Epistemic values in art

2021 ◽  
pp. 59-81
Author(s):  
Angelo Emanuele Cioffi
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yin Chung Au

AbstractThis paper proposes an extended version of the interventionist account for causal inference in the practical context of biological mechanism research. This paper studies the details of biological mechanism researchers’ practices of assessing the evidential legitimacy of experimental data, arguing why quantity and variety are two important criteria for this assessment. Because of the nature of biological mechanism research, the epistemic values of these two criteria result from the independence both between the causation of data generation and the causation in question and between different interventions, not techniques. The former independence ensures that the interventions in the causation in question are not affected by the causation that is responsible for data generation. The latter independence ensures the reliability of the final mechanisms not only in the empirical but also the formal aspects. This paper first explores how the researchers use quantity to check the effectiveness of interventions, where they at the same time determine the validity of the difference-making revealed by the results of interventions. Then, this paper draws a distinction between experimental interventions and experimental techniques, so that the reliability of mechanisms, as supported by the variety of evidence, can be safely ensured in the probabilistic sense. The latter process is where the researchers establish evidence of the mechanisms connecting the events of interest. By using case studies, this paper proposes to use ‘intervention’ as the fruitful connecting point of literature between evidence and mechanisms.


2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donal Khosrowi

Abstract:Proponents of evidence-based policy (EBP) call for public policy to be informed by high-quality evidence from randomized controlled trials. This methodological preference aims to promote several epistemic values, e.g. rigour, unbiasedness, precision, and the ability to obtain causal conclusions. I argue that there is a trade-off between these epistemic values and several non-epistemic, moral and political values. This is because the evidence afforded by standard EBP methods is differentially useful for pursuing different moral and political values. I expand on how this challenges ideals of value-freedom and -neutrality in EBP, and offer suggestions for how EBP methodology might be revised.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-70
Author(s):  
Snjezana Prijic-Samarzija

The new and vibrant field of the epistemology of democracy, or the inquiry about the epistemic justification of democracy as a social system of procedures, institutions, and practices, as a cross-disciplinary endeavour, necessarily encounters both epistemologists and political philosophers. Despite possible complaints that this kind of discussion is either insufficiently epistemological or insufficiently political, my approach explicitly aims to harmonize the political and epistemic justification of democracy. In this article, I tackle some fundamental issues concerning the nature of the epistemic justification of democracy and the best theoretical framework for harmonizing political and epistemic values. I also inquire whether the proposed division of epistemic labour and the inclusion of experts can indeed improve the epistemic quality of decision-making without jeopardizing political justification. More specifically, I argue in favour of three theses. First, not only democratic procedures but also the outcomes of democracy, as a social system, need to be epistemically virtuous. Second, democracy?s epistemic virtues are more than just a tool for achieving political goals. Third, an appropriate division of epistemic labour has to overcome the limitations of both individual and collective intelligence.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dayu Cao ◽  
Yan Zheng ◽  
Chunnian Liu ◽  
Xiaoying Yao ◽  
Shiyue Chen

PurposeThis study aims to identify and describe the relationships among different consumption values, anxiety and organic food purchase behaviour considering the moderating role of sustainable consumption attitude from the viewpoint of the theory of consumption values.Design/methodology/approachData were collected using a structured questionnaire survey in first-tier cities in China. A total of 344 consumers of organic foods participated in the study. Structural equation modelling and hierarchical regression analysis were employed for data analysis.FindingsThe results indicated the significant association of functional value-price, emotional value, social value and epistemic value with purchase behaviour. Anxiety had a positively significant influence on functional (quality), functional (price), emotional, social, conditional and epistemic values. In addition, the results indicated that functional (price), emotional, social and epistemic values played mediating effects in the relationships between anxiety and purchase behaviour. Moreover, sustainable consumption attitude had a positive moderating effect on functional value-price and purchase behaviour.Practical implicationsThe research not only provides novel and original insights for understanding organic consumption but also provides a reference for organic retailers to develop sales strategies and policymakers to formulate policies to guide organic consumption that are conducive to promoting sustainable consumption.Originality/valueFor the first time, this research attempts to explore the relationships among different consumption values, anxiety and purchase behaviour. It may improve the gap of inconsistency in attitude and behaviour in organic consumption, and provide a new perspective for the study of organic consumption.


Author(s):  
Brian Leiter

If all value judgments arise from affective responses, what are the implications for judgments about epistemic value and Nietzsche’s naturalism? The chapter offers a new reading of perspectivism: while all expressions of knowledge depend on “will” or “affect,” evolutionary pressures select in favor of some of these affects, such that most “creatures like us” converge on many epistemic values, albeit not all. Beyond that baseline, the “Busy World Hypothesis” reminds us that which objects of cognition command our attention is influenced by our other affects and interests, which determines what we come to know about the world. Nietzsche emerges as an anti-realist about epistemic value, as well as moral value, defending something like the old Stevensonian view that where people share attitudes, reasoning about what one ought to do and believe is possible; where people do not share attitudes, reasoning is not possible and only force prevails in a dispute.


Author(s):  
Linda Zagzebski

‘Virtue epistemology’ is the name of a class of theories that focus epistemic evaluation on good epistemic properties of persons rather than on properties of beliefs. The former or some interesting subset of the former are called intellectual virtues. Some of these theories propose that the traditional concepts of justification or knowledge can be analysed in terms of intellectual virtue, whereas others maintain that these traditional concepts are defective or uninteresting and it is desirable to replace them with the notion of an intellectual virtue. In all these theories, epistemic evaluation rests on some virtuous quality of persons that enables them to act in a cognitively effective and commendable way. Simple reliabilism may be treated either as a precursor to virtue epistemology or as an early form of it. Later versions add requirements for virtue intended to capture the idea that it is a quality which makes an epistemic agent subjectively responsible as well as objectively reliable. Proponents of virtue epistemology claim a number of advantages. It is said to bypass disputes between foundationalists and coherentists on proper cognitive structure, to avoid sceptical worries, to avoid the impasse between internalism and externalism and to broaden the range of epistemological enquiry to include such neglected epistemic values as understanding and wisdom. Some theorists argue that the real virtue of virtue epistemology is the way it permits us to redefine the central questions of epistemology. In addition, since virtue epistemology can be blended with virtue ethics, it holds out the promise of a unified theory of value.


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