Henry Shue (1999), 'Global Environment and International Inequality', International Affairs, 75, pp. 531-45.

Global Consequentialism and the Morality and Laws of War

Human Rights and 21st Century Challenges ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198824770.003.0003 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 59-75

Author(s):

Hilary Greaves

Keyword(s):

Moral Reasons ◽

Laws Of War ◽

International Affairs ◽

Jeff Mcmahan ◽

Global Form ◽

Empirical Fact ◽

Henry Shue

Rights-based and consequentialist approaches to ethics are often seen as being diametrically opposed to one another. This is entirely understandable, since to say that X has a (moral) right to Y is in part to assert that there are (moral) reasons to provide X with Y even if doing so foreseeably will not lead to better consequences. However, a ‘global’ form of consequentialism raises the possibility of some sort of reconciliation: it could be that the best framework for the regulation of international affairs (say) is one that employs a notion of rights, but if so, that (according to global consequentialism) is the case because regulating international affairs in that manner tends, as a matter of empirical fact, to lead to better consequences. By way of case study, this chapter applies these ideas to a recent dispute about the morality and laws of war, between Jeff McMahan and Henry Shue.

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Global Environment and International Inequality

Climate Ethics ◽

10.1093/oso/9780195399622.003.0014 ◽

2010 ◽

Author(s):

Henry Shue

Keyword(s):

Economic Development ◽

Natural Environment ◽

Global Environment ◽

Economic Welfare ◽

Industrial Activity ◽

International Inequality ◽

The Poor ◽

Theories Of Justice ◽

The Rich ◽

Rich Countries

My aim is to establish that three commonsense principles of fairness, none of them dependent upon controversial philosophical theories of justice, give rise to the same conclusion about the allocation of the costs of protecting the environment. Poor states and rich states have long dealt with each other primarily upon unequal terms. The imposition of unequal terms has been relatively easy for the rich states because they have rarely needed to ask for the voluntary cooperation of the less powerful poor states. Now the rich countries have realized that their own industrial activity has been destroying the ozone in the earth’s atmosphere and has been making far and away the greatest contribution to global warming. They would like the poor states to avoid adopting the same form of industrialization by which they themselves became rich. It is increasingly clear that if poor states pursue their own economic development with the same disregard for the natural environment and the economic welfare of other states that rich states displayed in the past during their development, everyone will continue to suffer the effects of environmental destruction. Consequently, it is at least conceivable that rich states might now be willing to consider dealing cooperatively on equitable terms with poor states in a manner that gives due weight to both the economic development of poor states and the preservation of the natural environment. If we are to have any hope of pursuing equitable cooperation, we must try to arrive at a consensus about what equity means. And we need to define equity not as a vague abstraction but concretely and specifically in the context of both development of the economy in poor states and preservation of the environment everywhere. What diplomats and lawyers call equity incorporates important aspects of what ordinary people everywhere call fairness. The concept of fairness is neither Eastern nor Western, Northern nor Southern, but universal. People everywhere understand what it means to ask whether an arrangement is fair or biased toward some parties over other parties.

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Ethics and Game Theory

Ethics & International Affairs ◽

10.1111/j.1747-7093.1989.tb00222.x ◽

1989 ◽

Vol 3 ◽

pp. 261-276

Author(s):

John R. Chamberlin

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

International Trade ◽

National Security ◽

The Self ◽

Global Environment ◽

Rational Behavior ◽

Strategic Interactions ◽

International Affairs ◽

Self Interest ◽

The Relationship

Game Theory has been an essential tool in analyzing national security, international trade, and the global environment since Neumann and Morgenstern introduced it more than 45 years ago. Chamberlin examines the work of these two authors, focusing on the relationship between rationality and morality as it arises in strategic interactions among players in a game based on three essential features: rational behavior, consequentialism, and the self-interest of players. The author concludes that due to the egoistic nature of actors, political dilemmas cannot easily be solved through the use of Game Theory. Nonetheless, he insists on its validity in contributing to our thinking about the place of ethics in international affairs and in clarifying both the dangers and potential areas of cooperation inherent in many international relationships.

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