scholarly journals Collective proceedings in the Competition Appeal Tribunal: taking stock and looking ahead

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 104-115
Author(s):  
Ricky Versteeg ◽  
Alexandra Malina
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Collective Actions ◽  
Appellate Courts ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Opportune Time ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Key Aspects ◽  
Court Of Appeal

A new collective actions regime for competition damages claims was introduced in the UK in 2015. Although seven proposed collective proceedings have been brought since that time, none have, as yet, continued beyond the certification stage, and no further cases are likely to proceed to a full certification hearing pending an appeal to the Supreme Court in the Merricks v Mastercard proceedings in 2020. It is, therefore, an opportune time to take stock of the new regime. This article explores the development of the regime to date, considers what lies ahead, and assesses the overall status and progress of the regime. It is suggested that the forthcoming Supreme Court appeal in Merricks provides a welcome opportunity both to build on the significant progress that has already been made on a number of key aspects of the new regimen over the past four years, and to redress some of the legal and policy implications of the recent Court of Appeal judgment in the Merricks proceedings, which risk undermining the important ‘gatekeeping’ function afforded to the Competition Appeal Tribunal under the legislation. The UK collective proceedings regime ought to then be on a strong footing to resume, albeit its development will remain necessarily iterative and cumulative as further important aspects of the new regime are considered by the CAT and appellate courts over the coming years.

The UK courts and EU law post-Brexit

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. Christopher-Vajda
Author(s):  
Christopher Vajda
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Transition Period ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
National Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Following the expiry on 31 December 2020 of the ‘transition period’ under the UK/EU Withdrawal Agreement, the relationship between UK and EU law had changed. Whilst much EU legislation at that date will continue to apply in UK law as ‘retained EU law’ and judgments of the EU courts handed down before that date will remain binding on UK courts as ‘retained EU case law’, the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court can depart from that case law. Whilst EU court judgments handed down after that date are not binding on UK courts, they may be taken into account. This article considers both the status of EU retained case law and when the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal may depart from it, and the future of EU law that is not ‘retained EU case law’ and how judgments of the European Courts and national courts of its Member States may influence UK judges in the future.

Morrisons off the hook as employers welcome clarity on vicarious liability for data breach

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (7) ◽  
pp. 504-506
Author(s):  
Emma Flett ◽  
Jenny Wilson ◽  
Rebecca Gover
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Causal Chain ◽  
Cautionary Tale ◽  
Vicarious Liability ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Protection Legislation ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Data Controller ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Abstract The UK Supreme Court has granted the appeal of supermarket chain WW Morrison Supermarkets plc (Morrisons), finding that the Court of Appeal had misunderstood a number of the governing principles of vicarious liability. Considering Morrisons’ liability afresh, the Supreme Court clarified that the motive and authorized acts of the wrongdoing employee are highly material to a finding of vicarious liability, whilst a causal chain of events is not. Whilst Morrisons’ victory is a welcome clarification on the law of vicarious liability, data controllers should take note: had Morrisons not been a sophisticated data controller paying particular attention to its obligations under data protection legislation, the outcome would likely have been more of a cautionary tale.

The Msiza-case: the perpetuation of injustices by the miscalculation of “just and equitable” compensation

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-226
Author(s):  
Elmien Du Plessis
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Land Reform ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Land Claims ◽  
The Past ◽  
Reform Legislation ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Title Deed ◽  
History Of ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Abstract In 1998 Mr Msiza, a labour tenant, successfully instituted a claim in terms of land reform legislation (the Land Reform (Labour Tenant) Act) for ownership of the land that he and his father occupied for six decades. In terms of this legislation, when the labour tenant is awarding the land, the owner of the land must be compensated for the loss of the land. In 2004, the Land Claims Court confirmed the award of land and ordered the state to make sure that Mr Msiza gets a title deed for the land. The case was heard again in 2016 in the Land Claims Court, where the court this time examined the question of compensation to be paid to the owner. The Land Claims Court ruled that the Constitutional compensation requirement is “just and equitable” compensation, and awarded less-than-market-value compensation by subtracting a seemingly arbitrary amount from the market value of the land. This decision was overturned in 2017 when the Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that the the just and equitable question were already considered in the calculation of market value, and therefore ruled that no amount be deducted from what the valuers calculated to be market value. The handling of the case, and the different approaches from the two courts, is a symptom of the uncertainty that judges are confronted with when they have to calculate “just and equitable” compensation. A history of the case will reveal that the inability to properly valuate the land, perpetuated the injustice that Mr Msiza is facing, of not having the land registered in his name, despite a valid award in terms of land reform legislation. This paper will show how the compensation requirement is a hurdle to Mr Msiza receiving the title deed to his land. By making use of the valuation reports and the court materials, the paper will endeavour to indicate what a better outcome would be, by focussing on the calculation of “just and equitable” compensation. The paper will argue for a purposive approach when interpreting legislation dealing with compensation, where the Constitutional purpose to “heal the divisions of the past” should play a central role in land reform cases.

scholarly journals Planting Seeds for the Future: Dissenting Judgments and the Bridge from the Past to the Present

Fundamina ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 91-127
Author(s):  
Clive Plasket
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Public Power ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Face ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Democratic Constitution

The principal focus of this contribution concerns five cases involving questions of public law, namely the meaning of discrimination; the meaning of public power and its control; whether administrative actions may be reviewed for unreasonableness; the rights of prisoners; and the control of emergency powers in the face of an ouster clause. All five cases were decided in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, now known as the Supreme Court of Appeal, and all were decided prior to 1994: in 1934, 1958, 1976, 1979 and 1988. In each, a dissenting judgment was delivered that articulated values that we today associate with our present democratic Constitution. Before dealing with those cases in detail, it is necessary to say something about the connection between the pre- and post-1994 law, and then to consider the role of some dissenting judgments in the development of the law.

scholarly journals Form and substance in contract damages

2019 ◽  
Vol 70 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-239
Author(s):  
David McLauchlan
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Specific Reference ◽  
Breach Of Contract ◽  
Business Travel ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
American Law ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This article discusses the role of form and substance in the modern law of contract both generally and with specific reference to the law of damages for breach of contract and, in particular, the decisions of the UK Supreme Court in Swynson Ltd v Lowick Rose LLP [2017] UKSC 32 and Fulton Shipping Inc of Panama v Globalia Business Travel SAU (The New Flamenco) [2017] UKSC 43. Although it was probably true to say when Atiyah and Summers wrote in Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law over 30 years ago that ‘the English law of contractual damages continues to be treated by judges and writers as governed by highly formal rules’, it would be wrong to describe the reasoning employed by judges in modern times when explaining, refining and applying these rules as highly formal. Particularly in appellate decisions, judicial reasoning is usually an amalgam of what the authors would describe as formal and substantive considerations. Indeed, the formal reason for supporting a decision may be preferred precisely because it provides the just or most convenient solution to the dispute, as in Swynson v Lowick Rose. In that case the Supreme Court overturned the decision of the majority of the Court of Appeal that denial of the damages claimed ‘would be a triumph of form over substance’, preferring the view of the dissenting judge who said that ‘the form here is the substance’. And, while the decision in The New Flamenco appears at first sight to rest on formal, arguably formalistic, reasoning, a closer reading reveals that substantive considerations influenced the outcome of the appeal.

scholarly journals THE JUSTICIABILITY OF RELIGION

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-310
Author(s):  
Satvinder S. Juss
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Objective Assessment ◽  
Belief System ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Religious Institutions ◽  
Religious Institution ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Court Of Appeal

AbstractInShergill & Others v. Khaira & Others[2014] UKSC 33, the UK courts considered whether a Sikh holy saint had the power to dismiss trustees who questioned his “succession” to the religious institution of theNirmal Kutia Johal. The Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal that religious questions were “nonjusticiable,” reinstated the judgment at first instance of the High Court to the contrary. The decision of the Supreme Court is important because whenever questions of the identification and legitimacy of successors to a religious institution have arisen, their “justiciability” before a secular court has invariably been a bone of contention on grounds that it threatens the autonomy of religious institutions. InShergillthe Supreme Court got around these concerns by drawing a normative distinction between the public law of the land (which the courts are required to determine), and the internal private law of a religious institution on matters of succession, ordination, and removal (which are not in themselves for the courts to decide). ButShergillalso went further than previous case law in two respects. First, the fundamental tenets of a belief system are capable of an objective assessment by a secular court provided that there is public law element to a dispute, in which case the court can then decide on the fitness of the successor for office. This means there is no general presumption that a secular court is barred from considering religious questions per se. Second, these principles apply just as much to the judicial consideration of non-Christian faiths as they to the Christian religion, and this is so notwithstanding the court's unfamiliarity with other faiths.

A Note on Mandela v Executors, Estate Nelson Mandela 2018 (4) SA 86 (SCA) and the Conundrum around the Customary Marriage between Nelson and Winnie Mandela

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Eastern Cape ◽  
High Court ◽  
Nelson Mandela ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.

The Right to Housing: Challenges Associated with the ‘Waiting List System’ Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality V Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 5 2014 3 SA 23 (SCA)

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-121
Author(s):  
Shamier Ebrahim
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Waiting Lists ◽  
The State ◽  
Waiting List ◽  
Allocation Process ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The right to adequate housing is a constitutional imperative which is contained in section 26 of the Constitution. The state is tasked with the progressive realisation of this right. The allocation of housing has been plagued with challenges which impact negatively on the allocation process. This note analyses Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 51 which dealt with a situation where one of the main reasons provided by the Supreme Court of Appeal for refusing the eviction order was because the appellants subjected the unlawful occupiers to defective waiting lists and failed to engage with the community regarding the compilation of the lists and the criteria used to identify beneficiaries. This case brings to the fore the importance of a coherent (reasonable) waiting list in eviction proceedings. This note further analyses the impact of the waiting list system in eviction proceedings and makes recommendations regarding what would constitute a coherent (reasonable) waiting list for the purpose of section 26(2) of the Constitution.

Summary of Results

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Kuenzler
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Government Agencies ◽  
Property Law ◽  
Trademark Law ◽  
Intellectual Property Law ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government ◽  
Networked Economy

The persuasive force of the accepted account’s property logic has driven antitrust and intellectual property law jurisprudence for at least the past three decades. It has been through the theory of trademark ownership and the commercial strategy of branding that these laws led the courts to comprehend markets as fundamentally bifurcated—as operating according to discrete types of interbrand and intrabrand competition—a division that had an effect far beyond the confines of trademark law and resonates today in the way government agencies and courts evaluate the emerging challenges of the networked economy along the previously introduced distinction between intertype and intratype competition. While the government in its appeal to the Supreme Court in ...

scholarly journals Deservingness in Judicial Discourse. An Analysis of the Legal Reasoning Adopted in Dutch Case Law on Irregular Migrant Families’ Access to Shelter

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Lieneke Slingenberg
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Migrant Families ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Discourse ◽  
Major Shift ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
Irregular Migrant ◽  
Court Of Appeal

In September 2012, the Dutch Supreme Court upheld a judgment of the Hague Court of Appeal that the eviction from basic shelter of a mother and her minor children, who did not have legal residence in the Netherlands, was unlawful. This ruling was instigated by a radically new interpretation of the European Social Charter’s personal scope and caused a major shift in Dutch policy. This article provides a case study into the legal reasoning adopted by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. It argues that, instead of relying on legal doctrinal reasoning for justifying the outcome, both courts referred to factors that the general public relies on to assess people’s deservingness of welfare. This finding raises fundamental questions about the relationship between human rights law and deservingness; and calls, therefore, for further research into the relevance of deservingness criteria in judicial discourse.

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