The Holy Trinity as Source of Human Dignity according to St Thomas Aquinas

Author(s):  
Richard Conrad
2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 75-92
Author(s):  
Christian Schröer

An act-theoretical view on the profile of responsibility discourse shows in what sense not only all kinds of technical, pragmatic and moral reason, but also all kinds of religious motivation cannot justify a human action sufficiently without acknowledgment to three basic principles of human autonomy as supreme limiting conditions that are human dignity, sense, and justifiability. According to Thomas Aquinas human beings ultimately owe their moral autonomy to a divine creator. So this autonomy can be considered as an expression of secondary-cause autonomy and as the voice of God in the enlightened conscience.


2010 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-23
Author(s):  
Christofer Frey

Abstract This interpretation of the conditions of the reception of the Decalogue in medieval Christianity and the Reformation period supports the hypothesis that the leading perspectives of ethics are formed by basic assumptions of the reality of human life. This hypothesis is contrary to G.E. Moore’s socalled ›naturalistic fallacy‹, because the ›natural law‹ as an important basic assumption implies a view of nature different from modern times. It is either founded in the eternal divine law (Thomas Aquinas) or in a flexible conception close to history and change (supported by Luther). The Melanchthonian conception, however, relies more or less on a nonhistoric view which implies the notion of human dignity combined with the construction of practical principles appealing to all human persons. In contrast to the Anglosaxon mainstream of ethical thought we find here first indicators of an ethics which combines a transcendental (›transzendental‹ in the Kantian sense) foundation and an examination of everyday’s norms. Thus the Decalogue inspires the search for the conceptions of reality in the background of norms.


Human Affairs ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marián Palenčár

AbstractThe article looks at general problems associated with the explication of the concept of human dignity, then looks specifically at this in relation to bioethics and suggests possible solutions. The author explores the intellectual history of the concept (Cicero) and responds to the radical criticism that the concept of human dignity is useless and redundant in bioethical discourse (it is ambiguous, lacks cognitive content, is of religious provenance and is incompatible with the modern (Darwinist) scientific image of the world). He argues 1) that the ambiguity and relativity of the concept can be solved by precisely identifying the content and performing a classification analysis and shows that the concept does have cognitive content that is irreducible to other concepts; 2) that the need to elaborate the concept of human dignity is pre-Christian in origin (Cicero) and that the idea of a personal God and the Holy Trinity are not prerequisite to the concept; and 3) that the idea of


2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-51
Author(s):  
Mary Christine Ugobi-Onyemere ◽  

In the quest to understand the meaning of existence, the human being is torn between many choices, exposed to individualism of all forms, especially atheistic perspectives. John Paul II’s personalism in the light of Thomas Aquinas’ personalistic notion of mercy suggests an alternative of meaningful living, co-existence, and holistic transcendence. John Paul’s search for the basis on which individual and social rights may grow and enhance human dignity demonstrate the ontological human worth. Following Aquinas’ model, John Paul shows that human dignity takes precedence over all options and needs preservation. Similarly, Aquinas’ classification of the human person as “rational subsistent” portrays this dignity in “effective mercy” that allows one to thrive in all kinds of existential vicissitudes. This essay explores John Paul’s personalist notion of mercy reflecting Aquinas’ model in the contemporary milieu in view of holistic existence.


Vivarium ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-114
Author(s):  
Amos Edelheit

AbstractThis article presents the first detailed account of Giorgio Benigno Salviati's discussion of the will written in Urbino during the mid-1470s and the early 1480s. A Franciscan friar and a prominent professor of theology and philosophy, Salviati was a prolific author and central figure in the circles of Cardinal Bessarion in Rome and of Lorenzo de' Medici in Florence. This article focuses on his defense of the Scotist theory of the will. It considers its fifteenth-century context, in which both humanist and scholastic thinkers dealt with the question of the intellect and the will. While basing himself partly on authorities such as Aristotle, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas, Salviati is clearly aware of the novelty of his theory, and its important implications for ethics and theology.


Author(s):  
Tina Beattie

Abstract This paper considers the question of women’s ordination to the sacramental priesthood in the context of human dignity and rights. Differentiating between two forms of ontological or intrinsic dignity – the universal dignity of the human being made in the imago Dei, and the particular dignity of those baptised into the imago Trinitatis – it argues that the refusal of ordination to women is a violation of baptismal dignity that constitutes a refusal of women’s rights. It analyses the arguments against women’s ordination and shows them to be based on a misreading of Thomas Aquinas, on the innovative concept of sexual complementarity which has replaced the earlier hierarchical model of sexual difference, and on appeals to mystery that might be better described as mystification. It concludes that the refusal to allow women to respond to the call to ordination is based on a modern form of essentialised sexual difference that is alien to the Catholic tradition and that violates Christological orthodoxy, insofar as it suggests that women are not able to image Christ.


Author(s):  
Carlos Ramos Rosete

Toda disciplina de tipo humanista o de carácter social asume como uno de sus presupuestos fundamentales una noción de lo que es el ser humano. Llevar a cabo una reflexión de tipo filosófico sobre las nociones de hombre, persona y dignidad se vuelve imprescindible para aclarar elementos antropológicos que son fundamentos teóricos de las ciencias humanas y sociales. La palabra “hombre” admite significados que en parte coinciden y en parte difieren con la noción de persona. La expresión “persona humana” no es siempre una redundancia. Siguiendo el pensamiento de Santo Tomás de Aquino, que distingue entre las nociones de hombre y persona, la subsistencia de la persona humana se vuelve fundamento de la dignidad humana y fuente de los derechos humanos.All humanist or social discipline assumes as one of its fundamental principles an idea of what human being is. Accomplishing a philosophical reflection about the man notions, person and dignity become essential to clarify antropological elements which are theorical fundaments of human and social sciences. The Word man accepts meanings that are partly the same and partly different with the concept of human person, in some way, is not totally a redundancy. Following Saint Thomas Aquinas´s thought who distinguishes between the notions of man and person, it is noted that the subsistency of the human person turns into the human dignity basis and source of all human rights.


2009 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Adriano Pessina

La Dichiarazione universale dei Diritti dell’uomo del 1948 dell’ ONU ha posto in termini politici, e non soltanto filosofici o religiosi, al centro stesso della logica della cittadinanza l’affermazione della dignità umana e della libertà come qualità innate e non acquisite. Affermare che tutti gli uomini nascono liberi ed eguali in dignità significa affermare di fatto che la dignità è un attributo ontologico, una qualità intrinseca (e quindi inalienabile) dell’essere umano, al di là di differenze di sesso, di salute, di stato sociale. L’uso della nozione di persona come sinonimo delle qualità dell’adulto rischia di frantumare questo guadagno della politica. La biopolitica liberale rischia di essere fonte di discriminazioni tra gli uomini quando adotta un concetto di persona distinto da quello di essere umano. In essa rivive il dualismo antropologico proprio del platonismo. Le tesi di Hannah Arendt, di Eva Kittay e di Martha Nussabaum ci permettono di evidenziare i caratteri della persona umana sia come soggetto sia come essere corporeo diveniente nel tempo, secondo quell’intuizione che fu propria di Tommaso d’Aquino. Se si torna a pensare alla persona umana come essere umano diveniente nel tempo, è possibile salvaguardare i diritti di tutti e in particolare difendere quelle fasi della vita umana in cui la persona umana è esposta, per le fasi dello sviluppo o per la malattia, alla dipendenza. Solo così si può pensare ad una giustizia che includa tutti e tutte le fasi dell’esistenza, anche quelle segnate dalla disabilità. ---------- The United Nations Universal declaration of human rights (1948) has centred the assertion of human dignity and freedom as innate (not acquired) qualities in the logic of citizenship itself; this claim has been made not only in philosophical and religious terms, but also in political terms. Affirming that all men born free and equal for what concerns their dignity means to affirm actually that dignity is an ontological attribute, an intrinsic quality (and therefore inalienable) of the human being, beyond sex, health and social standing differences. The use of the notion of person as synonym of the qualities of adult risks to crush this gain of politics. The liberal biopolitics risks to be a source of discriminations among men when it adopts a concept of person different from that of human being. According to this view, the anthropological dualism peculiar to the Platonism lives again. Hannah Arendt, Evas Kittay and Martha Nussabaum’s thesis allow us to underline the human person characteristics as both subject and bodily being, according to the Thomas Aquinas’ intuition. If we think again human person as human being, it is possible to safeguard the everybody rights and particularly to defend those phases of human life in which human person is exposed, for the phases of the development or for the illness, to the dependence. Only in this way justice could be thought including all and all the phases of the existence, also those marked by disability.


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