Moral fictionalism

Author(s):  
Daniel Nolan

Moral fictionalism is the doctrine that the moral claims we accept should be treated as convenient fictions. One standard kind of moral fictionalism maintains that many of the moral claims we ordinarily accept are in fact false, but these claims are still useful to produce and accept, despite this falsehood. Moral fictionalists claim they can recover many of the benefits of the use of moral concepts and moral language, without the theoretical costs incurred by rivals such as moral realism or traditional moral noncognitivism. These benefits might include social benefits, like being able to resolve conflict peacefully, or psychological benefits for individuals, like resisting temptations that would be harmful.

Author(s):  
Billy Dunaway

This book develops and defends a framework for moral realism. It defends the idea that moral properties are metaphysically elite, or privileged parts of reality. It argues that realists can hold that this makes them highly eligible as the referents for our moral terms, an application of a thesis sometimes called reference magnetism. And it elaborates on these theses by introducing some natural claims about how we can know about morality, by having beliefs that are free from a kind of risk of error. This package of theses in metaphysics, meta-semantics, and epistemology is motivated with a view to an explanation of possible moral disagreements. Many writers have emphasized the scope of moral disagreement, and have given compelling examples of possible users of moral language who appear to be genuinely disagreeing, rather than talking past one another, with their use of moral language. What has gone unnoticed is that there are limits to these possible disagreements, and not all possible users of moral language are naturally interpreted as capable of genuine disagreement. The realist view developed in this book can explain both the extent of, and the limits to, moral disagreement, and thereby has explanatory power that counts significantly in its favor.


Philosophy ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Goldstick

An argument against the claim that moral realism cannot be sustained because moral beliefs, being affective-conative states, cannot themselves be true or false. In fact moral claims can fail both in terms of a failure of the standard it expresses to be realised by a given agent and also in terms of whatever it commends to be good or bad, right or wrong, in actual fact.


2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (7) ◽  
pp. 1361-1390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi-Fei Chuang ◽  
Yang-Fei Tai

Purpose This research aims to predict private club members’ intentions to switch service providers based on the benefit exchange theory through a structural model with a second-order factor. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a qualitative procedure to develop a functional, social and psychological model based on the benefit exchange and switching intention literatures. A further quantitative analysis surveyed a sample of 366 private club members and assessed the usefulness of this model. Findings The results of the confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling indicate that social benefits have a stronger impact on switching intention than loss of functional benefits under the context of a high level of interaction between members and between members and service providers. In addition, they confirm the moderating effects of psychological benefits on the relationship between functional benefits and switching intention. Practical implications The findings indicate that members are unlikely to switch if there are positive word of mouth and interpersonal interactions between members and the club (social benefits). Even if they are disappointed with the functional benefits of the club’s products or services, they may still choose to stay with it owing to psychological benefits affecting their decision to switch. The findings offer managerial insights into utilizing relationship marketing activities to strengthen interpersonal relationships, word of mouth, trust, commitment and emotional factors to retain members. Originality/value This research confirms that the benefit exchange theory can explain members’ intentions to switch from their current clubs and provides valuable recommendations to managers on retaining their clubs’ members. Because the switching intentions of club members have not previously been adequately studied, this study fills an important gap in the literature.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUSTIN MORTON

ABSTRACT:Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) claim that evolution has influenced our moral faculties in such a way that, if moral realism is true, then we have no positive moral knowledge. I present several popular objections to the standard version of this argument before offering a new EDA that has clear advantages in responding to these objections. Whereas the Standard EDA argues that evolution has selected for many moral beliefs with certain contents, this New EDA claims that evolution has selected for one belief: belief in the claim that categorical reasons exist. If moral realism is true, then this claim is entailed by all positive moral claims, and belief in it is defeated due to evolutionary influence. This entails that if realism is true, then we have no positive moral knowledge. While there may be objections against this New EDA, it is much stronger than the Standard EDA, and one realists ought to worry about.


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-312
Author(s):  
Justin Morton ◽  

Epistemological objections to moral realism allege that realism entails moral skepticism. Many philosophers have assumed that theistic moral realists can easily avoid such objections. In this article, I argue that things are not so easy: theists run the risk of violating an important constraint on replies to epistemological objections, according to which replies to such objections may not rely on substantive moral claims of a certain kind. Yet after presenting this challenge, I then argue that theists can meet it, successfully replying to the objections without relying on the problematic kinds of substantive moral claims. Theists have a distinctive and plausible reply to epistemological objections to moral (and, in fact, normative) realism.


2020 ◽  
pp. per.2276
Author(s):  
Julius Frankenbach ◽  
Tim Wildschut ◽  
Jacob Juhl ◽  
Constantine Sedikides

Nostalgia, a sentimental longing or wistful affection for the past, confers self–oriented, existential, and social benefits. We examined whether nostalgic engagement is less beneficial for individuals who are high in neuroticism (i.e. emotionally unstable and prone to negative affect). Specifically, we tested whether the benefits of experimentally induced nostalgia are moderated by trait–level neuroticism. To address this issue, we conducted a high–powered individual participant data meta–analysis ( N = 3556, k = 19). We found that the benefits of nostalgia were not significantly moderated by neuroticism, as they emerged for both high and low neurotics. This finding upheld when the self–oriented, existential, and social benefits of nostalgia were analysed jointly and when they were analysed separately. Taken together, individuals high and low in neuroticism are equally likely to benefit psychologically from engagement in nostalgic reverie. © 2020 The Authors. European Journal of Personality published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Association of Personality Psychology


Author(s):  
Michael Winterbottom

This paper, which began life as a lecture given at Quintilian’s birthplace, Calahorra, was published in 1998. It concerns Quintilian’s use of moral language and his deployment of moral concepts. The many topics covered include his views on contemporary philosophers and the long-standing dispute between rhetoric and philosophy; what he means by ‘a good man’; his own work ethic and disapproval of time-wasting; his constant introduction of moral terms into discussions of style; his attitude to pleasure; and what he means by ‘natural’. It is suggested that these views were central to Quintilian’s first, lost work on the causes of the corruption of eloquence.


Author(s):  
Eric Sampson

Arguments from disagreement against moral realism begin by calling attention to (or supposing) widespread, fundamental moral disagreement among a certain group of people (e.g., the folk, moral philosophers, idealized agents). Then, some skeptical or anti-realist-friendly conclusion is drawn. Chapter 2 proposes that arguments from disagreement share a structure that makes them vulnerable to a single, powerful objection: they self-undermine. For each formulation of the argument from disagreement, at least one of its premises casts doubt either on itself or on one of the other premises. On reflection, this shouldn’t be surprising. These arguments are intended to support very strong metaphysical or epistemological conclusions about morality (e.g., that there are no moral facts, that none of our moral beliefs are justified). They must therefore employ very strong metaphysical or epistemological premises. But, given the pervasiveness of disagreement in philosophy, especially about metaphysics and epistemology, very strong premises are virtually certain to be the subject of widespread, intractable disagreement—precisely the sort of disagreement that proponents of these arguments think undermine moral claims. Thus, these arguments undermine their own premises. If Chapter 2’s argument is sound, it provides realists with a single, unified strategy for responding to any existing or forthcoming arguments from disagreement.


Author(s):  
Colin Marshall

This chapter discusses the nature of moral realism, identifying desiderata that the view defended here (Compassionate Moral Realism) needs to meet. First, the general idea behind the moral realism/anti-realism distinction is described, drawing on Geoffrey Sayre-McCord’s work: the issue of whether morality lives up to its apparent importance and objectivity. Several approaches to defining the distinction are described and clarified. These approaches concern paradigmatic views, the literal truth of moral claims, stance-independent moral facts, and (drawing on Sharon Street’s work) an epistemic asymmetry between virtuous and vicious agents. It is claimed that it is sufficient for moral realism to hold if these semantic, metaphysical, and epistemic criteria are jointly satisfied. Certain robust metaphysical criteria such as metaphysical fundamentality are also considered, but are rejected as necessary conditions for moral realism.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 695 ◽  
Author(s):  
Siân de Bell ◽  
Hilary Graham ◽  
Piran C. L. White

The degradation of urban natural spaces reduces their ability to benefit human populations. Restoration can support urban sustainability by improving both the ecological health of these spaces and the public benefits they provide, but studies rarely combine both perspectives. We assessed the ecological and social benefits of an urban river restoration project relative to an unrestored river on the basis of the following four principles: Increasing ecological integrity; benefitting and engaging society; taking account of the past and future; and sustainability. Ecological health at each site was assessed by analyzing macroinvertebrate samples. The social benefits were measured by conducting focus groups with local users of green spaces surrounding the two rivers and comparing their responses. Restoration increased the ecological health of the river and was viewed positively by users, enhancing the river as a space to visit for psychological benefits. However, there were concerns over the erasure of the cultural heritage of the area. Our findings indicate that the long-term sustainability of restoration projects, particularly in urban areas, can be enhanced by integrating ecological and social dimensions. Although short-term ecological improvements may be small, they have the potential to provide a range of benefits for human populations.


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