Globalization, sovereignty and policy choice

1999 ◽  
pp. 226-244
Keyword(s):  
Policy Choice

Welfare Effect of the Trade Policy Choice Between Countries

2012 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 125
Author(s):  
Illtae Ahn ◽  
Hyukseung Shin
Keyword(s):  
Trade Policy ◽  
Welfare Effect ◽  
Policy Choice

Ethics and Public Policy

1981 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
George J. Graham
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Policy Analysis ◽  
Policy Process ◽  
Policy Issue ◽  
Policy Choice ◽  
Single Text ◽  
Public Policy Analysis ◽  
The Government ◽  
New Framework ◽  
Selection Of

The purpose of this course is to introduce a new framework linking the humanities to public policy analysis as pursued in the government and the academy. Current efforts to link the particular contributions from the humanities to problems of public policy choice are often narrow either in terms of their perspective on the humanities or in terms of their selection of the possible means of influencing policy choice. Sometimes a single text from one of the humanities disciplines is selected to apply to a particular issue. At other times, arguments about the ethical dimensions of a single policy issue often are pursued with a single — or sometimes, no — point of access to the policy process in mind.

scholarly journals National and Sub-National Social Distancing Responses to COVID-19

Economies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 69
Author(s):  
Terrence Iverson ◽  
Edward Barbier
Keyword(s):  
National Policy ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Policy Choice ◽  
Social Distancing ◽  
Efficient Control ◽  
National Governments

We examine the effectiveness of sub-national actions to control a novel disease, such as COVID-19, in the absence of national policy. Evidence shows that countries where sub-national governments have undertaken unilateral social distancing measures to combat the pandemic with little or no coordination have performed less well in controlling the spread of the disease. We explore analytically whether agreement on a common social distancing policy among sub-national governments, i.e., states or provinces, can lead to a better outcome than if each state or province pursues its own social distancing policy in isolation. A key feature of our model is that it accounts for the inter-jurisdictional spillover effects of each sub-national jurisdiction’s policy choice with respect to social distancing. Our results show that, in the absence of a national mandatory agreement, a sub-national agreement with sufficient coordination of social distancing policy among states yields a more effective and efficient control of a pandemic compared to states choosing policy unilaterally. These findings strongly support calls for greater cooperation among and assistance for sub-national governments to improve the effectiveness of their social distancing efforts in controlling the pandemic.

Accounting for the Distribution of Benefits and Costs in Benefit–Cost Analysis

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
James K. Hammitt
Keyword(s):  
Cost Analysis ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Policy Choice ◽  
Alternative Evaluation ◽  
Benefit Cost Analysis ◽  
Transfer Programs ◽  
Net Benefits ◽  
Benefit Cost ◽  
Benefits And Costs

Abstract Benefit–cost analysis (BCA) is often viewed as measuring the efficiency of a policy independent of the distribution of its consequences. The role of distributional effects on policy choice is disputed; either: (a) the policy that maximizes net benefits should be selected and distributional concerns should be addressed through other measures, such as tax and transfer programs or (b) BCA should be supplemented with distributional analysis and decision-makers should weigh efficiency and distribution in policy choice. The separation of efficiency and distribution is misleading. The measure of efficiency depends on the numéraire chosen for the analysis, whether monetary values or some other good (unless individuals have the same rates of substitution between them). The choice of numéraire is not neutral; it can affect the ranking of policies by calculated net benefits. Alternative evaluation methods, such as BCA using a different numéraire, weighted BCA, or a social welfare function (SWF), may better integrate concerns about distribution and efficiency. The most appropriate numéraire, distributional weights, or SWFs cannot be measured or statistically estimated; it is a normative choice.

Stick Then Carrot: When Do Governments Give Amnesty during Civil War?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lesley-Ann Daniels
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Policy Choice ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
The Government

Abstract Governments grant amnesties to rebel groups during civil wars and this is a puzzle. Why would the government offer an amnesty, which can be interpreted as a signal of weakness? In certain circumstances, offering amnesty is a rational policy choice. Governments should give amnesties when they are winning: the risk of misinterpreted signals is lessened, costs are low, rebel groups are weakened, and so amnesty can be used instrumentally to encourage defection or division among foot soldiers or as an incentive to leaders. Therefore, the government capitalizes on its military advantage and offers amnesty in a “stick then carrot” tactic. Using a database of amnesties during conflicts from 1990 to 2011, the article shows that governments are more likely to give amnesties following high rebel deaths. The use of amnesty during conflict is nuanced and context is important when understanding strategic choices.

scholarly journals Frege’s puzzle and the ex ante Pareto principle

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Mahtani
Keyword(s):  
Policy Choice ◽  
Choice Situation ◽  
Pareto Principle ◽  
Social Situations ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Almost All ◽  
Rational Behaviour ◽  
Fixed Population

Abstract The ex ante Pareto principle has an intuitive pull, and it has been a principle of central importance since Harsanyi’s defence of utilitarianism (to be found in e.g. Harsanyi, Rational behaviour and bargaining equilibrium in games and social situations. CUP, Cambridge, 1977). The principle has been used to criticize and refine a range of positions in welfare economics, including egalitarianism and prioritarianism. But this principle faces a serious problem. I have argued elsewhere (Mahtani, J Philos 114(6):303-323 2017) that the concept of ex ante Pareto superiority is not well defined, because its application in a choice situation concerning a fixed population can depend on how the members of that population are designated. I show in this paper that in almost all cases of policy choice, there will be numerous sets of rival designators for the same fixed population. I explore two ways that we might complete the definition of ex ante Pareto superiority. I call these the ‘supervaluationist’ reading and the ‘subvaluationist’ reading. I reject the subvaluationist reading as uncharitable, and argue that the supervaluationist reading is the most promising interpretation of the ex ante Pareto principle. I end by exploring some of the implications of this principle for prioritarianism and egalitarianism.

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