Learning to Solve Complex Propositions: Does knowledge of truth-values bootstrap modal operators?

In Chapter 2 we argue that internalists are committed to a kind of relativism, and that theirs is a particularly radical form of relativism. Thought experiments involving certain symmetries across space and/or time play a starring role. If the kinds of symmetries featured in them are possible, we argue, the truth values of narrow content must be relative to some very unusual parameters.

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Logicism Reconsidered

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195325928.003.0007 ◽

2009 ◽

Author(s):

Agustín Rayo

Keyword(s):

Fourth Section ◽

Truth Values ◽

The Third

This article is divided into four sections. The first two identify different logicist theses, and show that their truth-values can be established given minimal assumptions. The third section sets forth a notion of “content-recarving” as a possible constraint on logicist theses. The fourth section—which is largely independent from the rest of the article—is a discussion of “neologicism.”

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Examining Automatic Stereotyping From a Propositional Perspective: Is Automatic Stereotyping Sensitive to Relational and Validity Information?

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin ◽

10.1177/01461672211024121 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 014616722110241

Author(s):

Tal Moran ◽

Jamie Cummins ◽

Jan De Houwer

Keyword(s):

Total N ◽

Relational Information ◽

Truth Values ◽

Alternative Perspective ◽

Automatic Stereotyping ◽

Reference Person ◽

Trait Associations

Research on automatic stereotyping is dominated by the idea that automatic stereotyping reflects the activation of (group–trait) associations. In two preregistered experiments (total N = 391), we tested predictions derived from an alternative perspective that suggests that automatic stereotyping is the result of the activation of propositional representations that, unlike associations, can encode relational information and have truth values. Experiment 1 found that automatic stereotyping is sensitive to the validity of information about pairs of traits and groups. Experiment 2 showed that automatic stereotyping is sensitive to the specific relations (e.g., whether a particular group is more or less friendly than a reference person) between pairs of traits and groups. Interestingly, both experiments found a weaker influence of validity/relational information on automatic stereotyping than on non-automatic stereotyping. We discuss the implications of these findings for research on automatic stereotyping.

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The Liar Without Relativism

Erkenntnis ◽

10.1007/s10670-020-00350-0 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Poppy Mankowitz

Keyword(s):

Natural Language ◽

Recent Literature ◽

Liar Paradox ◽

Full Understanding ◽

Truth Values ◽

The Liar ◽

The Liar Paradox ◽

Semantic Relativism

AbstractSome in the recent literature have claimed that a connection exists between the Liar paradox and semantic relativism: the view that the truth values of certain occurrences of sentences depend on the contexts at which they are assessed. Sagi (Erkenntnis 82(4):913–928, 2017) argues that contextualist accounts of the Liar paradox are committed to relativism, and Rudnicki and Łukowski (Synthese 1–20, 2019) propose a new account that they classify as relativist. I argue that a full understanding of how relativism is conceived within theories of natural language shows that neither of the purported connections can be maintained. There is no reason why a solution to the Liar paradox needs to accept relativism.

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Formula size games for modal logic and μ-calculus

Journal of Logic and Computation ◽

10.1093/logcom/exz025 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 29 (8) ◽

pp. 1311-1344 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Lauri T Hella ◽

Miikka S Vilander

Keyword(s):

Modal Logic ◽

Optimal Strategy ◽

Order Logic ◽

First Order Logic ◽

Kripke Models ◽

First Order ◽

Modal Operators ◽

Crucial Difference ◽

Definition Of ◽

Person Game

Abstract We propose a new version of formula size game for modal logic. The game characterizes the equivalence of pointed Kripke models up to formulas of given numbers of modal operators and binary connectives. Our game is similar to the well-known Adler–Immerman game. However, due to a crucial difference in the definition of positions of the game, its winning condition is simpler, and the second player does not have a trivial optimal strategy. Thus, unlike the Adler–Immerman game, our game is a genuine two-person game. We illustrate the use of the game by proving a non-elementary succinctness gap between bisimulation invariant first-order logic $\textrm{FO}$ and (basic) modal logic $\textrm{ML}$. We also present a version of the game for the modal $\mu $-calculus $\textrm{L}_\mu $ and show that $\textrm{FO}$ is also non-elementarily more succinct than $\textrm{L}_\mu $.

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