The Role of Hypothesis Formation in a Community of Psychology

2001 ◽  
pp. 409-428
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Jenny Marie

This paper analyses three crucial research skills: problem identification, data collection and hypothesis formation. It concludes that science research students should be taught about the creative process as they are under pressures that can inhibit creative thought. They should also be taught the importance of tacit knowledge for learning how to do research, as this will aid the process. Styles of thought and language allow researchers to identify and solve problems and limit what the latter can be. Students may benefit from further knowledge of these, so they can understand why their interpretations differ from others and how to create truly original hypotheses. The paper calls for further research into the relationship between language and hypothesis formation.


Author(s):  
Jeanne L. Schroeder

Stanley Fish and Bernhard Schlink agree that there can be no rule for finding a correct legal interpretation. Each, however, offers a negative rule to recognize incorrect interpretations. Schlink asserts that incorrect interpretations can be eliminated through the scientific method of falsification. Fish claims that any interpretation not concerned with the author’s state of mind must be rejected. Unfortunately, Fish’s insistence on authorial intent could be read as downplaying the role of the interpreter. Although interpretation is objective in that it involves the examination of an object, it is not merely objective. Communication is collaboration; interpretation needs an interpreter. It is intersubjective. But interpretation cannot be relegated entirely to the intersubjective “symbolic” order where language and law is located. The symbolic can never be disentangled from the orders of the “imaginary” and the “real” that are its logical boundaries. Interpretation has a subjective aspect because it requires the creative act of the interpreter’s imagination. Schlink recognizes that a subjective moment of hypothesis formation is essential to interpretation but tries to distinguish it from a subsequent objective or intersubjective testing process. There is no rule that can disprove our legal interpretations. This is why judging is always a moral act.


Author(s):  
Bradley E. Alger

This chapter introduces the role of “automatic thinking,” in hypothesis formation. Automatic thinking refers to the default operations of our mind that affect how we view and understand the world. These operations are behind cognitive biases and heuristic reasoning, inductive reasoning, and, most importantly, our tendency to engage in continual, conscious and unconscious, hypothesis generation. Unconscious hypotheses allow us to predict what will happen next and see why things “make sense.” They also account for our susceptibility to the “cognitive illusions,” that lead us astray. The chapter also questions whether “inductive reasoning” should count as a form of “reasoning” at all, since the ability to recognize and respond to regularities in the environment appears to be an adaptive trait shared by all animals and, perhaps, plants as well. This chapter argues that much of the criticism of the hypothesis has failed to take these automatic mental processes into account. The chapter suggests that a better sense of our automatic mental activity can lead to improvements in scientific thinking.


JAMA ◽  
1966 ◽  
Vol 195 (12) ◽  
pp. 1005-1009 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. J. Fernbach
Keyword(s):  

JAMA ◽  
1966 ◽  
Vol 195 (3) ◽  
pp. 167-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. E. Van Metre

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Winnifred R. Louis ◽  
Craig McGarty ◽  
Emma F. Thomas ◽  
Catherine E. Amiot ◽  
Fathali M. Moghaddam

AbstractWhitehouse adapts insights from evolutionary anthropology to interpret extreme self-sacrifice through the concept of identity fusion. The model neglects the role of normative systems in shaping behaviors, especially in relation to violent extremism. In peaceful groups, increasing fusion will actually decrease extremism. Groups collectively appraise threats and opportunities, actively debate action options, and rarely choose violence toward self or others.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Arceneaux

AbstractIntuitions guide decision-making, and looking to the evolutionary history of humans illuminates why some behavioral responses are more intuitive than others. Yet a place remains for cognitive processes to second-guess intuitive responses – that is, to be reflective – and individual differences abound in automatic, intuitive processing as well.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefen Beeler-Duden ◽  
Meltem Yucel ◽  
Amrisha Vaish

Abstract Tomasello offers a compelling account of the emergence of humans’ sense of obligation. We suggest that more needs to be said about the role of affect in the creation of obligations. We also argue that positive emotions such as gratitude evolved to encourage individuals to fulfill cooperative obligations without the negative quality that Tomasello proposes is inherent in obligations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Whiten

Abstract The authors do the field of cultural evolution a service by exploring the role of non-social cognition in human cumulative technological culture, truly neglected in comparison with socio-cognitive abilities frequently assumed to be the primary drivers. Some specifics of their delineation of the critical factors are problematic, however. I highlight recent chimpanzee–human comparative findings that should help refine such analyses.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Parr

Abstract This commentary focuses upon the relationship between two themes in the target article: the ways in which a Markov blanket may be defined and the role of precision and salience in mediating the interactions between what is internal and external to a system. These each rest upon the different perspectives we might take while “choosing” a Markov blanket.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document