Pension funds and domestic debt markets in emerging economies

Author(s):  
Jennifer Churchill ◽  
Bruno Bonizzi ◽  
Annina Kaltenbrunner
2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain Hardie ◽  
Lena Rethel

AbstractIn the period from the 1990s emerging market financial crises until the North Atlantic financial crisis of 2008, the development of domestic bond markets in developing economies was a prominent agenda item in international financial reform circles. The crises of the 1990s drew attention to the vulnerabilities generated by frequently occurring double mismatches of currency denominations and maturities in the borrowing of emerging economies. This led to a series of reform efforts targeted at both increasing liquidity and the range of borrowers in domestic bond markets. In the aggregate, these efforts were successful: For emerging market economies as a whole, domestic debt now exceeds international debt. Moreover, domestic corporate bond markets have emerged in many countries, often for the first time. However, the nature of market development has been far from uniform, and often has not been in line with government aims. In this paper, we examine the interplay of government and business actors in market development. Drawing on 155 interviews with policy and market actors as well as secondary data, we show that the main explanation of variation in market development lies in the pre-existing structure of financial markets, conceptualized as a heterogeneous set of interest/influence constellations.


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatiana Didier ◽  
Sergio L. Schmukler

Author(s):  
Hassan Malik

This concluding chapter explains that both the Bolshevik Revolution and the subsequent default were intertwined and historically contingent. They emerged from a particular set of historical circumstances, processes, and turning points. The events and the processes that produced them were linked by the explicitly financial character of the war the Bolsheviks waged against their opponents—be they the ancien régime, the Provisional Government, domestic class enemies, or foreign powers. Indeed, by 1917 and well before the Bolshevik takeover, a default in Russia—whether in the form of an outright cancellation of debts or a “restructuring”—had become inevitable. Three years of war had seen the Russian Empire lose critical parts of its economy to the enemy, while the strategy of relying on domestic debt markets had seen diminishing returns, forcing the government to resort to the printing press. Even by employing the latter method, the government could not keep up. Under such circumstances, even counterfeiters could not keep pace with the rate at which currency was being issued.


2009 ◽  
Vol 2008 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans J. Blommestein ◽  
Philipp Anderson ◽  
Ceyla Pazarbasioglu ◽  
Alison Harwood

Author(s):  
Yilmaz Akyüz

This chapter argues that the conventional approach to the management and resolution of external financial crises in emerging economies is inefficient and inequitable and needs to be reformed. Such reforms need to account for increased complexities arising from deepened integration, notably the difficulties in differentiating between external and domestic debt in terms of their holders, currency denomination, and governing laws. Effective debt resolution mechanisms would be needed to bail-in creditors whether the crisis is one of liquidity or solvency, or due to private or sovereign debt, or locally or internationally issued external debt, particularly since crises caused by excessive private borrowing lead to large increases in public debt. Debt workouts should include temporary standstills, protection against creditor litigation, lending into arrears and debt restructuring and combine statutory and voluntary elements, including collective action clauses, duly reformed to avoid the kind of predicaments encountered during the Argentinian restructuring.


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