Winning the Third World

Author(s):  
Gregg A. Brazinsky

Winning the Third World examines afresh the intense and enduring rivalry between the United States and China during the Cold War. Gregg A. Brazinsky shows how both nations fought vigorously to establish their influence in newly independent African and Asian countries. By playing a leadership role in Asia and Africa, China hoped to regain its status in world affairs, but Americans feared that China's history as a nonwhite, anticolonial nation would make it an even more dangerous threat in the postcolonial world than the Soviet Union. Drawing on a broad array of new archival materials from China and the United States, Brazinsky demonstrates that disrupting China's efforts to elevate its stature became an important motive behind Washington's use of both hard and soft power in the "Global South."

1993 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Alden ◽  
Mark Simpson

Thepace of conflict-resolution in the Third World has been nothing short of astounding since 1990. A whole array of low-intensity wars have been terminated. Some, such as in Nicaragua and El Salvador, had occupied pride of place in the reinvigorated test of wills between Moscow and Washington during the 1980s. Others, as in Kampuchea, were fuelled by the parallel rivalry between Moscow and Beijing, which both fed off and had an impact on the key dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union. A few, such as the ‘bush war’ in Namibia and the fighting in the Western Sahara, never became serious testing-grounds for the superpowers.


1979 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-403 ◽  
Author(s):  
Trong R. Chai

An analysis of 344 selected votes in the four major issue areas in the UN General Assembly from 1971 to 1977 examines the question whether China has fulfilled its promise to support the Third World and oppose the superpowers. The findings are: 1) China was much more favorable to the Third World than to the West in this period and more supportive of the developing nations than of the Communist bloc on all except colonial issues; 2) China voted with the Third World more often than with the Communist nations, even when colonial issues were included; 3) China was least friendly to the United States on the majority of issues and in all years; and 4) the Soviet Union was the most anti-China nation in the Communist world, and of the four permanent members of the Security Council, Soviet voting agreement with China was the third lowest on political and security issues in the overall period and was often the lowest on arms control and disarmament. Thus at least within the context of UN voting, China has succeeded in developing its pro-Third World and anti-superpower position, particularly on economic and security issues.


1987 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 280-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane S. Jaquette ◽  
Abraham F. Lowenthal

NO country in Latin America, and few anywhere in the third world, was the subject of more social science writing during the late 1970s and early 1980s than Peru. Books, monographs, articles, and dissertations poured forth from Peru itself, from elsewhere in Latin America, and from the United States, Western Europe, and even the Soviet Union and Japan.


Worldview ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 4-6
Author(s):  
Nicholas O. Berry

It is a truth, if not universally acknowledged at least widely accepted, that the United States Government would like its Third World allies and client states to be stable, progressive, democratic, and domestically popular. While the U.S. feels it must protect these allies and clients from direct Soviet aggression, ideally they would manage their internal problems themselves.Unfortunately, the ideal is the exception in the Third World. Many of America's allies and clients face a disloyal opposition at home, and often one that seeks or attracts assistance from the Soviet Union or its surrogates. With few exceptions, these governments are neither democratic nor want to be: For every Costa Rica there is an El Salvador or a Guatemala; for every Singapore there is a South Korea or a Philippines.


2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 32-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Iandolo

The 1960–1961 Congo crisis was a defining moment for the Cold War in the Third World. This article combines declassified Soviet documents with published and archival sources from the United States, Great Britain, and Ghana to assess the role of the Soviet Union in the development of the Congo crisis. The Soviet government initially worked to establish economic relations with the newly formed independent government in Congo, but Soviet leaders had to shift their strategy when confronted by Western intervention in Congo and the prospect of a civil war. Despite Nikita Khrushchev's threats that Soviet troops would intervene in the conflict, the USSR did not have the military wherewithal to guarantee the survival of the Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba or other pro-Soviet elements. This outcome ended a brief phase of Soviet success in Africa and significantly altered Soviet policy in the Third World.


Author(s):  
Robert J. McMahon

‘The rise and fall of superpower détente, 1968–79’ describes how the French term détente served as a convenient shorthand for the more stable and cooperative relationship being forged by the Cold War’s primary protagonists during the 1970s. The United States and the Soviet Union worked to lessen the danger of nuclear war through the negotiation of verifiable arms control agreements and to formulate a core set of ‘rules’ to govern their relationship. Nevertheless, competition continued, especially in the Third World. Each side, moreover, harboured a fundamentally different understanding about the meaning of détente. By the end of the 1970s, those problems had grown so severe that they brought the era of détente to an abrupt close.


1991 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony G. Pazzanita

Of the dozens of conflicts in the Third World which have occurred in the post-war era, few have been of greater duration and bloodshed or have attracted the attention of as many outside actors, including the superpowers, as Angola. It has only been since the mid-1980s that the conflict began moving towards eventual settlement, with the prospects for peace often seeming to depend largely on the attitudes of Cuba, South Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Further affecting the overall environment was the state of East–West relations, the internal situation in Angola, and South Africa's occupation of Namibia. A short historical background will serve as prelude to an extensive examination of the dynamics which fuelled the war in Angola for such a long period of time.


1983 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 593-603
Author(s):  
Eboe Hutchful

This paper explores the nature of the relationship between the peace movement in the West and the Third World. Western countries lack, individually and collectively, the materials essential for the smooth functioning of their armament industries and require easy access to cheap supplies from well-endowed Third World countries. This appropriation is facilitated by their manipulation of the capitalist world economy which is dominated, after all, by the United States and, where possible, by their control over Third World countries, often with the collusion of their ruling elites. Liberation from this asymmetric relationship is imperative for the peoples of the Third World who are engaged in a desperate struggle for survival. However, Western countries do not tolerate such developments and, in fact, consider any nation that supports liberation struggles (especially the Soviet Union) as an enemy to be destroyed—if necessary, in a “winnable nuclear war.” Since the Soviet Union, China, and their allies support liberation movements as a matter of course, the Third World, instead of being peripheral, is actually central to the current climate of nuclear confrontation and superpower rivalry. And actually, the liberation struggles in the Third World are the corollary of the struggles of the peace movement in the West: that is, if the focus of the peace movement in the West were adjusted to stress liberty and justice as vital ingredients of peace. It is important to grasp this nexus, not only to preclude one party working against the other, but also to encourage their joining forces to work toward their goals more effectively. Clearly, this sort of cooperation will require the peace movement to enlarge its program of action. The paper concludes on this note by proposing some amendments to the current agenda of the peace movement.


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