncertain factors in business, the market demand, manufacturing costs and retail operating costs are assumed to be uncertain variables. Expected and chance-constrained models are developed to address these uncertain variables. Stackelberg game is used to solve the proposed models. The equilibrium optimal wholesale price and unit margin are provided in order to determine the maximum profit. Finally, numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed models.

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