Ethics and Game Theory

1989 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 261-276
Author(s):  
John R. Chamberlin
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
International Trade ◽  
National Security ◽  
The Self ◽  
Global Environment ◽  
Rational Behavior ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
International Affairs ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Relationship

Game Theory has been an essential tool in analyzing national security, international trade, and the global environment since Neumann and Morgenstern introduced it more than 45 years ago. Chamberlin examines the work of these two authors, focusing on the relationship between rationality and morality as it arises in strategic interactions among players in a game based on three essential features: rational behavior, consequentialism, and the self-interest of players. The author concludes that due to the egoistic nature of actors, political dilemmas cannot easily be solved through the use of Game Theory. Nonetheless, he insists on its validity in contributing to our thinking about the place of ethics in international affairs and in clarifying both the dangers and potential areas of cooperation inherent in many international relationships.

Do Prudent Agents Play Lotteries? Von Neumann's Contribution to the Theory of Rational Behavior

2006 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Giocoli
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
100Th Anniversary ◽  
Economic Behavior ◽  
Rational Behavior ◽  
John Von Neumann ◽  
Von Neumann ◽  
Balanced Growth ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Fixed Point Techniques

The year 2003 marked the 100th anniversary of the birth of John von Neumann (1903–1957), one of greatest geniuses of the last century. Beyond contributing to fields as diverse as set theory, quantum mechanics, atomic energy, and automatic computing, von Neumann has also had a decisive influence upon modern economics. From the invention of game theory to the axiomatization of expected utility, from the introduction of convex analysis and fixed-point techniques to the development of the balanced growth model, the von Neumann heritage can be clearly traced in several areas of our discipline. The aim of this paper is to clarify the relationship between the two concepts of rationality he devised in his classic 1944 book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, written with the collaboration of the Austrian economist Oskar Morgenstern (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953).

scholarly journals Not Just an Inferior Virtue, nor Self-Interest: Adam Smith on Prudence

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleonora Viganò
Keyword(s):  
Adam Smith ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
The Self ◽  
History Of Ethics ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Dialectical Tension ◽  
History Of ◽  
Moral Dimensions ◽  
Sense Of Justice ◽  
The Relationship

This paper focuses on the treatment of prudence by Adam Smith. Smith was one of the few philosophers to conceive of it as a moral virtue. Smithian prudence is the care of one's own happiness that is limited and ennobled, respectively, by the sense of justice and that of self-command. A reconstruction of Smith's view of prudence helps to clarify three central points in his thought: the interaction between the agent's economic and moral dimensions, the relationship between the self and the other, and the dialectical tension between partiality and impartiality. Furthermore, Smithian prudence is important, in itself, as an approach to the above-mentioned points that is still viable. These three points are recurrent crucial issues in the history of ethics.

TOURNAI AND THE ENGLISH CROWN, 1513–1519

1998 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. S. L. DAVIES
Keyword(s):  
Fifteenth Century ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Political ◽  
International Affairs ◽  
Henry V ◽  
Royal Power ◽  
Self Confidence ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Church

The English occupation of Tournai has recently generated far-reaching claims about its importance; allegedly Tournai provided a foretaste of certain developments of the Henrician Reformation. This article argues that Tournai was treated as an integral part of Henry VIII's ‘kingdom of France’ and its status consistently distinguished from that of the English kingdom. It was not, as has been suggested, granted representation in the English parliament. The argument that advanced ideas of ‘sovereignty’ derived from fifteenth-century French thought entered into English political discourse through Tournai is also countered. Important jurisdictional points were raised, notably over the administration of the bishopric, involving three powers, England, France, and the Habsburg government of Flanders. But Henry's insistence on his rights as a sovereign prince were directed against France, not, as has been claimed, against the papacy. Nothing in Henry's dealings with Tournai transcended well-established English doctrine and practice about the relationship between the political authority and the church. Nor did Henry's treatment of the conquered town evoke novel doctrines of royal power; it followed closely precedents set by Henry V. The conquest of Tournai increased the self-confidence of Henry VIII's government in both domestic and international affairs; but largely through Henry's belief that he was successfully emulating the military achievement of Henry V, not through any input of novel political doctrine.

Configuring terrorism in the age of ISIS: The New York Times’ coverage of the 2015 Beirut and Paris attacks

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amani Ismail ◽  
Smeeta Mishra
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
National Security ◽  
New York Times ◽  
The Self ◽  
Nation State ◽  
Global Village ◽  
Loss Of Life ◽  
The New York Times ◽  
Cultural Proximity ◽  
Self Interest

This study inquires whether cultural proximity may explain how media handle terrorism in a global village era where cultural proximity may have given way to cosmopolitanism in news-making. Findings indicate that although loss of life is not culture-bound, cultural proximity persists, as comes through in the sheer contrast in the amount of coverage devoted to Paris versus Beirut. This distinction ought to be qualified, for even with Paris, the self-interest of the nation-state was prioritized, meaning that national security and welfare come first, followed by those of culturally proximate locales. Sensational violence was emphasized for both Lebanese and French victims.

scholarly journals Epidemiological game-theory dynamics of chickenpox vaccination in the USA and Israel

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (66) ◽  
pp. 68-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jingzhou Liu ◽  
Beth F. Kochin ◽  
Yonas I. Tekle ◽  
Alison P. Galvani
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Vaccination Coverage ◽  
Herd Immunity ◽  
Individual Choice ◽  
Breakthrough Infection ◽  
Potential Cost ◽  
General Consensus ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The Relationship

The general consensus from epidemiological game-theory studies is that vaccination coverage driven by self-interest (Nash vaccination) is generally lower than group-optimal coverage (utilitarian vaccination). However, diseases that become more severe with age, such as chickenpox, pose an exception to this general consensus. An individual choice to be vaccinated against chickenpox has the potential to harm those not vaccinated by increasing the average age at infection and thus the severity of infection as well as those already vaccinated by increasing the probability of breakthrough infection. To investigate the effects of these externalities on the relationship between Nash and utilitarian vaccination coverages for chickenpox, we developed a game-theory epidemic model that we apply to the USA and Israel, which has different vaccination programmes, vaccination and treatment costs, as well as vaccination coverage levels. We find that the increase in chickenpox severity with age can reverse the typical relationship between utilitarian and Nash vaccination coverages in both the USA and Israel. Our model suggests that to obtain herd immunity of chickenpox vaccination, subsidies or external regulation should be used if vaccination costs are high. By contrast, for low vaccination costs, improving awareness of the vaccine and the potential cost of chickenpox infection is crucial.

scholarly journals Socrates and the Politics of Music: Preludes of the Republic

2007 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher P. Long
Keyword(s):  
Political Community ◽  
The Self ◽  
Musical Imagery ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Erotic

At least since the appearance of Aristotle’s Politics, Plato’s Republic has been read as arguing for a politics of unity in which difference is understood as a threat to the polis. By focusing on the musical imagery of the Republic, and specifically on its compositional organization around three ‘preludes’, this essay seeks an understanding of Socratic politics that moves beyond the hypothesis of unity. In the first ‘prelude’, Thrasymachus and his insistence that justice is the self-interest of the stronger threatens to subject the harmony of the community to the tyrannical whims of the individual. In the second, the perfected justice of Adeimantus’s city threatens to destroy the erotic rhythm of difference that is the very condition for the possibility of the polis. It is only in the song of dialectic, which itself is called a ‘prelude’, that the tension between the rhythm of plurality and the rational homophony of unity is dynamically tuned in such a way that both the anarchic politics of self-interest and the totalitarian politics of rationalized oppression are equally muted. This conception of politics is embodied in the relationship that emerges between Glaucon and Socrates. Ultimately, the true political community is established here, between rational, erotic individuals seeking justice in concrete, living dialogue.

scholarly journals How Does Altruism Enlarge A Climate Coalition?

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 553 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu-Hsuan LIN
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Solution Design ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Interest Prediction

This study examines the relationship between individual altruistic attitudes and the incentives of participating in a climate coalition by using a laboratory experiment. A dominant strategy solution design categorizes players into two roles in the game: critical and non-critical players. The critical players have a weakly dominant strategy of joining and are essential to an effective coalition. On the other hand, the non-critical players have a dominant strategy of not-joining. The theory suggests that strong altruism would lead non-critical players to join a coalition. The experimental evidence shows that coalitions could be enlarged from the self-interest prediction. However, the result indicates that the individual incentives for participation seem to be negatively correlated with altruistic attitudes. The stronger the altruistic tendencies the less likely individuals are to join a coalition.

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