scholarly journals Knowledge and the Objection to Religious Belief from Cognitive Science

2016 ◽  
pp. 113-125
Author(s):  
Kelly James Clark ◽  
Dani Rabinowitz
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Belief

Born idolaters: The limits of the philosophical implications of the cognitive science of religion

2015 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Jong ◽  
Christopher Kavanagh ◽  
Aku Visala
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Cognitive Constraints ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Work Done

SummaryIn recent years, theoretical and empirical work done under the rubric of the cognitive science of religion (CSR) have led many to conclude that religion (or, at least, some aspects thereof) is “natural”. By this, it is meant that human beings are predisposed to believe in supernatural agents, and that their beliefs about these agents are constrained in various ways. The details about how and why these predispositions and cognitive constraints developed and evolved are still largely unknown, though there is enough of a theoretical consensus in CSR for philosophers to have begun reflecting on the implications of CSR for religious belief. In particular, much philosophical work has been done on the implications of CSR for theism, on both sides of the debate. On one hand, CSR might contribute to defeating particular arguments for theism, or indeed theism altogether; on the other hand, CSR might provide support for specific theological views. In this paper, we argue that the CSR is largely irrelevant for

scholarly journals Emotional bonds: Bridging the gap between evolutionary and humanistic accounts of religious belief

2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-28
Author(s):  
Léon Turner
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Social Bonding ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Evolutionary Account ◽  
Emotional Bonds ◽  
Pluralistic Approach ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Broad Consensus

Recent years have seen a growing willingness in the evolutionary cognitive science of religion (ECSR) to embrace an inclusive, theoretically pluralistic approach and the emergence of a broad consensus around some key themes that collectively constitute a central theoretical core of the field. Nevertheless, ECSR still raises serious problems for some in the humanities. In exploring the reasons for the perception of conflict between humanistic and cognitive evolutionary approaches to religion, I suggest that both ECSR’s default account of the origins of religion and religion’s role in social bonding rely upon notions of culturally unmediated universal cognitive mechanisms that preclude alternative humanistic explanations. I subsequently suggest that the gap between humanistic approaches and the evolutionary study of religion more broadly conceived may be narrowed by further expanding ECSR to include recent research into the brain opioid theory of social attachment (BOTSA), which emphasises the emotional rather than cognitive basis of religion’s social bonding functions. Finally, I outline a possible evolutionary account of the earliest forms of religious ideas and practices, which decouples the origins of religion from the evolution of specialised cognitive machinery and which humanists are likely to find more amenable than mainstream ECSR.

scholarly journals Religious Belief is Not Natural. Why Cognitive Science of Religion Does Not Show That Religious Belief is Trustworthy

Studia Humana ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 34-44
Author(s):  
Hans Van Eyghen
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
World Religions ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Theories Of Religion ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Afterlife Beliefs

Abstract It is widely acknowledged that the new emerging discipline cognitive science of religion has a bearing on how to think about the epistemic status of religious beliefs. Both defenders and opponents of the rationality of religious belief have used cognitive theories of religion to argue for their point. This paper will look at the defender-side of the debate. I will discuss an often used argument in favor of the trustworthiness of religious beliefs, stating that cognitive science of religion shows that religious beliefs are natural and natural beliefs ought to be trusted in the absence of counterevidence. This argument received its most influential defense from Justin Barrett in a number of papers, some in collaboration with Kelly James Clark. I will discuss their version of the argument and argue that it fails because the natural beliefs discovered by cognitive scientists of religion are not the religious beliefs of the major world religions. A survey of the evidence from cognitive science of religion will show that cognitive science does show that other beliefs come natural and that these can thus be deemed trustworthy in the absence of counterevidence. These beliefs are teleological beliefs, afterlife beliefs and animistic theistic beliefs.

scholarly journals Knowledge and the Objection to Religious Belief from Cognitive Science

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelly James Clark ◽  
Dani Rabinowitz
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Short Discussion ◽  
Theistic Belief

A large chorus of voices has grown around the claim that theistic belief is epistemically suspect since, as some cognitive scientists have hypothesized, such beliefs are a byproduct of cognitive mechanisms which evolved for rather different adaptive purposes. This paper begins with an overview of the pertinent cognitive science followed by a short discussion of some relevant epistemic concepts. Working from within a largely Williamsonian framework, we then present two different ways in which this research can be formulated into an argument against theistic belief. We argue that neither version works. 

William James and Embodied Religious Belief

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 366-386
Author(s):  
Tobias Tan
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Embodied Cognition ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Cultural Context ◽  
William James ◽  
Religious Practices ◽  
4E Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Scaffolding

Scholars have recently identified resemblances between pragmatist thought and contemporary trends in cognitive science in the area of ‘embodied cognition’ or ‘4E cognition.’ In this article I explore these resemblances in the account of religious belief provided by the classical pragmatist philosopher William James. Although James’s psychology does not always parallel the commitments of embodied cognition, his insights concerning the role of emotion and socio-cultural context in shaping religious belief, as well as the action-oriented nature of such beliefs, resonate with embodied and embedded accounts of religious belief. James’s insights are readily extended in light of contemporary embodied cognition research to highlight the interdependency between religious belief of individuals and the cognitive scaffolding provided by embodied religious practices.

Cognitive Science and Religious Belief

2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (10) ◽  
pp. 734-745 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham Wood
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Belief

scholarly journals The Epistemic Parity of Religious-Apologetic and Religion-Debunking Responses to the Cognitive Science of Religion

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 466
Author(s):  
Walter Scott Stepanenko
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Argumentative Strategies ◽  
Science Of Religion

Recent work in the cognitive science of religion has challenged some of the explanatory assumptions of previous research in the field. Nonetheless, some of the practitioners of the new cognitive science of religion theorize in the same skeptical spirit as their predecessors and either imply or explicitly claim that their projects undermine the warrant of religious beliefs. In this article, I argue that these theories do no additional argumentative work when compared to previous attempts to debunk religious belief and that these recent debunking efforts are very much motivated by methodological commitments that are shared with canonical research. I contend that these argumentative strategies put debunkers very much on an epistemic par with religious apologists: both advocate responses to the cognitive science of religion that are primarily motivated by methodological commitments.

The cognitive science of religion: a modified theist response

2010 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID LEECH ◽  
AKU VISALA
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Natural Explanation ◽  
Science Of Religion

AbstractCritics of religion have recently claimed that the natural explanation of religious-belief formation offered by the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) is incompatible with theism. Defenders of theism have in turn responded to these claims by arguing for the compatibility of the CSR account with theism. In this paper we propose a modified defence of the compatibility of the CSR account with theism which supplements extant theistic arguments by drawing out the implications of certain points about the nature of CSR explanation which have so far been left relatively unexploited. In developing this defence, we argue that extant atheistic and theistic readings of the CSR can be understood as accepting certain presuppositions, especially about the relative centrality of the CSR account in explaining religious belief, which, we argue, would be detrimental to the theist case were they actually intended, and which should be clearly rejected. We suggest that the theist should argue explicitly from the nature of CSR explanation to its compatibility with theism.

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