scholarly journals A crítica de Gilbert Keith Chesterton à filosofia moderna a partir da filosofia do senso comum

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Adson Da Silva Muniz ◽  
José Francisco Dos Santos

O presente artigo busca compreender a crítica de Gilbert Keith Chesterton à filosofia moderna a partir da filosofia do senso comum. Para tal intento, primeiramente é apresentado o realismo filosófico segundo Chesterton. Em seguida, se descreve o abandono dos primeiros princípios filosóficos pela filosofia moderna e suas consequências para a sanidade mental do homem. Enfim, explicita-se a defesa da filosofia do senso comum como meio para se chegar a uma visão verdadeira da realidade. Para a construção de tal pesquisa, as principais fontes bibliográficas utilizadas foram os livros Hereges, Ortodoxia e Chesterton e o Universo, bem como obras de comentadores e estudiosos. Com a pesquisa se espera um aprofundamento no pensamento de G. K. Chesterton e na sua proposta de retorno à filosofia do senso comum, como sendo uma filosofia capaz de devolver ao homem a sanidade mental.Palavras-chave: Chesterton. Realismo. Senso comum.Abstract: The present article consists on investigation that, through bibliographic exploratory method, searches to comprehend the Gilbert Keith Chesterton’s critic to the modern philosophy from the common sense philosophy. For this intent, firstly is presented the philosophical realism according to Gilbert Keith Chesterton. After, it described the abandonment of the first philosophical principles by the modern philosophy and its consequences to the man’s mental sanity. Finally, it will be explicated (ou “exemplified”) the defense of the common sense philosophy as way to become a truly vision of reality, according to Chesterton. To the construction of this research, the main bibliographic sources used was the books: Hereges, Ortodoxia and Chesterton e o Universo, as well commentators works and students of the G. K. Chesterton’s thinking. With the research is waited a deepening in the Chesterton’s thinking in his proposal of return to the common sense philosophy, as a philosophy capable to give back to the man his mental sanity.Keywords: Chesterton. Realism. Common sense.

2007 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Keefe

James Frederick Ferrier developed his philosophy from a common sense background. However, his rejection of common sense philosophy in particular and Enlightenment philosophy in general results in the development of a system of idealism. In his series of lectures ‘An Introduction to the Philosophy of Consciousness - Parts I to VII’, which appeared in Blackwoods Magazine (1838–39), he outlines the problem with modern philosophy and argues that philosophy should follow a new direction. In his view, the most peculiar and interesting aspect of humanity is consciousness. He contends that the attempt to develop a ‘science of man’ is impossible because it transforms a person into an object of study and thereby fails to capture the most distinctive aspect of humanity, namely, consciousness. According to Ferrier, philosophy should be an extension of consciousness itself; it is: ‘consciousness sublimed’. This paper will outline the central arguments in ‘An Introduction to the Philosophy of Consciousness’ and show that an early example of British idealism was not only developed out of the common sense tradition but shares with common sense philosophy a focus on the immediate evidence of consciousness, placing the relationship between thought and world at the centre of philosophical inquiry.


Author(s):  
Hsueh M. Qu

This chapter makes the case that Hume’s epistemological framework in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding is superior to that of the Treatise of Human Nature. First, the framework of EHU 12 has strong parallels to contemporary epistemology, in contrast to the Title Principle from THN 1.4.7.11. In particular, aspects of this framework have affinities with Wright-style conservatism, and Steup’s internalist reliabilism. Second, this framework avoids the weaknesses that afflicted the Title Principle: it has adequate foundation, is able to satisfactorily reject superstition, and is founded on truth. Third, unlike its analogue in the Treatise, the epistemological framework of the Enquiry is able to offer a ‘compleat answer’ to Reid and Beattie by denying the common-sense philosophy that is the fundamental basis of their critiques of his philosophy.


2008 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanna L. Blumenthal

The authors of these insightful and stimulating commentaries all express skepticism about the role I assign to the Scottish Common Sense philosophy in my historical analysis, though their reasons for doing so are strikingly at odds with each other. Sarah Seo and John Witt concede the importance of the Common Sense philosophy at a theoretical level, even as they call attention to certain “competitor theories” of human nature, noting that these darker views of the self may have proved more influential in the framing of the American constitution. However, they go on to contend that all of this philosophizing about the human mind was actually of little consequence in the everyday adjudication of civil and criminal liability, as judges found more practical means of resolving “the otherwise intractable questions of moral responsibility” left unanswered by the Scottish philosophy. John Mikhail, by contrast, appears to be far more sanguine about the tractability of these questions, from a philosophical standpoint, going so far as to suggest that they were more or less resolved by British moralists before the Scottish Common Sense school even came into being. What truly set the Common Sense philosophers apart from their predecessors, and ought to determine their place in this history of ideas, Mikhail concludes, was the manner in which they contributed to the scientific process of tracing out the inner structure and innate capacities of “the moral mind”—a topic that is currently of intense interest in the cognitive and brain sciences.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-40
Author(s):  
Béla Mester

Abstract The topic of the present article is the destruction of the common sense tradition linked to the urbanity of philosophy, which had deep roots both in the European and Hungarian traditions. This destruction was based on Hegelian ideas by János Erdélyi as an argument of the greatest philosophical controversy of the Hungarian philosophical life in the 1850s. In Erdélyi’s argumentation, the turn from the supposed urbanity to the supposed rurality of the common sense has a fundamental role. The idea of the rurality of the common sense has an influence on the Hungarian intellectual history of the next centuries, as well.


Author(s):  
James W. Manns

A French Jesuit who flourished in the early eighteenth century, Buffier developed an outlook that he referred to as common-sense philosophy. While deeply influenced by the philosophies of Descartes and Locke, he saw their reliance on the testimony of inner experience to be conducive to scepticism concerning the external world. In reaction to this, he sought to establish the irrevocable claims of various ‘first truths’, which pointed towards external reality and qualified it in various respects. His work anticipates certain themes that surfaced later in the common-sense philosophy of Thomas Reid.


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