The Game Analysis on Risks of Logistics Enterprises Participate in Logistics Finance

2011 ◽  
Vol 335-336 ◽  
pp. 1039-1043 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rui Li Shi ◽  
Chun Xiang Guo

Although the financial crisis is seemly over, but its impact on the global economy is still spreading, and also make people pay more attention to the improvement and operation of the economic and financial system, the development of the logistics industry in this financial crisis has also been confronted with great challenge, in this case, the concept of logistics finance is more widely known by people. While logistics finance provides a good opportunity to the development of logistics industry, it also involves enormous risk. As the financial supervision system is incomplete, enterprise credit evaluation and supervision system is not perfected, risks of the logistics enterprises participate in the logistics finance are more obvious, and researches of this aspect will appear more valuable. Therefore, this paper established a game theory tripartite game model of logistics financial participants, on the base, risks of logistics enterprises participate in the logistics financial business were analyzed, and show the corresponding conclusions and recommendations.

2021 ◽  
Vol 275 ◽  
pp. 03078
Author(s):  
KunYang Liu ◽  
Yong Zhang

Blockchain technology is considered to be the representative technology of the fourth technological revolution, and logistics and supply chain field has been considered as the main application direction in the next step by industry and academia. In order to study the behavior and intention of Chinese cross-border logistics enterprises to introduce blockchain into internal supply chain, this paper constructs a model of cross-border logistics enterprises adopting blockchain technology on the basis of bounded rationality based on the game model, this paper attempts to find out the factors that affect the introduction of blockchain into the internal supply chain through mathematical derivation and numerical analysis. The game results show that the willingness of cross-border logistics enterprises to adopt blockchain is closely related to the technical ability of blockchain, the incremental performance after the introduction of blockchain, the conversion cost of blockchain technology, and other factors. Enterprises should coordinate various factors and choose to adopt blockchain technology according to their own situation.


2014 ◽  
Vol 687-691 ◽  
pp. 1662-1667
Author(s):  
Xue He ◽  
Shuang Liang Tian ◽  
Ping Chen ◽  
Wen Wen Tian

Using the differential game theory, we studied the investment problem on public libraries, and established the Leader-follower differential game model, which is between the governments and the private enterprises (social organization). By building the Hamiltonian solving the Stackelberg balanced optimal solutions in the main two game players when they choose their strategies. By adjusting the strategy of government and social utility’s coefficient of dynamic to increase the comprehensive social utility of libraries.


2013 ◽  
Vol 834-836 ◽  
pp. 1942-1946
Author(s):  
Shou Wen Ji ◽  
Ling Li Li

The built-in outsourcing logistics alliance is a new thing compared to other logistics concepts. This paper first makes a game analysis on the bulit-in outsourcing alliance of logistics based on game theory after conducting the research actuality on logistics outsourcing and alliance. According to research and analysis, the game theory is applied to the composition of built-in outsourcing logistics alliance and cooperative game is suitable for the alliance. Then the game analysis of the built-in outsourcing logistics alliance is made, which includes the establishment of a general game model and the game analysis which is suitable for choosing alliance member.


2013 ◽  
Vol 405-408 ◽  
pp. 3473-3476
Author(s):  
Cheng Zhi Li ◽  
Feng Peng

Project quality is affected by many factors,of which the rent-seeking behavior of the contractor is an important one.In this paper,the contractor’s rent-seeking behavior in various stage of construction projects and its effect to social welfare is analyzed based on the game theory and rent-seeking theory.After building a game model among the owner,contractor and supervisor,some suggestions are propounded to forestall such behavior from the point of equilibrium solutions.


2011 ◽  
Vol 50-51 ◽  
pp. 409-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Chao Feng ◽  
Chun Feng Liu ◽  
Shao Hong Yan ◽  
Ai Min Yang ◽  
Jin Peng Wang

With rapid growth of national economy, infrastructure construction maintains its vigorous development, but there are some serious problems in this field, for example, construction unit and supervision unit may conspire together to swindle governmental capital. This paper introduces some background which exists in construction project management system, analyses relation and benefit of project’s tripartite main body, and establishes conspiracy game’s utility matrix of construction unit and supervision unit by introducing game theory. By establishing conspiracy game model between construction unit and supervision unit, the paper mainly discusses conspiracy action which may occur between construction unit and supervision unit (rent-seeking and rent-creating), gets equilibrium probabilities of seeking rent and creating rent, and make some further analysis.


2014 ◽  
Vol 687-691 ◽  
pp. 1619-1621 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi Te Zhu ◽  
Cheng Hao Liu

System simulation software MATLAB is developed by the United States Mays Walker Corporation (Mathwork) for the study of engineering analysis and design process. On the basis of discussion on MATLAB simulation software, this paper introduces the evolutionary game model, and take the evolutionary game model between logistics enterprises and SMEs as an example , Showing the application of MATLAB simulation technology on evolutionary game.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Zhaoyang Wu ◽  
Shiyong Wang ◽  
Hong Yang ◽  
Xiaokui Zhao

In recent years, with the rapid development of the global economy and the development trend of more and more stable, well-developed network communications, online shopping has become an increasingly common way; as a result, the logistics industry has emerged from many industries and has become one of the most popular industries. However, due to the extensive involvement of the logistics industry, the overly complex technology, and the huge amount of data and information, the security of logistics has become one of the hot topics of special concern. Based on the background of an intelligent environment, this paper constructs a supply chain financial logistics supervision system based on Internet of Things technology. This article refers to the research experience of previous scholars, briefly introduces the theoretical knowledge of the Internet of Things technology, smart environment, and supply chain finance, and makes a certain analysis of the logistics supervision system. We collect and calculate logistics data through the wolf group hunting and siege formula in the wolf group algorithm and analyze the application performance of the logistics supervision system in reality. Then, we briefly designed the system architecture diagram of the logistics supervision system and compared the freight situation of the logistics supervision system before and after and statistics on the deployment of the logistics supervision system in customs, docks, airports, stations, and other places from 2015 to 2019. Finally, a comparative analysis of the performance of wolf pack algorithm and other algorithms was performed under different path planning. The final result shows that the logistics supervision system has important practical value in the logistics industry; in addition, the deployment of logistics supervision systems in customs, terminals, and other places has increased year by year from 2015 to 2019.


2012 ◽  
Vol 518-523 ◽  
pp. 4835-4838 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chun Xu Hao ◽  
Ya Li Wen

China adopted a series of measures on wetland eco-environmental protection to enhance improvement of ecological conditions of wetlands. However, there are still structural policies absence in the practicing process. Ecological compensation as a systematic arrangement between adjusting damage and environment protectors remain an effective measure of environmental conservation. This article from the perspective of game theory analyze wetland ecological compensation stakeholders, through the establishment of wetland ecological compensation of subject and object of the game model to arrive at the wetland ecological compensation of the main object of the Nash equilibrium strategy, and make specific recommendations.


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