Gulf Cooperation Council

Policy Papers ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (64) ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Asset Price ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Liquidity Management ◽  
Reserve Requirements ◽  
Gcc Countries ◽  
Domestic Debt ◽  
Monetary Authorities ◽  
Asset Price Cycles

Effective liquidity management is important to promote macro-financial stability in the GCC countries. Fixed exchange rate regimes provide credible nominal anchors in the GCC countries, but combined with open capital accounts, they also entail limited monetary policy independence. At the same time, high dependence on hydrocarbon revenue has made the region vulnerable to oil price-driven liquidity swings. And the latter can affect monetary policy implementation, including by exacerbating credit and asset price cycles. This highlights the importance of frameworks aimed at forecasting liquidity and ensuring appropriate liquidity levels through the timely absorption or injection of liquidity by central banks. Over the past decade, liquidity management in the GCC countries has been based mainly on passive instruments. Abundant liquidity during times of high oil prices have placed liquidity absorption at the center of the central bank operations. Reserve requirements have helped absorb liquidity but have not been used very actively. Standing facilities, another key instrument, are more passive in nature, with the amount of liquidity absorbed or injected driven by banks rather than monetary authorities. Central banks bills or other instruments have also been used, but issuance has not systematically been based on market principles. In addition, these operations have been constrained by limited liquidity forecasting capability and the shallow nature of interbank and domestic debt markets.

scholarly journals Inflation targeting: From “constrained discretion” to singularity

2020 ◽  
pp. 39-52
Author(s):  
Oleg Buklemishev
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Inflation Targeting ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Political Uncertainty ◽  
Policy Regime ◽  
Dynamic Inconsistency ◽  
Monetary Authorities ◽  
International Monetary Policy

In recent years, inflation targeting has become a staple of international monetary policy. The paper considers different challenges this monetary policy regime faces with regard to suppressed inflation, attaining the zero lower bound on the policy interest rates, and committing central banks to simultaneously pursue additional objectives such as financial stability. Inflation targeting has proved inefficient in raising inflation to the target zone from below, and unorthodox monetary policy tools have not proved their validity in this regard yet. As a result, monetary authorities are more inclined to discretion allowing them to compromise different aspects of “pure” inflation targeting. The value of this discretion is based on asymmetric information and boosted by additional functions assumed by central banks. However, it might bring about serious problems of dynamic inconsistency, compounded political uncertainty, and bureaucratic misconduct. Since none of the alternatives to inflation targeting currently looks fully satisfactory, it is concluded that the inflation targeting regime should be transformed to take into account the current situation, but a necessary precondition for the effectiveness of the new regime is enhanced accountability of central banks.

An Historical Perspective on the Quest for Financial Stability and the Monetary Policy Regime

2018 ◽  
Vol 78 (2) ◽  
pp. 319-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael D. Bordo
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Financial Crises ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Historical Perspective ◽  
Asset Price ◽  
Financial Instability ◽  
Historical Evidence ◽  
Policy Regime ◽  
Extreme Form ◽  
Credit Booms

This article surveys the co-evolution of monetary policy and financial stability for a number of countries from 1880 to the present. Historical evidence on the incidence, costs, and determinants of financial crises (the most extreme form of financial instability), combined with narratives on some famous financial crises, suggests that financial crises have many causes, including credit-driven asset price booms, which have become more prevalent in recent decades, but in general financial crises are very heterogeneous and hard to categorize. Moreover, evidence shows that the association across the country sample between credit booms, asset price booms, and serious financial crises is quite weak.

INFLATION TARGETING: IT'S NOT BROKE, IT DOESN'T NEED FIXING, BUT CAN IT SURVIVE?

2010 ◽  
Vol 01 (01) ◽  
pp. 59-80
Author(s):  
PIERRE L. SIKLOS
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Inflation Targeting ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Asset Price ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Economic Downturn ◽  
Price Increases ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Nominal Anchor

Until the end of 2005 there were few outward signs that the inflation targeting (IT) monetary policy strategy was deemed fragile or that the likelihood of abandoning it was high. In light of the severe economic downturn and the global financial crisis that has afflicted most economies around the world since at least 2008, it is worth reconsidering the question of the fragility of the inflation targeting regime. This paper reprises the approach followed in Siklos (2008) but adds important new twists. For example, the present study asks whether the continued survival of IT is due to the fact that some of the central banks in question did take account of changes in financial stress. The answer is no. Indeed, many central banks are seen as enablers of rapid asset price increases. The lesson, however, is not that inflation targeting needs to be repaired. Instead, refinements should be considered to the existing inflation targeting strategy which has evolved considerably since it was first introduced in New Zealand 20 years ago. Most notably, there should be continued emphasis on inflation as the primary nominal anchor of monetary policy, especially in emerging market economies (EME), even if additional duties are assigned to central banks in response to recent events.

scholarly journals Regular Econometric Model of Taylor for Albania

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 123
Author(s):  
Ergys Misha
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Inflation Targeting ◽  
Inflation Rate ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Financial Assets

The Taylor’s Rule Central Banks is applying widely today from Central Banks for design the monetary policy and for determination of interest rates. The purpose of this paper is to assess monetary policy rule in Albania, in view of an inflation targeting regime. In the first version of the Model, the Taylor’s Rule assumes that base interest rate of the monetary policy varies depending on the change of (1) the inflation rate and (2) economic growth (Output Gap).Through this paper it is proposed changing the objective of the Bank of Albania by adding a new objective, that of "financial stability", along with the “price stability”. This means that it is necessary to reassess the Taylor’s Rule by modifying it with incorporation of indicators of financial stability. In the case of Albania, we consider that there is no regular market of financial assets in the absence of the Stock Exchange. For this reason, we will rely on the credit developmet - as a way to measure the financial cycle in the economy. In this case, the base rate of monetary policy will be changed throught: (1) Targeting Inflation Rate, (2) Nominal Targeting of Economic Growth, and (3) Targeting the Gap of the Ratio Credit/GDP (mitigating the boom cycle, if the gap is positive, and the contractiocycle if the gap is negative).The research data show that, it is necessary that the Bank of Albania should also include in its objective maintaining the financial stability. In this way, the contribution expected from the inclusion of credit gap indicators in Taylor’s Rule, will be higher and sustainable in time.

scholarly journals CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS

2019 ◽  
pp. 94-100
Author(s):  
T.S. Hudima ◽  
V.A. Ustymenko
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Digital Currency ◽  
Business Entities ◽  
The Right ◽  
Article 5

The article is devoted to identifying the peculiarities of the central bank digital currency (CBDC), explaining their impact on the monetary policy of the state, and identifying the prospects for the transformation of domestic banking legislation in connection with the implementation of the CBDC. It is noted that the scope of competence of the Central Bank and the legal basis for the issuance of the CBDC will depend on the economic and legal features of the digital currency, the degree of its impact on the monetary policy, the financial stability of the country’s economy and so on. In the process of forming the appropriate legal field and defining the conceptual apparatus in the sphere of emission and circulation of the CBDC, the peculiarities of the use of the latter in economic transactions and the specific functions not inherent in ordinary means of payment should be taken. СBDC initiatives will help: 1) progressively narrow the banking system at the level of the Central Banks (such as the Chicago Plan) by allowing individuals and businesses to deposit directly into the accounts of the Central Banks; 2) increasing confidence of economic entities and individuals in the financial system; 3) strengthening the financial stability of the economy (both domestically and globally). Granting business entities or individuals the right to store digital money directly with the Central Bank can give rise to two main directions of influence on monetary policy: first, to strengthen its transmission mechanism; secondly, lead to banks being disrupted. This may lead to some legal issues regarding (1) the NBU’s area of competence; (2) the constitutional foundations of the legal economic order (Article 5 of the ECU). In particular, it cannot be ruled out that centralization of the production, servicing, and management of the СBDC turnover may violate the principles of competition in business activities, prevent abuse of monopoly position in the market, etc. Keywords: monetary policy, central bank digital currency, financial stability, competence, legal framework, economic operations, issue.

scholarly journals Negative Interest Rate Risk. Atavism or Normalization of Central Banks’ Monetary Policy

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (342) ◽  
pp. 89-116
Author(s):  
Irena Pyka ◽  
Aleksandra Nocoń
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Interest Rate Risk ◽  
Interest Rate Policy ◽  
Rate Policy ◽  
Negative Interest Rate Policy

In the face of the global financial crisis, central banks have used unconventional monetary policy instruments. Firstly, they implemented the interest rate policy, lowering base interest rates to a very low (almost zero) level. However, in the following years they did not undertake normalizing activities. The macroeconomic environment required further initiatives. For the first time in history, central banks have adopted Negative Interest Rate Policy (NIRP). The main aim of the study is to explore the risk accompanying the negative interest rate policy, aiming at identifying channels and consequences of its impact on the economy. The study verifies the research hypothesis stating that the risk of negative interest rates, so far unrecognized in Theory of Interest Rate, is a consequence of low effectiveness of monetary policy normalization and may adopt systemic nature, by influencing – through different channels – the financial stability and growth dynamics of the modern world economy.

Lässt sich die Geldschöpfung der Geschäftsbanken noch kontrollieren? – Geldpolitik seit der jüngsten Finanzkrise 2007/2008

2018 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 47-63
Author(s):  
Mathias Binswanger
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Financial Crises ◽  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
The Past ◽  
Monetary Authorities ◽  
Money Creation ◽  
Recent Financial Crisis

Zusammenfassung: Als Folge der jüngsten Finanzkrise ist der Einfluss der Zentralbanken auf die Geldschöpfung weitgehend verloren gegangen. Denn die Kontrolle über Reserven funktioniert nur solange, wie diese knapp sind und deren Bezug an bestimmte Bedingungen geknüpft werden kann. Seither halten die Geschäftsbanken in den ökonomisch wichtigsten Ländern de facto dermaßen viele Reserven, dass sie nicht mehr auf die jeweilige Zentralbank angewiesen sind. Diese Entwicklung lässt sich sowohl für die FED als auch für die EZB aufzeigen. Dies führt zu geldpolitisch neuen Herausforderungen, die bisher kaum beachtet wurden. Die Einflussmöglichkeit der Zentralbanken auf den Geldschöpfungsprozess der Geschäftsbanken wurde noch nie in so großem Stil ausgehebelt. Deshalb müssen Zentralbanken in Zukunft ihr Repertoire an geldpolitischen Massnahmen erweitern. Nur mit dem Drehen an der Zinsschraube wird man den Geldschöpfungsprozess in Zukunft kaum mehr in gewünschter Weise beeinflussen können. Summary: As a result of the recent financial crisis, the influence of central banks on money creation has largely disappeared. Controlling this process only works as long as money creation of commercial banks also leads to a need for additional reserves from the central bank. However, the large asset purchase programs of monetary authorities after the financial crises resulted in an enormous increase in reserves at commercial banks. Therefore, commercial banks have enough reserves to create additional money at large amounts and do not depend on central banks any more. This development is indicative for both the FED and the ECB. Therefore central banks face the challenge how they can restore their influence on the process of money creation. Just lowering or increasing interest rates, which was the major way of conducting monetary policy in the past, will not work anymore in the future.

FINANCIAL STABILITY AND MONETARY POLICY REACTION FUNCTION FOR SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES: AN ECONOMETRIC APPROACH

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
SAMIA NASREEN ◽  
SOFIA ANWAR
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
South Asian ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Series Data ◽  
Reaction Function ◽  
Asian Countries ◽  
Policy Objective ◽  
Monetary Policy Reaction Function ◽  
Policy Reaction Function

This study empirically investigates a monetary policy reaction function for South Asian economies by incorporating financial stability as an additional policy objective in the central bank’s loss function. Empirical results are estimated by applying auto-regressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration and vector autoregressive (VAR) approach using time-series data of five South Asian countries, namely, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Estimated results indicate that monetary policy significantly reacts to the level of financial stability in all countries. The result further suggests that central banks would tighten monetary policy if output gap widens and exchange rate depreciate. In addition, central banks of Pakistan and India do not respond significantly to inflation gap.

The Over-Burdened Central Bank and the Shift Away from Autonomy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre L. Siklos
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
Self Assessments ◽  
Crisis Conditions ◽  
Central Bankers ◽  
Influence Behavior

Many central banks took on additional responsibilities. Inadequate self-assessments remain unfinished almost a decade after the crisis erupted. Government-central bank relationships need to be conditioned on whether times are normal versus crisis conditions. Transparency confronts ambiguity when central banks must communicate the outlook and the conditionality of their decisions. Forward guidance was taken too far and ended up being futile. Central bankers simply exhausted their ability to influence behavior through mere words or ambiguous statements. This is a self-inflicted wound for institutions that are seen as overburdened. These forces leave central banking more vulnerable than is commonly acknowledged. Squaring the conventional objectives of monetary policy with the unclear aims of financial stability is difficult. Adequate limitations on the authority of central banks have yet to be thoroughly debated. We are nowhere near resolving the inherent tensions between old and new sets of central bank objectives.

Moderation Before the Storm

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre L. Siklos
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Financial Indicators ◽  
Policy Strategy ◽  
Central Bank Communication ◽  
Current State ◽  
Macroeconomic Environment

This chapter provides an overview of the macroeconomic environment since 2000. The era is broken down into three periods: 2000–2006, 2007–2010, and 2011–present. Warnings of an imminent crisis were present before 2007, but generally they were ignored by self-satisfied policymakers. Pre-crisis, inflation control was the once rising and, seemingly, preeminent monetary policy strategy. A review, both pre- and post-GFC, of a wide variety of macroeconomic and financial indicators is included, with discussion of lesser known variables such as proxies for central bank communication and balance sheet indicators. These clearly enable us to identify interventions by central banks while also highlighting areas of continuing concern. In some respects (e.g. concerns about financial stability), everything has changed post-crisis, but in other respects (e.g. monetary policy strategy) fewer changes are apparent. The chapter concludes by arguing that there are reasons to be apprehensive about the current state of monetary policy and central banking.

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