2019 ◽  
pp. 47-79
Author(s):  
Mitchell A. Orenstein

Western leaders and institutions did not fully realize that they were under attack from Russia between 2007 and 2012. Yet when they slowly realized that Russia had launched an all-out hybrid war against Western institutions, a determined response emerged. The United States and EU imposed several rounds of economic sanctions on Russia, punishing key individuals and sectors of the economy. The EU also sought to prevent Russia from using energy blackmail against its member states. It took measures to reduce Gazprom’s influence by ending discriminatory contract provisions and building interconnectors between countries. NATO shored up its defenses in Eastern Europe to prevent another Russian invasion. All the while, the EU and NATO continued the project of creating a “Europe whole and free,” including the lands in between, setting the stage for a deepening geopolitical confrontation with Russia.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (02) ◽  
pp. 141-160
Author(s):  
Tom Theuns

This paper critically engages the legal and political framework for responding to democracy and rule of law backsliding in the EU. I develop a new and original critique of Article 7 TEU based on it being democratically illegitimate and normatively incoherent qua itself in conflict with EU fundamental values. Other more incremental and scaleable responses are desirable, and the paper moves on to assess the legitimacy of economic sanctions such as tying access to EU funds to performance on democratic and rule of law indicators or imposing fines on backsliding states. I hold such sanctions to be a priori legitimate, and argue that in some cases economic sanctions are even normatively required, given that EU material support of backsliding member states can amount to material complicity in their backsliding. However, an economic conditionality mechanism would need to be designed to minimize unjust and counterproductive effects. One way to pursue this could be to complement sanctions against the backsliding government with investment for prodemocratic actors in that state.


2014 ◽  
pp. 13-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Glazyev

This article examines fundamental questions of monetary policy in the context of challenges to the national security of Russia in connection with the imposition of economic sanctions by the US and the EU. It is proved that the policy of the Russian monetary authorities, particularly the Central Bank, artificially limiting the money supply in the domestic market and pandering to the export of capital, compounds the effects of economic sanctions and plunges the economy into depression. The article presents practical advice on the transition from external to domestic sources of long-term credit with the simultaneous adoption of measures to prevent capital flight.


2015 ◽  
pp. 20-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Afontsev

Economic sanctions against Russia form a completely new context for public and private efforts to cope with crisis trends in Russian economy. With limited access to global goods, capital, and technology markets, it can at best minimize costs of the crisis but not come back to the normal growth path. Strategies to find new trade partners and sources of capital outside the group of countries that have introduced economic sanctions against Russia are welcome, but their potential is rather limited. Under these circumstances, crisis management should be centered neither on the alleged ‘Russia’s pivot to the East’ nor on the wide-scale import substitution but on normalization of economic relations with key country partners, regaining currency stability, and structural reforms aimed at moving national economy away from commodity specialization.


2017 ◽  
pp. 114-127
Author(s):  
M. Klinova ◽  
E. Sidorova

The article deals with economic sanctions and their impact on the state and prospects of the neighboring partner economies - the European Union (EU) and Russia. It provides comparisons of current data with that of the year 2013 (before sanctions) to demonstrate the impact of sanctions on both sides. Despite the fact that Russia remains the EU’s key partner, it came out of the first three partners of the EU. The current economic recession is caused by different reasons, not only by sanctions. Both the EU and Russia have internal problems, which the sanctions confrontation only exacerbates. The article emphasizes the need for a speedy restoration of cooperation.


2016 ◽  
pp. 43-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Vinokurov

The paper appraises current progress in establishing the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Although the progress has slowed down after the initial rapid advancement, the Union is better viewed not as an exception from the general rules of regional economic integration but rather as one of the functioning customs unions with its successes and stumbling blocs. The paper reviews the state of Eurasian institutions, the establishment of the single market of goods and services, the situation with mutual trade and investment flows among the member states, the ongoing work on the liquidation/unification of non-tariff barriers, the problems of the efficient coordination of macroeconomic policies, progress towards establishing an EAEU network of free trade areas with partners around the world, the state of the common labor market, and the dynamics of public opinion on Eurasian integration in the five member states.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ibrahim Sirkeci

Doğu ve güney komşuları üzerinde gelen göç akınlarının ve üye ülkeler arasındaki göçlerin artışıyla Avrupa Birliği (AB) en büyük krizlerinden birini yaşamaktadır. Avrupa’daki en ana tartışma konuları arasında Avrupa’ya göçü ve AB içindeki göçü sınırlamak ve üye ülkeler arasında mülteci kotası ve külfet paylaşımına yapılan itirazlar yer aldı. Bu krizde Türkiye anahtar ülke olarak ortaya çıktı ve ülkedeki büyük Suriyeli mülteci nüfusu ve bu nüfusun Avrupa’ya gitmesini engellemesi karşılığında vaat edilen milyarlarca Avro nedeniyle tartışmaların odağında yer aldı. Suriye krizi 4,8 milyon mülteci yarattı ve 2016 yılı sonu itibariyle bunların 2,8 milyonu Türkiye’de ikamet etmekteydi. Suriyeli mültecilere karşı cömert tavrıyla Türkiye güvenli bir ülke olarak tescil edilmiş oldu. Bu, hikayenin daha karanlık bir başka yüzünü gölgelemektedir. Çünkü aynı ülkenin vatandaşları 1980 askeri darbesinden bu yana milyonu aşkın sığınma başvurusu yaptılar. Ülkenin bugünkü şartları ve yeni veriler, Türkiye’den AB’ye yönelen daha çok mülteci akını olacağını gösteriyor. ABSTRACT IN ENGLISHTurkey’s refugees, Syrians and refugees from Turkey: a country of insecurityThe European Union (EU) has faced one of its biggest crises with the rise of population inflows through its Eastern and Southern neighbours as well as movements within the Union. In 2016, the main debate that dominated Europe was on restricting migration within and into the EU along with concerns and objections to the refugee quota systems and the sharing of the burden among member states. Turkey emerged as a ‘gate keeper’ in this crisis and has since been at the centre of debates because of the large Syrian refugee population in the country and billions of Euros it was promised to prevent refugees travelling to Europe. The Syrian crisis produced over 4.8 million refugees with over 2.8 million were based in Turkey by the end of 2016. Turkey with its generous support for Syrian refugees has been confirmed as a ‘country of security’. This shadows the darker side of affairs as the very same country has also produced millions of asylum seekers since the 1980 military coup. Current circumstances and fresh evidence indicate that there will be more EU bound refugees coming through and from Turkey. 


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