scholarly journals Exploring Organized Interests in Post-Communist Policy-Making

2021 ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-88
Author(s):  
Anželika Gumuliauskienė

The article analyzes the management of the influence of organized interests on public policy. The article reveals the concept of organized interests, the essential differences in comparing the concepts of organized interests and interest groups. The article takes the view that organized interests are a more neutral concept that better explains the nature of all actors seeking to influence public policy-making. The author of the article is of the opinion that the concept of interest groups – due to the disagreement of scientists in defining it – causes a lot of confusion when comparing the results of different researches and using the theoretical insights of other scientists. Organized interests interact with other public policy makers to influence policy outcomes. This article analyzes the ways in which organized interests can influence public policy. According to the author of the article, by identifying the ways of influencing public policy, it is possible to envisage ways to manage that influence. The article applies methods of analysis, synthesis, generalization and comparative analysis of scientific literature.


2000 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas T. Holyoke

Over the last several decades, scholars have developed several models of policy making, including interest group pluralism where an equilibrium between competing organized interests becomes law, and legislative control, where the equilibrium between the preferences of legislators becomes law. While pluralism has fallen out of favor, this paper argues that it still has a place in models of policy making complementary to the legislative control theory. Using the development and passage of the Gramm-Leach- Bliley Act, the legislation rewriting the nearly century old laws structuring the banking and finance policy domain, this article shows how this enactment required agreements between organized interests as well as between concerned legislators.


Author(s):  
Simon Bulmer ◽  
Owen Parker ◽  
Ian Bache ◽  
Stephen George ◽  
Charlotte Burns

This chapter focuses on the so-called organized interests, whose interaction with the formal European Union (EU) institutions is a central component of the EU’s decision-making process. The term ‘interest group’ refers to a range of organizations outside of the formal institutions that seek to influence decision making. They provide a link between state actors and the rest of society, also known as ‘civil society’. The chapter first considers the general growth of interest group activity at the European level before discussing the types of group that try to influence EU policy making and the forms of representation open to interests. It then explores the strategies and tactics that interest groups use to try to influence the different institutions. Finally, it analyses the issue of regulating interest group access to the EU institutions.


2008 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALAN M. JACOBS

Why do some elected governments impose short-term costs to invest in solving long-term social problems while others delay or merely redistribute the pain? This article addresses that question by examining the politics of pension reform in Britain and the United States. It first reframes the conventional view of the outcomes – centred on cross-sectional distribution – demonstrating that the politicians who enacted the least radical redistribution enacted the most dramatic intertemporal tradeoffs. To explain this pattern, the article develops and tests a theory of policy choice in which organized interests struggle for long-term advantage under institutional constraints. The argument points to major analytical advantages to studying governments' policy choices in intertemporal terms, for both the identification of comparative puzzles and their explanation.


Author(s):  
Brigitte Horváthová ◽  
Michael Dobbins ◽  
Rafael Pablo Labanino

AbstractThis paper contributes to our understanding of interest intermediation structures in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and, specifically, whether, which, how and to what extent organized interests are incorporated into policy-making processes. Unlike previous studies primarily focusing on patterns of economic coordination (Jahn 2016), we focus on energy policy-making in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. We address the extent to which these energy interest intermediation systems are gravitating towards a more corporatist policy-making paradigm and whether corporatist arrangements have been dismantled in view of the new wave of national conservatism in CEE. We offer a complex operationalization of corporatism based on concrete indicators and present the results of a survey of energy interest groups operating in the region. It covers questions regarding interest intermediation between the organized interests and the government, regulatory authorities as well as the degree of policy coordination and political exchange with the state and between rivalling organizations, enabling us to derive a “corporatism score” for each national institutional setting and discuss them in the light of Jahn’s (2016) corporatism rankings for the region. We show that—despite striking differences—at least rudimentary corporatist interest intermediation structures have emerged with some variations of pluralism and statism in all four countries.


Author(s):  
Ian Bache ◽  
Simon Bulmer ◽  
Stephen George ◽  
Owen Parker

This chapter focuses on the so-called organized interests, whose interaction with the formal European Union institutions is a central component of the EU’s decision-making process. The term ‘interest group’ refers to a range of organizations outside of the formal institutions that seek to influence decision making. They provide a link between state actors and the rest of society, also known as ‘civil society’. The chapter first considers the general growth of interest-group activity at the European level before discussing the types of group that try to influence EU policy making and the forms of representation open to interests. It then explores the strategies and tactics that interest groups use to try to influence the different institutions. Finally, it analyses the issue of regulating interest-group access to the EU institutions.


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