FATF’s Concerns and Pakistan's Measures for Compliance

Author(s):  
Tehmina Aslam ◽  
Muhammad Asad Aslam

Since August 2018, Pakistan has been dealing with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to avoid its harsh conditions. The aim of the study was to examine the current position of Pakistan vis-à-vis the conditions laid down by the FATF. A literature review was conducted to assess the situation over 20 months and a comparative analysis was done. Findings of the study showed that the ministry took nine actions. First, it banned two main and eleven affiliated organizations. Second, it froze 976 moveable and immovable assets of the banned organizations. Third, it intervened in the social welfare activities conducted by the banned organization and seized relevant institutes. Fourth, it ministry convicted more than 200 individuals concerned. Fifth, it appropriated funds amounting to Rs 2,400 million. Sixth, it introduced the mutual legal assistance law and contacted about 84 countries to glean information from them. Seventh, it formulated asset-freezing regulations. Eight, it introduced the charity law across the country. Ninth, it tri-furcated the 4th schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997 and established procedures for watching the prospective offenders. The result was that, in 20 months, Pakistan formulated policies meant for curbing money laundering and combating terrorism financing.

Global Jurist ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zaiton Hamin ◽  
Normah Omar ◽  
Wan Rosalili Wan Rosli

AbstractDealing with money laundering has been one of the toughest struggles nations around the world, including Malaysia, have had to face. Prevalent international concerns over such crime have led to the establishment of international policies and standards by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which aimed at preventing and ultimately criminalising such crime within the national boundary. In accordance with such policies, Malaysia has introduced the Anti-Money Laundering Act in 2001 (AMLA) as a legal modality in governing such crime. It has been amended and renamed the AMLATFA in 2003 to include terrorism financing. Again, recently in late 2013, AMLATFA has been amended to keep up with changing standards and times. Within this legal landscape, this paper will highlight the instrumental and normative problems surrounding the said legislation. The authors contend that despite the adherence to global governance standards, legal deficiencies in the AML/ATF law in Malaysia remained, which merits urgent attention and action from the relevant authorities. This paper employs a doctrinal legal research and secondary data of which the AMLATFA is the primary source. The secondary sources for this article include decided cases, articles in academic journals, books and online databases.


2012 ◽  
Vol 37 (02) ◽  
pp. 330-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maira Machado

The purpose of this article is to provide a comparative analysis of the transnational legal processes that Brazil and Argentina underwent to address money laundering. The article discusses the interaction between the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) norms and a number of changes both countries have experienced in the last decade. The comparison focuses on the three central pillars of the anti-money laundering order (AMLO): criminalization, administrative obligations imposed on the financial sectors, and the creation of a financial intelligence unit. Building from the analytical framework developed by Shaffer (2011), the evidence gathered in this study illustrates different dimensions of state change and highlights the main challenges to assess the effectiveness (output legitimacy) of transnational legal orders empirically.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Md Abubakar Siddique ◽  
Haitham Nobanee ◽  
Osama Fayez Atayah ◽  
Mohammed Khereldin Bayzid

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to measure anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism financing (CTF) disclosures by money exchanger providers in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Design/methodology/approach The authors conduct a content analysis on firms’ websites to compare their AML/CTF disclosure against the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The authors use a one-sample t-test to examine the degree of these disclosures. Findings Overall, money exchange providers in GCC countries do not demonstrate a high degree of AML/CTF disclosure (20.27%). Country-wise disclosure levels are: Qatar 31%, UAE 19%, Kuwait 17.1%, Oman 26.27%, Bahrain 23.27% and KSA 6.1%. Research limitations/implications The study contributes immensely to understanding the disclosure behavior of this sector. It also helps in assessing their compliance with FATF recommendations. Practical implications The results show poor AML/CTF disclosure and compliance by money exchange providers, which should lead to increased regulations by policymakers and more disclosure by practitioners. Social implications Money laundering (ML) and terrorism financing (TF) can adversely affect societies. This study should help regulators to identify vulnerable areas in ML and TF activities, compare disclosures by companies in their countries with those of other countries and identify areas for improvement. Originality/value The study is a novel attempt. No study has been undertaken before to investigate AML and CTF disclosure by money exchange providers either globally, regionally or in any country.


Significance The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a global body that works to combat money laundering and terrorism financing, has threatened to impose countermeasures on Iran in February 2019 if it does not comply with mandated reforms. This would effectively cut Iran out of the global financial system. Impacts Political considerations by FATF's member states will contribute to its decision. Israel, recently appointed an FATF member, will push for anti-Iran measures. An impeachment attempt against the foreign minister will likely fail.


2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 247-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Newbury

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to highlight vulnerabilities in Australia’s anti-money laundering/counter-terrorism financing (AML/CTF) regime through Australia’s non-compliance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations on the regulation of designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs). It is intended that through examination of the justifications for and against AML/CTF regulation of DNFBPs, the paper will provide support for the position that Australia’s AML/CTF regime should incorporate regulation of DNFBPs. Design/methodology/approach The paper presents findings from research conducted in 2015 that focused on some of the principal arguments for and against the extension of Australia’s AML/CTF regime to DNFBPs. Review and consideration of the merits of these arguments is undertaken to support the conclusion that AML/CTF regulation should be extended to DNFBPs, in line with the FATF recommendations. Findings The current exemption of many DNFBPs from AML/CTF regulation perpetuates vulnerabilities within Australia’s AML/CTF regime; until this is addressed, criminals will continue to exploit these vulnerabilities and the regulated AML/CTF sector will continue to shoulder an unfair burden of Australia’s AML/CTF response. Practical implications This paper provides an objective assessment of factors for and against the regulation of DNFBPs in Australia. It may be of value to government policymakers, regulators, financial institutions and DNFBPs. Originality/value This paper complements existing research on this subject and provides a specific focus on some of the main arguments for and against the extension of Australia’s AML/CTF regime to specific DNFBPs.


2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 230-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melvin R.J. Soudijn

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to broaden the discussion on trade-based money laundering (TBML). The literature is too narrowly focused on the misrepresentation of the value, quantity or quality of the traded goods. This focus leads to the analysis of price anomalies as a signal of over- or under-invoicing. However, TBML can also occur without manipulation of these factors. Design/methodology/approach – A review of the literature and case study of police investigations. Findings – Financial action task force (FATF) definitions are seriously flawed. The question of whether detecting TBML on the basis of statistical trade data is effective should be much more open to debate. Police investigations show that goods are shipped at their true value within the context of TBML. Research limitations/implications – Using outliers to identify and act on cases of TBML has often been propagated, but scarcely been used to actually show TBML. Real findings are needed. Practical implications – Goods intended for TBML can also be paid for in cash. These cash payments are often out of character with the normal clientele. This should alert companies and compliance sections of banks alike. Originality/value – The critique on the FATF definition opens the field for a more fitting definition. The description of actual TBML cases makes it possible to better understand this method of money laundering.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Deen Kemsley ◽  
Sean A. Kemsley ◽  
Frank T. Morgan

Purpose This paper aims to define the fundamental nexus between income tax evasion and money laundering. The G7 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) designates tax evasion as a predicate offense for money laundering. We determine whether this designation is complete from a conceptual standpoint, or whether there is a stronger connection between tax evasion and money laundering. Design/methodology/approach This paper applies the FATF definition for money laundering – as well as generally accepted definitions for tax evasion and for a standard predicate offense – to identify the necessary conditions for each crime. This paper then uses these conditions to test opposing hypotheses regarding the nexus between tax evasion and money laundering. Findings This paper demonstrates that tax evasion does not meet the conditions for a standard predicate offense, and treating it as if it were a standard predicate could be problematic in practice. Instead, it is concluded that the FATF’s predicate label for tax evasion, together with tax evasion methods and objectives, imply that all tax evasion constitutes money laundering. In a single process, tax evasion generates both criminal tax savings and launders those criminal proceeds by concealing or disguising their unlawful origin. Practical implications The FATF could strengthen its framework by explicitly defining all tax evasion as money laundering. This would enable regulatory agencies to draw upon the full combined resources dedicated to either offense. Originality/value The analysis demonstrates that tax evasion completely incorporates money laundering as currently defined by the FATF.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-111
Author(s):  
Samuel Anindyo Widhoyoko ◽  
Deoga Payudha ◽  
Jeannada Natasha ◽  
Jerremy Immanuel

The process of company liquidation is always full of money laundering allegations and vulnerable to fraud. This fraudulent scheme is referred to as phoenix activity. The main purpose of phoenix activity is to avoid liability and expenses, which detriments the stakeholders. This research explains the importance of the role of forensic accountants prior, during, and after bankruptcy. The methodology used in this research is literature review examining the problems through various researches and frameworks. The literature review discusses three aspects related to fraudulent bankruptcy scheme i.e. motivation, the scheme processes and litigation processes. The research concludes that the presence of forensic accountants is important in the insolvency prevention and detection, in their roles as(1) independent and hired experts; (2) professional legal assistance providers of Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and asset manager; (3) business valuation experts; (4) private investigators; and (5) surveillance body for anti-money laundering purposes.


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