scholarly journals A experiência perceptual na perspectiva da teoria da percepção direta

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-233
Author(s):  
Mariana Claudia Broens

The objective of this paper is to analyse the concept of skilful action underlying the studies of perceptual experience, especially the visual one, from the perspective of the theory of direct perception. The problem we propose to investigate can be formulated as follows: what are the possible contributions of the concept of affordance to understand the nature of skilful actions generally attributed to processes resulting from internal representations or mental models? In particular, we will try to investigate to what extent the concept of social affordance (as a possibility of action that the bodies of the organisms offer directly to other organisms) can help to understand aspects of complex skilful actions that involve capacities considered as deriving from the possession of a Theory of Mind. We will try to show that the perspective of the ecological psychology of direct perception (Gibson 1986, Turvey 1992, Petrusz & Turvey 2010) allows to understand aspects of human skilled action, especially of a collaborative nature, from a conception of perceptual experience that involves information intrinsically significant.

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel Segundo-Ortin ◽  
Manuel Heras-Escribano

AbstractA widely shared assumption in the literature about skilled motor behavior is that any action that is not blindly automatic and mechanical must be the product of computational processes upon mental representations. To counter this assumption, in this paper we offer a radical embodied (non-representational) account of skilled action that combines ecological psychology and the Deweyan theory of habits. According to our proposal, skilful performance can be understood as composed of sequences of mutually coherent, task-specific perceptual-motor habits. Such habits play a crucial role in simplifying both our exploration of the perceptual environment and our decision-making. However, we argue that what keeps habits situated, precluding them from becoming rote and automatic, are not mental representations but the agent's conscious attention to the affordances of the environment. It is because the agent is not acting on autopilot but constantly searching for new information for affordances that she can control her behavior, adapting previously learned habits to the current circumstances. We defend that our account provides the resources needed to understand how skilled action can be intelligent (flexible, adaptive, context-sensitive) without having any representational cognitive processes built into them.


Author(s):  
Daniel Churchill

It is widely assumed that mental models are internal representations. Humans are capable of constructing these models when required by demands of an external task or by a self-generated stimulus. “Mind’s eye” can see, run, and interact with these mental models. Rather than stored in strictly fixed form in the mind, mental models are constructed on the spot when needed. Repeated application leads to refinement of a mental model and possible automation of its construction and use processes in one’s cognitive practice.


Author(s):  
Kenneth Nemire

Mental models are internal representations of the external world that are thought to influence perception and decision-making. An inappropriate mental model of a “roller coaster” was hypothesized to have caused the injury of one person and the death of another in a roller coaster incident. A study was conducted to learn about existing internal representations of roller coasters. Participants were asked to draw a roller coaster. Despite the existence of several types of roller coasters, 98% of the study participants drew a roller coaster representing the oldest and most prevalent type of coaster. The results of the study are discussed with respect to this injury incident and the importance of educating product users about more appropriate mental models that may help prevent injury or death.


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 197-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
E.E. Rumyantseva ◽  
T.N. Samarina

We describe a study involving 72 mentally healthy adolescents (13-17 years), 24 young men (15 ± 1,4 years), 48 women (15 ± 1,4 years) and 8 children (13-18 years), 6 boys (15 ± 1,9 years) and 2 women (16 ± 2,1 years) who had undergone previous episode of schizophrenia (F 20, ICD-10) and at the time of the survey being in remission. We tested the hypotheses about differences in the development of the theory of mind in different groups of adolescents. The study was conducted using test of "Reading the mental state of the other by his gaze" and a test of social intelligence by Gilford and Sullivan. It was found that the healthy adolescents build better mental models of the other person than adolescents with schizophrenia (U = 102, p≤0,05). In the group of mentally healthy women, we found a statistically significant relationship between the understanding of mind by the gaze and social intelligence (r = 0,6; p = 0.01). The used test proved to be a representative tool for the study of mind in different groups of adolescents.


1997 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-32
Author(s):  
Gail Musen

There are three major weaknesses with Glenberg's theory. The first is that his theory makes assumptions about internal representations that cannot be adequately tested. The second is that he tries to accommodate data from three disparate domains: mental models, linguistics, and memory. The third is that he makes light of advances in cognitive neuroscience.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isis Chong ◽  
Robert W. Proctor

James J. Gibson, the founder of ecological psychology, introduced a radical empiricist approach to perception and action centered on direct perception in naturalistic environments that was counter to popular representational views of his time. This direct perception approach and the associated introduction of the affordance concept have been extremely influential in several fields of study. However, since its inception, the affordance concept has evolved in a manner such that it now deviates significantly from Gibson’s original intention. This review follows use of the affordance concept by four sets of influential experimental psychologists: Gibson, Donald Norman, Mike Tucker and Rob Ellis, and Daniel Bub and Michael Masson. Particular attention is paid to the manner in which they applied the concept and the contributions provided by each set of researchers. The primary goal of this review is to determine what cognitive psychologists can take away from developments within the field and what considerations should be taken into account when using the term affordance. Having a more thorough understanding of the factors that led to the concept of affordance and its recent reformulations will better equip cognitive psychologists and, by extension, human factors researchers to further advance the study of perception–action relations.


Author(s):  
Kenneth Nemire

Mental models – internal representations of the external world – influence perception and decision making. An inappropriate mental model of a roller coaster contributed to one injury and one death in a roller coaster incident. This study revealed that participants' mental models represented the oldest and most prevalent type of roller coaster, despite the existence of several different types. Investigating mental models of users involved in injury incidents often reveals how such incidents occur. To prevent inaccurate mental models from leading users into hazardous situations, product and system designers should follow product safety guidelines to eliminate or reduce the hazards.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Windhager ◽  
Günther Schreder ◽  
Eva Mayr

Information visualizations can amplify human cognition by transferring strenuous cognitive operations with abstract data into visual reasoning processes with external graphic representations. Cognitive scientists have conceptualized the internal representations emerging in such distributed cognitive systems as mental models, whose structures and dynamics are modeled on the basis of the external representations. While visual-syntactical rules for the construction of simple representations are well defined by different visualization methods and can be relatively easily internalized by the user, an essential question remains how to synthesize coherent macromodels from multiple views. To address this question from a mental models perspective, we assemble and discuss visual coherence techniques, which assist users in assembling “bigger pictures” of complex, abstract subject matters. As such we contribute to a macrosyntax for information visualizations, to more systematically support macrocognitive synthesis and reasoning operations. We delineate and exemplify three different strategies of coherence techniques: methods to support the initial construction of mental models, methods to support the sequential integration of information, and methods to support the synchronous integration of local insights into a global representation.


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