The Application of MATLAB Simulation Technology on Evolutionary Game Analysis

2014 ◽  
Vol 687-691 ◽  
pp. 1619-1621 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi Te Zhu ◽  
Cheng Hao Liu
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The United States ◽  
Simulation Software ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Engineering Analysis ◽  
Matlab Simulation ◽  
Simulation Technology ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Analysis And Design ◽  
Logistics Enterprises

System simulation software MATLAB is developed by the United States Mays Walker Corporation (Mathwork) for the study of engineering analysis and design process. On the basis of discussion on MATLAB simulation software, this paper introduces the evolutionary game model, and take the evolutionary game model between logistics enterprises and SMEs as an example , Showing the application of MATLAB simulation technology on evolutionary game.

scholarly journals Evolutionary game analysis of Chinese cross border logistics enterprises adopting blockchain technology in supply chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 275 ◽  
pp. 03078
Author(s):  
KunYang Liu ◽  
Yong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Technological Revolution ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Technical Ability ◽  
Blockchain Technology ◽  
Logistics Enterprises ◽  
Mathematical Derivation

Blockchain technology is considered to be the representative technology of the fourth technological revolution, and logistics and supply chain field has been considered as the main application direction in the next step by industry and academia. In order to study the behavior and intention of Chinese cross-border logistics enterprises to introduce blockchain into internal supply chain, this paper constructs a model of cross-border logistics enterprises adopting blockchain technology on the basis of bounded rationality based on the game model, this paper attempts to find out the factors that affect the introduction of blockchain into the internal supply chain through mathematical derivation and numerical analysis. The game results show that the willingness of cross-border logistics enterprises to adopt blockchain is closely related to the technical ability of blockchain, the incremental performance after the introduction of blockchain, the conversion cost of blockchain technology, and other factors. Enterprises should coordinate various factors and choose to adopt blockchain technology according to their own situation.

Evolutionary game analysis of information sharing by institutional investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Relationship Network ◽  
The Relationship

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.

An evolutionary game analysis of user-pay public–private partnership projects

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Danrong Song ◽  
Jinbo Song ◽  
Hehui Yuan ◽  
Yu Fan
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
The Public

PurposeWith the growing demand for infrastructure and public services in recent years, PPP-UP have attracted a great deal of attention. However, while the user focuses on the payment for use and the private sector is concerned with its return on investment, the public sector pays more attention to the efficient utilization of public funds. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to join PPP-UP, an evolutionary game model involving the three parties is constructed.Design/methodology/approachAn evolutionary game model is established that considers the users and the public and private sectors in user-pay public-private-partnership projects (PPP-UP). Eight scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. A situation where all three players are willing to cooperate in theory is also examined. The key influencing parameters that affect cooperation behaviors are further discussed.FindingsFirst, the results illustrate that by properly adjusting the influencing factors, the cooperation status among the three parties can be changed along with certain evolutionary trends. Second, it is hard to modify unsatisfactory evolutionary stability by small changes in both the price compensation of and the construction and operation compensation. Third, it is necessary to involve the users in the decision-making process in PPP-UP and take their demands regarding benefits and payments into account.Originality/valueIn this paper, we focus on PPP-UP to research interactions among the public and private sectors and the users. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, to facilitate the successful implementation and development of a project, several conditions are needed to ensure tripartite cooperation. Several recommendations are then proposed for decision-makers in PPP-UP.

scholarly journals Behavioral Analysis of Subjects for Green Technology Innovation: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Yongquan Guo ◽  
Hua Zou ◽  
Zhu Liu
Keyword(s):  
Technology Innovation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Strategic Choice ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Simulation Software ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Green Technologies ◽  
Technology Application ◽  
Technology Applications ◽  
The Government

The application of green technologies can reduce environmental hazards and promote sustainability. The connotation of green technology innovation has two main aspects: the first aspect is the generation of green technology from nothing to something, and the other aspect is the improvement and upgrading of existing green technology; these two aspects are related. However, from the existing research, there are relatively few studies on the process of green technology innovation from these two aspects at the same time. If green technology is not studied from this perspective, the evolutionary process and influencing factors of green technology from generation to development cannot be clarified, which is not conducive to the development of green technology and the realization of the goal of environmental friendliness. Research considers the green innovation process from R&D to upgrading linkages and analyses the roles of government departments, green technology R&D institutions, and green technology application enterprises in green technology innovation. In addition, the green technology application enterprises are considered to promote technology enhancement through technology application feedback with green technology R&D institutions. The evolutionary game model of three subjects was established, the strategic evolution process of different subjects was analyzed, the influence of each element on the strategic choice of different subjects was explored, and the stability analysis of strategic choice was conducted using simulation software. The study shows the following: (1) The greater the government’s punishment and support to green technology R&D institutions, the more favorable it is for green technology R&D institutions to carry out green technology R&D. (2) In green technology applications, if the government has no direct interest relationship with green technology application enterprises, the enterprises will choose negative response behavior. (3) The greater the technology enhancement gains of green technology R&D institutions and the greater the feedback gains of technology applications actively carried out by enterprises in response to the government’s call, the more the government departments tend to support green technology R&D.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game for Collaborative Innovation of the IoT Industry under Government Leadership in China: An IoT Infrastructure Perspective

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 3648
Author(s):  
Jie Hou ◽  
Baizhou Li
Keyword(s):  
Development Strategy ◽  
Smart Cities ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The United States ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
The Development Strategy ◽  
Government Leadership

Since the United States, the European Union, China, and other countries put forward the development strategy of Internet of Things (IoT), it has been growing rapidly, leading to industrial restructuring and the sustainable development of various industries. Not only can collaborative innovation of the IoT industry accelerate R&D efficiency and product substitution frequency of IoT infrastructure, but also it can promote the construction of smart cities, the application of Big Data and Cloud Computing, and the development of 5G. In China, government is a leader and initiator of IoT infrastructure deployment. Therefore, in this paper, we construct an evolutionary game model of the IoT industry under government leadership represented by government, telecom equipment manufacturers, and telecom operators. Then, we analyze the asymptotic stability, equilibrium stability, and evolutionary stability strategy of the model. Finally, we carry out numerical simulation to investigate the effect of eight factors and four mechanisms on evolutionary behaviors of the three parties. The results show each factor has a different influence on them. Evolutionary game model offers ideas for government and industry subjects before the collaborative innovation of IoT infrastructure deployment in practice.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Capital-Constrained Supplier’s and Manufacturer’s Financing Schemes

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Suyong Zhang ◽  
Panos. M. Pardalos ◽  
Xiaodan Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Financial Risk ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Interaction Mechanism ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Strategy Selection ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Purchase Order ◽  
Financing Strategy ◽  
Theoretical Results ◽  
Financing Schemes

Purchase order financing (POF) and buyer direct financing (BDF) are both innovative financing schemes aiming to help financial constrained suppliers secure financing for production. In this paper, we investigate the interaction mechanism between suppliers’ financing strategy selection and manufacturers’ loans offering strategy adoption under two innovative financing schemes. We developed an evolutionary game model to effectively investigate the interaction mechanism between suppliers and manufacturers and analyzed the evolutionary stable strategies of the game model. Then we used system dynamics to present the performance of the evolutionary game model and took a sensitivity analysis to verify the theoretical results. The main conclusions are as follows: in the supply chain, to deal with the noncooperation among suppliers and manufacturers on innovative financing schemes, the revenue of manufacturers, the rate of manufacturer loan, and the proper financial risk factor should be relatively high.

Low-Carbon Selection Decision for Logistics Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game under the Supervision of Government

2011 ◽  
Vol 219-220 ◽  
pp. 736-741
Author(s):  
Ye Zhou ◽  
Hui He ◽  
Yan Feng Wang
Keyword(s):  
Global Climate ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Global Climate Warming ◽  
Logistics Enterprises ◽  
Selection Decision ◽  
The Government ◽  
Supervision Strategies ◽  
Emission Of Greenhouse Gases

The emission of greenhouse gases leading to global climate warming has caused widespread concern on the part of governments worldwide. As one of the main sources of carbon emissions, modern logistics occupies a unique position for energy saving. But as economic entities, logistics enterprises have no real incentive to implement low-carbon logistics operations, which needs government to stimulate logistics enterprises to implement low-carbon strategy through regulations. Constructed an Evolutionary Game Model for logistics enterprises to implement low-carbon selection decision under the supervision of the government, analyzed the effcts of different regulative parameters on the implementation of low-carbon strategy in logistics business. The results show that government's regulation and strategies play a crucial role in carrying out the low-carbon strategy. Finally, according to different evolution conditions and conclusions, it proposes appropriate supervision strategies for government to promote logistics enterprises to put the low-carbon strategy into effect.

The Game Analysis for Financial Fraud Behavior of CPAs under the Shareholder Selecting Pattern

2014 ◽  
Vol 926-930 ◽  
pp. 4032-4036
Author(s):  
Ping Chen ◽  
Shuang Liang Tian
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Financial Fraud ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Audit Independence

CPAs enjoy higher audit independence under the shareholders selecting pattern, which is widely used in developed countries. According to the characteristics of shareholders selecting pattern, as well as that of listing companies’ managers and CPAs, we established asymmetric evolutionary game model between managers and CPAs, and researched the paths and the mechanism which two players’ behavior evolved respectively. Based on this, we discussed the forming conditions of financial fraud.

The Game Analysis on Risks of Logistics Enterprises Participate in Logistics Finance

2011 ◽  
Vol 335-336 ◽  
pp. 1039-1043 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rui Li Shi ◽  
Chun Xiang Guo
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
Financial Supervision ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Good Opportunity ◽  
Logistics Industry ◽  
Supervision System ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Logistics Enterprises

Although the financial crisis is seemly over, but its impact on the global economy is still spreading, and also make people pay more attention to the improvement and operation of the economic and financial system, the development of the logistics industry in this financial crisis has also been confronted with great challenge, in this case, the concept of logistics finance is more widely known by people. While logistics finance provides a good opportunity to the development of logistics industry, it also involves enormous risk. As the financial supervision system is incomplete, enterprise credit evaluation and supervision system is not perfected, risks of the logistics enterprises participate in the logistics finance are more obvious, and researches of this aspect will appear more valuable. Therefore, this paper established a game theory tripartite game model of logistics financial participants, on the base, risks of logistics enterprises participate in the logistics financial business were analyzed, and show the corresponding conclusions and recommendations.

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