Cassatieberoepen tegen criminele vonnissen en arresten in het Scheldedepartement, 1796-1813

Pro Memorie ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-69
Author(s):  
Jos Monballyu

Summary In the Scheldt department (Département de l’Escaut), cassation appeal for violation of law against criminal judgments by a Criminal Court was introduced in 1796 and could be made by both the convicted and the Public Prosecution Service. In total, 265 (16, 6%) of the 1595 criminal judgments were appealed in cassation by 373 criminal convicted persons and in 12 cases by the Public Prosecution Service. Of those 265 cassation appeals, 236 (89%) were rejected and 29 (11%) were accepted. The motives that the Court of Cassation applied to aside these 29 judgments were very diverse and related to the violations of law that both the lower investigative bodies and the judges of the Criminal Court had committed in the course of criminal proceedings.

Author(s):  
J. Monballyu

Summary In the department of the Lys, the cassation appeal against criminal judgments was introduced in 1796 and could be made by both the criminal convicts and the Public Prosecution Service. The first cassation appeal was lodged on 5 May 1796 and the last on 18 December 1813. In total, 187 (24%) of the 779 criminal judgments were appealed in cassation, in 172 cases by 319 criminal convicts and in 15 cases by the Public Prosecution Service. Of those 187 cassation appeals, 167 (89.3%) were rejected and 20 (10.7%) were accepted. In the latter cases, this led to the annulment of the contested judgment and, in most cases, the criminal proceedings were (partially) repeated for an equivalent, nearby criminal court.


Author(s):  
Алексей Викторович Дашин ◽  
Петр Михайлович Малин ◽  
Алексей Васильевич Пивень

В статье анализируется структура публичного законного интереса в уголовном судопроизводстве, входящих в него элементов на примере института домашнего ареста. Авторская модель публичного законного интереса участников уголовного процесса «привязана» к стадийности и может распространяться не только на вопросы, связанные с мерами пресечения. По мнению авторов, публичный законный интерес в контексте рассматриваемой проблемы воплощается в жизнь на основе нормативно установленного действия, содержащего конкретно сформулированные правила, устанавливающие четко определенные права и обязанности участников правоотношений. Данная деятельность сопряжена с определенными этапами (стадиями), которые в той или иной степени характерны соответствующей мере пресечения, и возможна в той стадии, где осуществляется оценка действий, предпринятых должностным лицом, осуществляющим производство по уголовному делу. Реализация публичного законного интереса, заявленного следователем, дознавателем на избрание домашнего ареста, зависит от того, как соответствующие устремления оценят другие должностные лица - руководитель следственного органа, прокурор (не обладающие правами реализации публичного законного интереса), то есть от их усмотрения. Законодатель не предоставляет следователю, дознавателю возможность «непосредственно» обратиться в суд - участнику процесса, наделенному правом реализовать их устремление на избрание меры пресечения. Подобные «преграды» не предусмотрены в законе для иных участников уголовного процесса, не наделенных публичной властью и стремящихся реализовать свой законный интерес. The article analyzes the structure of public legitimate interest in criminal proceedings, its constituent elements on the example of the institution of house arrest. The author's model of the public legitimate interest of participants in the criminal process is «tied» to the stage and can extend not only to issues related to preventive measures. According to the authors, public legitimate interest in the context of the problem under consideration is brought to life on the basis of a normatively established action containing specifically formulated rules establishing clearly defined rights and obligations of participants in legal relations. This activity is associated with certain phases (stages) that are more or less characteristic of the corresponding measure of restraint, and is possible at the stage where the actions taken by the official conducting the criminal proceedings are evaluated. The realization of the public legitimate interest declared by the investigator, the investigating officer for the election of house arrest depends on how the relevant intentions will be evaluated by other officials - the head of the investigative body, the prosecutor (who do not have the rights to realize the public legitimate interest), i.e. on their discretion. The legislator does not give the investigator, the inquirer the opportunity to turn «directly» to the court - a participant in the process, entitled to realize their intentions for the election of measures of restrain. Such «barriers» are not provided in the law for other participants in the criminal process who are not endowed with public authority and who seek to realize their legitimate interest.


Author(s):  
Juan Luis Gómez Colomer

El Ministerio Fiscal español tiene ante todo un problema de identidad orgánica. Se desea que sea independiente del Gobierno, pero las normas confirman una cierta dependencia. El Ministerio Fiscal debe ser dependiente del Gobierno si se consuma la reforma hacia un modelo adversarial de enjuiciamiento criminal, porque ésa es la naturaleza que mejor cuadra con dicho sistema, en donde el acusado sabe que enfrente tiene a la Administración, que, cumpliendo con su deber público, le exige con todo su poder responsabilidad por sus actos. Hasta que se produzca el cambio, es mejor dejar las cosas como están. El Ministerio Fiscal no debe instruir el proceso penal ni dirigir la investigación del crimen mientras no tengamos el antedicho sistema adversarial vigente en España. Sería constitucional si lo hiciera, pero no está probado que esté preparado para hacerlo, y probablemente, a pesar de declaraciones oficiales, no desee asumir ahora esa responsabilidad. Con las normas y la práctica actual, correría el peligro de ser visualizado en los casos más importantes como un órgano no objetivo.The Spanish Public Prosecution Service has, foremost, a problem of organic identity. It is believed that it should be independent from the Government, but the laws confirm some degree of dependence. The Public Prosecution should depend on the Government if the reform toward an adversarial model of criminal procedure is pursued, because that is the nature that best fits a system in which the defendant knows he is facing an Administration that, fulfilling its public duty, is demanding with all its powers that he takes responsibility for his actions. Until the change is produced, it is better to leave things as they are. The Public Prosecution Service should not direct the criminal investigation while the foresaid adversarial system in not in force in Spain. If it did, it would be constitutional, but it has not been demonstrated that it is ready to do so and, probably, in spite of official declarations, the Public Prosecution does not want now to assume that responsibility. With the current laws and practices, the Prosecution Service would be in danger of being taken as a non-objective organ in the most important cases.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 244
Author(s):  
Sri Endah Wahyuningsih ◽  
Agus Sunaryo

In fact, there are still many cases of corruption that have not been revealed; this resulted in the public to be pessimistic with the seriousness of the Prosecutor Office in uncovering variouscases of corruption that are happening today. The purpose of this study is to know the role ofthe Prosecutor Office in the eradication of criminal acts, to obtain an overview of the mechanismof corruption handling by prosecutors in Indonesia and to analyze the obstacles and solutionsin eradicating crime in the Attorney General. The research method was sociological juridical,and data collection were gained by using observation and interview. The existence and role ofthe Public Prosecution Service in eradicating corruption crime begins when the case has notbeen transferred to the Court until the execution of the decision of the Court. However, in thecriminal act of corruption the Prosecutor’s Office has the authority as a public prosecutor aswell as an investigator. The authority of the prosecutor as a special criminal investigator shall beregulated by Law Number 16 Year 2004 regarding the Attorney of the Republic of Indonesia inArticle 30 paragraph (1) letter d. In addition, in its role against the eradication of corruption, theProsecutor’s Office has always conducted a coordination relationship with the Police Agency andthe Corruption Eradication Commission. The mechanism for handling corruption in the AttorneyGeneral Office, through several procedures already set out in the law includes Investigation,Investigation and Prosecution.


Author(s):  
José P. Ribeiro de Albuquerque

The preconditions for the question I want to address today are the social skills, duties and responsibilities of the Portuguese Public Prosecution Service. It is an independent and autonomous judicial body, based on a constitutional and legal model that confers functions on the Public Prosecution Service encompassing not only criminal prosecution and participation in the implementation of the criminal policy, but also the legal representation for employees, the promotion and protection of the welfare of children and young people, as well as the protection of collective and diffuse interests (environment, urban planning, public health, etc.), the safeguarding of the judicial independence and of the law, the enforcement of judicial decisions, the constitutional review and the promotion of the public interest. It is in the Public Prosecution´s powers of initiative in the public interest that I would like to focus on.


2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Iswantoro Iswantoro ◽  
Rian Saputra ◽  
Anggo Doyoharjo ◽  
Resti Dian Luthviati

<table width="593" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"><tbody><tr><td valign="top" width="366"><p><em>This study aims to analyze the causes of the ineffective supervision carried out by the Prosecutor's Commission in an effort to improve the performance of the Public Prosecutors Office of the Republic of Indonesia. The facts show that there are many negative public reports and complaints regarding the performance of the AGO. These reports are examined first, before being given a recommendation to the Attorney General. As the external supervisor of the Public Prosecution Service, the Prosecutor's Commission has the task of supervising, monitoring and evaluating the behavior of prosecutors and public prosecutors. The existence of the Republican Prosecutor's Commission is experiencing weaknesses in carrying out its duties and authorities</em><em>.</em></p><p><strong><em>Keywords:</em></strong></p><p><em>Prosecutor's Commissioner; Effectiveness; Indonesia.</em></p></td></tr></tbody></table>


Author(s):  
N.L. Holvast ◽  
J.M.W. Lindeman

Abstract The autonomous position of legal professionals is no longer self-evident. Professionals are under increased pressure to reform. This phenomenon is not only true for legal professionals. A broader trend – which is recognised for the medical profession, academic profession and alike – is that paraprofessionals are gaining a more prominent position. In this paper, we focus on the developments in the Dutch public justice system. We conduct a case-study on the role of paraprofessionals in courts and in the public prosecution service – two understudied legal institutions in this regard. By drawing on empirical data unfolding the working routine of the judiciary and the prosecution service, we find two paradigms that define the thinking about professionalism: a traditional ‘pure professional’ paradigm and a new, more hybrid paradigm that includes (policy-based) managerial thinking. The latter appears to be enhanced by a New Public Management (NPM) approach within these institutions. Although we observe resistance among (para)professionals towards professional changes and ambiguity in the relationships between professionals and paraprofessionals, we also observe that managerialism has changed the work processes and the division of labour between professionals and paraprofessionals.


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 209-210 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacki Sleator

AbstractJacki Sleator outlines the origins of the Public Prosecution Service (PPS) and how the organisation made its transition from a small organisation to one of the biggest legal departments in N Ireland.


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